Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

FE files, lot 55 D 338, “Korean Political Conference, June 1953”

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Department of the Army

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, June 21, 1953—5:16 p.m.

C 63250. Exclusive for the Acting Chairman JCS [Fechteler]. Ref CX 63228.¹

1. In the event that ROK action in releasing North Korean POWs and Rhee’s public statements in connection therewith prove to be a definite and prolonged stumbling block in the armistice negotiations, I propose for your consideration the folg:

a. Depending on the nature of your reply to ref, I will include in my reply to Marshal Kim Il Sung and Gen Peng Teh-huai’s ltr the offer that I meet with them in an exec session at Panmunjom with only Harrison, Nam-Il and interpreters present.

b. The purpose of this meeting would be a frank discussion by the comds concerned of the armistice sit and to determine, if possible, whether the Communists intend to go ahead with an armistice under present conditions of our inability to control the actions of Rhee and the ROK Government.

c. Full explanation would be given to the Communists as to the reasons for the Korean POW escapes, which no doubt would lead to a frank discussion of other methods by which Rhee could subsequently violate the terms of the negotiations to which both sides have agreed.

d. I would outline to the Communists the courses of action open to the UNC in the event of ROK action to sabotage the armistice agreement, namely, our ability to control any offensive action on their part by withholding tactical and logistical support.

e. If I get the impression they are interested in going ahead with the armistice under the conditions which I will have fully explained to them, and after assuring the Communists of our earnest determination to implement its provisions to the best of our ability, I will propose that we come to agreement and sign at an early date, with the provision that supervisory pers would be in place by an agreed date.

2. I will refrain during this discussion with the Communists Comds from making any implied threats, for to do so would nullify the purpose of the meeting which is to determine, if possible, their intentions to go through with an armistice agreement. If a subsequent meeting develops, and it becomes apparent that the Communists are going to cont indefinitely to use the POW break for propaganda and psych purposes, I recommend I be authorized to make a statement that, in the event they cannot see their way clear to conclude an armistice under the present conditions, the UNC has no alternative but to discontinue further discussions, and to resume hostilities without being able to guarantee that in the future the hostilities could be confined to the Korean Peninsula.

3. I fully realize the advantages and disadvantages of the course of action indicated above, but the overriding principle involved in the sit in which we find ourselves is that we are being blackmailed by Rhee into continuation of a war which the United States Government apparently does not intend to prolong. If an armistice could be signed under present conditions with the understanding by both parties that Rhee has the capability of violating some of its provisions, we would confront Rhee with a fait accompli, and proceed as best we can thereafter.

4. For this plan to be eff, if it is adopted,² it is essential that it be closely held. It is rqstd that every possible precaution be taken to prevent speculation on the subject or inadvertent disclosure of the fact that such project is under consideration.

1. Dated June 20, p. 1224.

2. In a joint State–Defense telegram, DA 942048, June 22, 1953, Collins to Clark, CINCUNC was advised as follows:

   “Feeling here is that your meeting personally with Communist commanders is undesirable, particularly at this time. We consider substance of approach outlined to be overtaken by your message DTG 221100Z from Army Eight.” (FE files, lot 55 D 338) See infra.