795.00/6–2153: Telegram
The Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) to the Department of State
priority
3973. No distribution. From Murphy. In my daily discussions with General Clark on the subject of Rhee’s attitude towards armistice agreement and his defiance of UNC authority in unilaterally ordering ROKA personnel to organize escape North Korean PW’s, there is evident a point of view which I am not certain you may fully understand.
It is Clark’s stated opinion that the balance of approximately 9,000 North Korean PW’s will escape. He believes Koreans are determined to achieve this result. Clark is equally determined, he says, to avoid clashes between US and ROKA personnel which would result in substantial loss of life. He tells me that if further outbreaks occur US troops will not use firepower against PW’s or against ROKA personnel. Defense informed of his plan and approves. As soon as it becomes evident to Rhee that firepower is not to be employed it is no doubt true, as Clark believes, that balance of PW’s will escape.
Reason for Clark’s attitude is practical rather than political. He says simply that US does not possess adequate strength in Korea to risk large scale opposition of ROK’s behind the lines and danger to security our forces which would accompany active disaffection and hostility of ROK’s, an inevitable concomitant to loss of life if firepower were used against ROKA and PW’s.
It has been my opinion stated to Clark that if Rhee and his associates had been convinced ab initio of our firm intention to use firepower to maintain UNC authority, they would not have undertaken to go as far as they did. As long as they realize they can disregard UNC authority with impunity they will be tempted to flaunt it further in their opposition to an armistice agreement. In saying this, I realize it is comparatively easy for the layman to suggest a stronger line in the absence of intimate knowledge of the detailed military situation.
General Clark’s opinion, in which I am told General Taylor concurs, is based on military considerations of a practical nature relating to relative [Page 1229] strengths of forces involved and situation where limited United States and United Nations forces are dependent on ROK Government which has overwhelming ground force strength in the area.
That being the position, I have pointed out to Clark what seem to me consequences which may flow from current evolution of situation.
- (1)
- Deterioration of United Nations Command authority and increasing domination by Rhee of situation.
- (2)
- Unfavorable impact on allied governments and world opinion if knowledge that, contrary to general assumption that UNC is in command, actually Rhee is in command in Korea.
- (3)
- Effect on morale of United Nations forces of knowledge that armistice agreement about to be signed is being deliberately sabotaged by Rhee and a few associates. Similar effect on world opinion.
- (4)
- Announcement has been made that United States troops alone without mixture other United Nations forces are now responsible for security remaining North Korean PW’s. If latter now permitted to escape because United States troops cannot employ firepower, further deterioration United States authority and prestige inevitable.
- (5)
- Communists, of course, will be convinced of cynical collusion our part believing, as they seem to, that ROK is puppet government and Rhee United States creature.
- (6)
- In all of this United Nations major objective of conclusion armistice agreement, text now completed, is of course jeopardized, and United Nations might be obliged to withdraw from Korea without an armistice.
After discussion ways and means of extricating ourselves from this inevitable situation, Clark plans to propose to JCS that he offer to meet personally in executive session with Kim Il-Sung and Peng Teh-huai for frank exposition United Nations position outline of which Clark is sending JCS. This would be in reply to Communist letter delivered to Harrison yesterday1 and, of course, subject to requested governmental guidance as to reply. I concur this idea which seems certainly worth exploring but I believe if the meeting does occur it should be limited to expose of situation relating to ROK attitude, and presentation of United Nations determination to conclude armistice agreement but devoid of anything in nature of threat of type of military action which might follow failure to sign. Clark had thought of some, perhaps mild, reference to greater sanctions agreement. I feel that would not only be inconsistent with purpose of meeting but doubt United Nations governments would approve.
- For a text of that letter, see Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, pp. 906–907.↩