795.00/6–2553: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Department of State
operational priority
CX 63325. (Army Message) To Department Army Washington, information American Embassy Pusan (exclusive for Ambassador Briggs). This is a joint Robertson–Collins message for State, Defense and JCS.
The following conclusions reached at a conference 24 June, attended by General Clark, Ambassador Murphy, Ambassador Briggs, Mr. Robertson and General Collins:1
- 1.
- All here are convinced that signing an armistice as soon as possible is most desirable.
- 2.
- A reply should be made to the Communists’ letter of 202 June as soon as possible after Robertson has completed his talks with Rhee.
- 3.
- Clark and Murphy believe that there is a chance of the Communists accepting an armistice even though we cannot specifically guarantee that Rhee will live up to all of its provisions, provided we assure Communists we will do everything practicable to insure compliance.
- 4.
- Clark and Murphy believe that Communists will agree, without material change in text of present agreement to an armistice under conditions proposed by CINCUNC in his DTG 221100Z,3 as modified by his DTG 230020Z,4 re removal of POW’s to demilitarized zone, thus obviating necessity for presence of Indian troops and NNRC personnel in South Korea. Provided agreement with Rhee can be reached on other conditions, he might finally agree to allow Chinese anti-Communists to remain on Cheju-Do and Indian troops and NNRC to take over their control there.
- 5.
- Clark is convinced that remaining Korean POW’s (approximately 8,600) not desiring to return to North Korea will eventually escape unless agreement can be made with Rhee for their eventual removal to demilitarized zone; however, Clark feels even their escape would not bar the acceptance by Communists of an armistice. (See CINCUNC messages DTG 250610Z5 and DTG 221100Z).
- 6.
- All conferees agree that final decisions on UN plan in event of Rhee intransigence should be reached within a few days.
- 7.
- All agree that if Rhee remains intransigent, Robertson should be authorized to inform Rhee that UN will get out of Korea. In this event we should be prepared to make an agreement with the Communists, independent [Page 1271] of Republic of Korea for withdrawal of UN forces. Provision would also have to be made for release by Communists of our POW’s remaining in their hands.
- 8.
- Feeling here is that if Rhee is convinced that we mean to withdraw he might change his attitude.
General Clark feels that the only conditions under which there might be a possibility that the Republic of Korea Army would take action to replace present Republic of Korea Government would be after Rhee had been informed categorically that we intend to withdraw from Korea unless he agrees to armistice and the Republic of Korea Army is convinced that we mean business.