Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 157 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense¹

top secret

Washington, June 30, 1953.

Subject:

• NSC 157, U.S. Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice.²

1. In response to the request contained in the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated June 26, 1953, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views on a report, prepared by the Department of State and reviewed by the National Security Council Planning Board, entitled “U.S. Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice” (NSC 157).

2. The report sets forth what it terms as two alternative feasible objectives to be pursued in the political conference on Korea following the signing of an armistice:

a. A Korea divided for an indefinite period on the present demarkation line with the Republic of Korea (ROK) tied into the United States security system and developed as a military ally; and

b. A unified, neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK.

The report concludes that it is in the interests of the United States, and recommends that it should be the United States objective, to secure a unified and neutralized Korea.

3. It appears that the concept of a neutralized Korea is predicated upon two assumptions: first, that the North Koreans would acquiesce in such an arrangement; and second, that the Communists would observe the provisions of an agreement or political settlement of this nature. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that both of these assumptions are unrealistic. The Communist element in North Korea have an intense hatred for President Rhee and his Government. Further, an assumption that the Communists would abide by the spirit as well as the letter of such an agreement is open to serious question.

a. Neither an armistice agreement nor a political settlement based on a unified, neutralized Korea should be viewed as an indication that the Communists have changed or abandoned their objective of bringing the Korean Peninsula under their domination. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Communists will seek to fill the vacuum created by a neutralized Korea. Communist agreement to a neutralized Korea would provide them with an ideal situation in which to infiltrate and gain control, much as they did in Czechoslovakia. In effect, the Communists would have agreed to a temporary concession in exchange for the prospect of an ultimate gain;

b. Moreover, United States and United Nations prestige would suffer materially if U.S.-U.N. forces were withdrawn from Korea, with Chinese Communist forces merely withdrawn beyond the Yalu River, to achieve no more than the establishment of a “neutralized” Korea. A withdrawal of this nature would be regarded as a concession to the Communists and would be viewed throughout the world, particularly in Korea and elsewhere in the Far East, as evidence that the United States is unwilling to continue to oppose Communist aggression with military force. Under such circumstances, the Communists would realize a decided strategic advantage through the withdrawal of U.S.-U.N. forces from a relatively unarmed Korea in exchange for a scarcely comparable withdrawal on their part, compensated for by the retention of the threat consisting of strong Communist forces deployed in close proximity to the Korean-Manchurian border.

4. A neutralized Korea would appear on the surface to permit a reduction of United States military commitments through the withdrawal of United States forces from Korea. Actually, United States military commitments would be materially increased by virtue of the proposed provision that the United States guarantee not only the territorial but also the political integrity of a unified Korea under circumstances which render Korea so susceptible to Communist infiltration and subversion. Moreover, this extension of United States commitments would be entered into under conditions wherein Korean armed forces might be so limited, both numerically and in their composition, that they would be of no appreciable or immediate assistance in the event of United States military operations in the area. With respect to such possible operations, the possession of bases in Korea would, from a military point of view, offer no particular advantage to the United States vis-à-vis Communist China, other than the value of those bases as they would contribute to the peripheral defense of the Japanese islands. On the other hand, the passing of these bases to Communist control would pose a threat to the security of the Japanese islands. In the absence of greatly augmented United States air and naval forces in the Far East, the position of the United States in Japan could become serious if the Chinese Communists were to be in a position to exploit their air offensive capabilities from bases in Korea.

5. As long as the Communists adhere to their determination to dominate the Far East, continued United States support of ROK forces is believed essential to United States security interests. Moreover, the ability of the ROK to contribute to or provide for its own defense under the terms of any political settlement, both in the immediate future and in the long-term, must be carefully considered so that the ROK will not become a prey to renewed aggression from without or subversion from within. The United States should not have as its stated and primary objective the neutralization of Korea, an objective which if implemented would almost surely lead to a fatal impairment of the ability of the ROK Government to provide for its own defense or would deny the ROK that capability entirely. Although the principal deterrent to renewed aggression against Korea lies in the prospect of retaliation by United States forces, the existence of relatively strong Korean armed forces in the area adds considerably to this deterrent.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the establishment of a unified but neutralized Korea would be to the strategic disadvantage of the United States. Moreover, the precedent which it would set would constitute a serious hazard if applied, for example, to Germany. It might eventually involve cumulative injury to United States security interests if the application of such a precedent were extended to Australia, or even to Indochina.

7. In addition to the considerations set forth above which indicate the undesirability from a military point of view of a “neutralized” Korea, recent developments in relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea Government with regard to an armistice would appear to be inconsistent with the proposal for a neutralized Korea.

8. In the light of the foregoing considerations and from the military point of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic United States objective with respect to Korea be the attainment of a unified, independent, and non-Communist Korea. Until this objective is realized, the United States should maintain a strong military posture in the Far East, thus enabling timely and effective support to the Republic of Korea. This posture should include the retention and support of adequate Republic of Korea armed forces. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest, as a means of making progress in the attainment of the above objective, that overt and covert programs be developed, which in conjunction with the maintenance of military security in the Republic of Korea, would serve to

a. Establish the Republic of Korea as an example, economically and politically, of the advantages of association with the free world, and

b. Create dissatisfaction and unrest in North Korea, toward the end that the North Korean people will be encouraged to take part in the attainment of a unified, independent, and non-Communist Korea.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

W. M. Fechteler
Chief of Naval Operations

1. This memorandum was submitted to the NSC at the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under a covering memorandum by Gleason on June 30, 1953.
2. Dated June 25, p. 1272.