Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone Conversations
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the President1
The President called with reference to the cable to Clark,2 which Wilson and Fechteler brought to him, and which he understands was prepared in State. The President thinks that Clark is in a better position than we are here to figure out what will influence Rhee, we sent Robertson and Collins out, and they are capable men. This message says “If ROK government remains completely intransigent you would not actually sign an armistice”—how are we going to find out what he will do. The President said he is frightened by the message as it stands. The Secretary said he understood that it was a joint message worked out by Defense and State.
The Secretary said he thought it was important that Clark understand that he should begin to do something about the “new arrangements” and if he does so it might make Rhee stop and think. The President repeated that we were too far away to be sending long directives, let’s support Robertson and Clark since we have them out there. He thought we could send out a short message telling Clark to begin thinking in practical matters and prepare for it, and we think it wise to let Rhee know that we are preparing. He said Defense was frightened at this message and brought it to him. They can all meet at 8:30 Thursday morning and go over it, but just send a short one out tonight.3
The Secretary said we should also discuss the further point as to whether we should attempt to sign an armistice without Korea. The President said we won’t know until that time, the Secretary said we know now we cannot carry it out—we don’t have the POW’s. After consultation with Defense the President said that militarily we would be in a better position if we sign the armistice and then get out than if we don’t and have to get out anyway. The Secretary said that such an [Page 1265] armistice would not last 24 hours. The President thought it might help preserve the integrity of our own troops. The Secretary said that if we made any deals at the expense of South Korea, we would have a terrific public reaction in this country. The President said we must recognize that the Communists are still “the enemy”. Defense then raised the question of whether any message need go out tonight in view of the morning meeting, but the Secretary said he didn’t think any action would come about until Clark begins to talk about what we are going to do, which will develop a feeling of chagrin in Korea.
The President said he would talk to Defense some more and have them call the Secretary when they had something. The Secretary said that would not be necessary if the President talked to them.
- Although there was no indication on the source text, this memorandum was probably drafted by Burnita O’Day, Dulles’ personal secretary.↩
- The reference was to a draft of what was finally transmitted as telegram JCS 942368 to Clark, June 25, p. 1271.↩
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At 6:55 p.m., June 24, the JCS sent Clark the following message in telegram JCS 942260: “Ref President’s letter to Rhee of 18 June. Please advise of any action initiated or contemplated in the direction of ‘another arrangement’.” (FE files, lot 55 D 338, “Korean Political Conference, June 1953”)
General Collins replied to JCS 942260 from Tokyo on June 25 (telegram C 63320 to the JCS):
↩“I have discussed with Clark possible plans in event ‘another arrangement’ must be made in lieu of armistice. Clark informs me he instructed Taylor some time ago to develop such plans. I discussed this morning with Clark and key members his staff necessity of prompt completion of such plans. With Clark’s concurrence, I will follow up with Taylor this evening at Taegu. I will be prepared on my return Washington to outline specific details of plans which will be developed under two or three sets of assumptions.” (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45))