795.00/6–2953: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Department of State
DTG 290645Z. (Army message) From Robertson and Clark (at Army Eight) to DeptAr for JCS and State info CINCUNC Tokyo exclusive for Clark and Murphy (passed AmEmb Seoul exclusive for Robertson and Briggs). This is joint message from Robertson and Clark.
We met with Rhee, Prime Minister Paek, and Foreign Minister Pyun at 0930 June 29. Robertson reviewed Korean aide-mémoire of 28 June1 point by point explaining carefully that it did not as expected, represent “an agreement reached” between Rhee and Robertson. Robertson then handed Rhee the original of the Korean aide-mémoire with the remark [Page 1286] that as it contained so many inaccuracies and so much of it is irrelevant, it could not provide a basis for discussion and therefore was returned as unacceptable.
Rhee went over much familiar ground discoursing on his favorite theme of the world struggle against communism; his desire to continue the struggle in Korea by force of arms (we will throw our men and women too into the battle with or without weapons—we will commit suicide, et cetera; his lack of faith in the efficacy of a political conference to unify Korea or protect it against Communist penetration. Et cetera.)
After careful and explicit review by Robertson of President’s and Secretary Dulles’ offers of support and assistance, explanation of US ideas regarding development of political conference, Rhee said he would revise aide-mémoire in effort to bring it into line with our ideas. Robertson stated that his aide-mémoire2 accurately outlined the points on which Rhee has requested clarification and urged that it be taken as basis for further elaboration. Rhee said there were a number of other points not referred to in our aide-mémoire which he now felt it necessary to outline.
Clark then informed Rhee that UNC is proceeding with armistice negotiations and that it is now necessary to reply to Communists letter. He expressed hope that we could count on ROK for its cooperation and support. Rhee said that he wanted to work with us but he felt a number of points should be clarified before he could give such assurance. He said he would make every effort to give us immediately a revised and more satisfactory version of his last aide-mémoire and Robertson agreed to wait for it.
We appreciate that this conversation is unsatisfactory and as disappointing as the contents of their aide-mémoire are misleading and irrelevant. Our interlocutors registered some shock, which we believe healthful, over our rejection of their aide-mémoire and the vigorous explanation given them by Robertson. This plus the effect of Clark’s statement regarding intention to proceed with Panmunjom negotiations we believe may exercise a sobering and helpful effect on Rhee, who now seems fully conscious of the trend of affairs.
Robertson hopes later today to report further concerning whatever version of ROK memorandum may be received.