Office of the Historian

795B.00/7–153: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State1

top secret
niact
Seoul, July 1, 1953—noon.

1. Eyes only for the Secretary from Robertson. Please pass full text to Secretary as written. The following personal opinions and observations are submitted for what they are worth:

1.
Rhee in addition to being a shrewd, resourceful trader is also a highly emotional, irrational, illogical fanatic fully capable of attempting to lead his country into national suicide.
2.
He believes with deep conviction that the present armistice pact is a skillful Communist device to win by negotiation what they have failed to achieve by military action.
3.
He is not likely to be influenced by public opinion alone. He has already been subjected to continuous US and Allied arguments as well as invectives and he is keenly aware that he has lost the support of public opinion in the US as well as the rest of the world.
4.
Our only hope of obtaining his cooperation is to convince him that working with us is the best way of achieving the objective to which he has dedicated his life.
5.
His cooperation is still possible but he must be led, as well as pushed.
6.
Rhee has aroused his country to a determination and will to fight Communism, probably unmatched by any other country in the world including ourselves. Such spirit and fortitude should be preserved, not destroyed. In addition, his army equipped by us, is largest and most effective anti-Communist army in Asia and we badly need it on our side.

I am expecting a final position paper from Rhee this morning of which you will be advised later.2 In the meantime, I suggest that you have a joint message sent to Rhee signed by Senators Knowland, Smith, Congressman Judd, General Van Fleet and any others known to Rhee as his friends as opposed to critics.3 Message obviously should [Page 1292] contain statement that signatories have carefully considered latest proposals submitted by President and strongly advocate Rhee’s acceptance and his support of the Armistice as being in the best long range interests of Korea. Such a statement, in my opinion, would be infinitely more effective than further castigations from whatever source.

[Robertson]
  1. A marginal notation on the source text by O’Connor indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram on July 1.↩
  2. See the letter from Rhee to Robertson, July 1, p. 1292.↩
  3. In telegram 2 to Seoul, drafted by Dulles, the Secretary of State informed Robertson that the persons mentioned in this paragraph were sending Rhee a communication which Dulles hoped would be generally helpful. The Secretary also added that there was in Washington agreement with Robertson’s diagnosis of Rhee and widespread respect and support of the job which the Assistant Secretary was doing in Korea. (795.00/7–153)↩