FE files, lot 55 D 338, “Korean Political Conference, June 1953”: Telegram
The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Kyes) to the Commander in Chief United Nations Command (Clark)
top secret
Washington, June 29, 1953—10:40
p.m.
DEF 942613. Exclusive for Gen Clark, pass exclusive for Robertson. From OSD sgd Kyes. This is a Joint State–Defense msg.
- 1.
- During high level meeting held today there was general discussion of Rhee’s attitude toward armis as reported in recent msgs from you and Robertson up to and including ur DTG 290645Z.1
- 2.
- It was recognized that Commies remain real enemy and this fact must not be lost sight of in planning our own strategy.
- 3.
- There is no intent to modify ur existing discretion re conclusion of armis and handling ROK sit as contained in JCS 942368.2
- 4.
- Security ur forces continues to be overriding consideration.
- 5.
- There is no intention of withdrawing from Korea.
- 6.
- However, in thought that some of ideas expressed at mtg might
prove useful or at least provide atmosphere our own thinking there
is given below for ur consideration and comment ideas put fwd by one
or more of those present.
- a.
- It is probable that Rhee will continue to bluff and to temporize so long as he thinks there is chance of wringing from us any add concessions of forcing change in our pos.
- b.
- Most promising line of action now open seems to be to cause Rhee and his advisers to believe that we will withdraw from Korea in event he sabotages armis. If no change results in Rhee’s attitude, it would be our hope that influential ROK polit and mil elements would themselves take steps to bring about sit in ROK Gov which will assure ROK cooperation with armis.
- c.
- Within broad latitude already given you there may be possibility of quietly and adroitly creating impression among Rhee and ROK leaders that UNC is preparing to withdraw if ROK attitudes remain unchanged. Such measures shld speak for themselves rather than require making of overt statements to Rhee and ROK leaders. However, this shld not preclude using indirect and covert channels to give Rhee and ROK leaders impression we are preparing for withdrawal.
- d.
- Although impossible from here to assess extent to which tactical sit would permit you to implement them, such measures might include quietly beginning to effect concentration of United States and other UN forces, strengthening of base defenses, consolidation of some depots and increasing their security, movement of any excess supplies from Korea to Japan, and even halting introduction into Korea of United States replacements. It was fully recognized that any or all such moves would be entirely subj to ur own estimate of local sit and overriding consideration of security of ur forces. However, thought was that if you found such moves practicable they might be successful in bringing about [Page 1288] ROK acceptance armis, and, if not successful, would place UNC in better pos meet any future contingency.
- 7.
- If and when you take action on any moves such as those outlined above, it will be important that you keep Wash fully informed so that support may be given from here in such matters as dealing with press and forn gov reptvs.
- 8.
- Would also appreciate ur est on capability and probability of ROK Army taking action to prevent Rhee from sabotaging armis.