Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Seoul Embassy files, lot 61 F 98

Memorandum of Discussion of a Meeting Held at Tokyo on the Korean Situation¹

top secret

Tokyo, June 24-25, 1953

Present:

• General Clark
• General Collins
• Assistant Secretary Robertson
• Assistant Secretary McCardle
• Ambassador Briggs
• Ambassador Murphy
• General Milburn
• Colonel Throckmorton
• Colonel Conine
• Mr. Kenneth Young
• Mr. John A. Calhoun

Date: June 24, 25, 1953

The conferees met in General Clark’s headquarters Wednesday afternoon, June 24 and again on Thursday, June 25. Mr. Robertson summarized the points that he had emphasized in his meetings with President Rhee and showed General Clark a copy of Secretary Dulles’ letter to President Rhee² which General Clark read to the meeting. General Clark also read and the conferees discussed at length Rhee’s draft Aide-Mémoire.³ At the end of the second meeting the conferees drafted a radio to State, Defense and JCS summarizing the conclusions of the conferees.⁴ The following is a summary of the principal subjects discussed:

1. Military Situation. General Clark began the conference with a report on the casualties which the UN forces had sustained during the past two weeks. He also described the Communist capability for renewed military pressure.

2. Mr. Robertson’s Discussions with Rhee. Mr. Robertson informed General Clark of the views of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles regarding President Rhee, his opposition to an armistice and the desirability of eliminating any possible misunderstandings and making clear our desire to work closely with the ROK following an armistice. The essential point is President Rhee cannot dictate the global policy of the United States or the basic decisions of the UN. Mr. Robertson outlined his view that an armistice puts Rhee and the ROK in a much stronger position than it had in 1950 because now it can benefit from a treaty with the United States, increased economic aid, the greater sanctions statement,⁵ and a political conference in which the United States is pledged to the ROK in full support. Mr. Robertson stated that the Secretary wants him to stress to President Rhee that he should realize the United States does not conceive of itself as just another member along with several other UN members in a political conference. Rather the US will work closely with the ROK to develop a joint strategy for a political conference. The Secretary believes there is a good chance to get a unified Korea if we work closely with the ROK. Mr. Robertson also pointed out to General Clark that he had come to supplement all the efforts that General Clark and Ambassador Briggs had been making during the past few weeks with President Rhee.

3. Korean Draft Aide-Mémoire. Both meetings went over the draft Aide-Mémoire in considerable detail. General Clark read it in full. On the four conditions listed in the draft Aide-Mémoire the conferees agreed as follows:

(a). The first one would be completely impractical. The United States Government could not commit itself to undertake to get an agreement with the Communists on a time limit for the conference. The US Government could only again tell the ROK that it would try to proceed promptly and vigorously in a political conference to obtain the objectives which both the US and the ROK want.

(b). The second condition on military aid would be no problem, in Mr. Robertson’s opinion. If the situation develops satisfactorily he could talk in general terms about a mutual defense treaty. Mr. Robertson said that he had brought along a draft which he might discuss with the Korean officials. General Clark said he had seen this draft.

(c). The provision of economic and military aid would also not present any problems. Mr. Robertson pointed out that Tasca’s recommendations⁶ were under urgent consideration in Washington.

(d). The conferees discussed the question of prisoners at some length.

4. The Problem of Remaining Non-Repatriates. General Clark pointed out that Rhee is extremely firm on opposing the entry into the Republic of Korea of any indoctrinators or Communist members of the N.N.R.C. He also reported that unless conditions were changed in some way the remaining 8600 Korean non-repatriates would sooner or later, and probably sooner, break out of their camps. General Clark described at some length his strong views against using force to prevent such break-outs which, he said, had received immediate and complete support of Washington. Accordingly, General Clark was extremely concerned to find some way of getting around Rhee’s opposition and the probability of break-outs. He told the conferees that he had discussed this matter frankly with President Rhee and had asked him for time to work the problem out. Rhee gave him his word of honor that Korean security units still under the UN Command would cooperate on Cheju-do Island in so far as the Chinese prisoners were concerned. The only way to avoid the break-out of the remaining 8600 Korean prisoners is to obtain Rhee’s cooperation on some compromise. General Clark said that he had proposed to Rhee, as he had informed Washington, that the 8600 Koreans be moved to the demilitarized zone and processed there by the N.N.R.C. and that the Chinese non-repatriates be sent to a neutral country. A variation of this would be to get Rhee’s agreement to retain the Chinese on Cheju-do and let the N.N.R.C. process them there. General Clark has not proposed this yet to Rhee but he thought that Rhee might agree to it. General Clark also mentioned the last possible course of action of moving all of the non-repatriates to the demilitarized zone. He stated that he had the logistical capability of doing that though it might be difficult. Mr. Robertson and General Collins pointed out that moving the Chinese to a neutral country or to the D.Z. would face considerable opposition in the Congress and in the United States.

General Clark believed that the Communists would accept these arrangements and would accept such textual modifications in the prisoner agreement as might be necessary. He did not feel that these changes in the agreement would be material. He feels that the Communists definitely want an armistice. Ambassador Murphy strongly concurred in General Clark’s opinion regarding the Communist attitude.

5. Prompt Signing of Armistice and Reply to Communist Letter of June 19.⁷ General Clark and Ambassador Murphy both strongly recommended that a reply be sent promptly to the Communists in response to their four questions of June 19. General Clark read a draft reply which his staff had done up.⁸ He said it was going to be sent to Washington on June 25 or 26. The general sense of the draft reply was to the effect that the ROK is a sovereign state, and the UNC has control over ROK forces now; the ROK Government had violated this control by orders unknown to CINCUNC; the armistice is between the two military commands which involves the ROK on the UN side but does not require ROK signature; the cooperation of ROK civil authorities will be needed to implement the armistice and the command will attempt to obtain such cooperation; the Command will institute necessary military safeguards for the personnel of the N.N.R.C.; the escape of the prisoners was regrettable and resulted from the collusion between ROK security guards and the ROK civil authorities; and the UNC will continue to seek the escapees. It was agreed that whatever the final nature of a reply to the Communist letter, reply should await developments of Mr. Robertson’s mission.

It would be desirable to get the armistice signed as soon as possible, the conferees agreed, particularly with a view to bringing Rhee’s opposition to a head and to take the necessary measures during the next few days regarding this opposition. General Clark and Ambassador Murphy stressed the urgent desirability of getting an armistice in order to terminate the high casualties of recent weeks. On the assumption that the armistice is signed and Rhee withdraws his forces for continued action, General Clark pointed out that he would undertake redeployment of UN forces so that ROK forces alone would hold the eastern part of the line and UN forces a shorter line on the west. General Clark outlined the various military possibilities that might theoretically occur if the Communists moved against the ROK part of the line.

There was some feeling that if an armistice could not be obtained as a result of the ROK opposition thereto, the UN should work out an alternate arrangement with the Communists. Some of the difficulties involved in this course were discussed. There was some discussion of the difficulties which ROK intransigence would present if we went ahead and signed an armistice.

6. Possible Courses of Action. There was considerable discussion of three possible courses of action:

(a). Defer the armistice and continue the hostilities along with the ROK,

(b). Conclude an armistice despite ROK opposition,

(c). Some other arrangement permitting our ultimate withdrawal from Korea.

The first course of action is considered unacceptable particularly in terms of American public reaction. The second course of action seemed impractical because the Communists would probably insist on assurances of ROK cooperation in implementation of the armistice which we would not be able to provide. While the Communists might nevertheless conclude an armistice under such conditions ROK capabilities for frustrating or preventing the execution of the armistice make it highly doubtful that we should go through with this course of action. The foregoing points were all brought out by various participants but no consensus of views was reached.

The third possibility General Clark explained his “think piece” about a meeting with the top Communist leaders. Some strong doubt about the advisability of such an approach was expressed around the table. By way of an alternate General Collins expressed the opinion that we should not sign the armistice if Rhee will not cooperate in its implementation. In that event we should make an arrangement with the Communists in lieu of an armistice under which the Communists would permit our withdrawal and return our prisoners in their hands.

All the conferees agreed that the time had come to tell Rhee the blunt truth that the United States will have no other alternative but to get out if he pursues his present policy. This conclusion led to long discussion of how it should be done and what the military and political effects would be. Ambassador Murphy pointed out that it would require the consultation with the 15 other governments with forces in Korea. The reaction of the ROK military leaders was canvassed but no firm or final evaluation came out of the matter as to the possibility that they might take matters into their own hands if Rhee remained adamant and if the ROK leaders were convinced that the US meant business about withdrawal. On the question of positive measures by us against Rhee it was the feeling of the conferees that that would be impractical because that would be extremely difficult to carry out and would consume a lot of time in preparation.

7. Decision Needed. All of the conferees unanimously agreed that a decision was needed in Washington within the next three or four days regarding the question of withdrawal and authorization to put this matter bluntly to Rhee and the ROK military leaders, during the course of Mr. Robertson’s and General Collins’ visit to Korea.

1. The source text did not indicate a drafter. Clark described this meeting in his From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 285.
2. Dated June 22, p. 1238.
3. For text, see telegram CX 63282, Clark to JCS, June 23, p. 1240.
4. Sent as telegram CX 63325, infra.
5. For text of the statement, see the Annex to NSC 154, p. 1173.
6. For an excerpt of the Tasca report, see enclosure 2, p. 1247.
7. Text of the letter is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, pp. 906907. The questions contained in the letter were summarized in telegram CX 63228, Clark to JCS, June 20, p. 1224.
8. In joint State–Defense message, JCS 942083, June 23, Clark was instructed not to answer the questions posed by the Communists. This telegram is not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 1225.