Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Matthews files, Lot 53 D 413

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
operational immediate

Seoul, June 22, 1953—8 p.m.

DTG 221100Z. Refs: A. G 5812 KCG.² B. GX 6228 KCG.³

1. I have just finished an hour and ten minute conversation alone with President Rhee. I found him extremely nervous. He explained that he had not slept most of the night and he seemed under considerable strain and tension. Taylor, who has seen him recently, has the same impression that I do—that perhaps the impact of world reaction to his unilateral actions is having an effect upon him. We may be wrong. He was extremely friendly and asked me to tell President Eisenhower that he is still trying to work together with him.

2. I stated that he must accept two premises as basic to the discussion at hand. First, that it was the firm determination of my government to secure an armistice under honorable terms. Second, that he must accept the fact that my government was not prepared to eject the Chinese Communist troops from Korea by force nor attempt to inject this issue into the terms of the armistice itself; we looked to the political conference to solve this issue.

3. I told him I was particularly concerned with the possibility of clashes between US and ROK troops at Korean non-repatriate POW camps. I indicated to him it was my overriding concern that there never be physical violence between ROK troops and the UN troops. He expressed the same concern and agreed that he would exert every influence to avoid such incidents. I am sure he will take no action, at least for the present, to demand the release of the remaining Korean non-repatriate POWs by force. How long this will last depends upon future developments.

4. He also promised that his troops on the island camps would cooperate in maintaining the security of camps holding both pro-Communist Korean and all Chinese POWs.

5. I next told him of the necessity of our finding some common ground upon which to reach agreement for cooperation under the armistice terms. I then brought up the 4 points which Rhee had raised before, reported to you in refs A and B.

a. With reference to the first point, I told him that any time limit that might be set for a political conference would be dependent upon mutual agreement between the parties to that conference, but that naturally I considered there should be some time limit specified. He gave no indication as to the time limitation he had in mind, as he has in the past. He indicated that, at the end of whatever time limit was finally set, the armistice should come to an end and the US could decide at that time either to cooperate further with the ROKs in whatever action seemed appropriate or to withdraw US forces from Korea.

b. With reference to the second point—the mutual security treaty—he indicated intense interest in reaching agreement on this subject, saying that it would not have to be lengthy document, but merely provide the usual terms by which the US would come to ROK aid. I pointed out clearly that my government could never agree, in such a treaty, to come to this assistance if ROK were the aggressor. He replied he would not expect US to do so, but would expect US to condemn him.

c. With reference to the third point—the buildup of the ROK forces—I told him he should have had ample reassurances on that subject. He indicated he should be assured that the buildup would include the ROK Navy and Air Force, as well as the Army.

d. The last subject, which he had mentioned twice in refs A and B, had to do with ROK inability to tolerate the presence of pro-Communist Indian troops and Communist representatives of the NNRC in his backyard. I then told him that I would, in complete sincerity, give him my views on this subject and, although I was speaking without the authority of my government, I had in mind a possible solution which might relieve him to some extent. I again stressed at this point in the discussion that he might as well accept the fact that my government was not prepared to eject Chinese Communist troops from Korea by force and also accept the fact that we look to the political conferences to solve this issue. I indicated again the firm determination of my government to secure a suitable armistice. I told him, however, that there might be some slight modifications to the present POW agreement that could be worked out. I suggested the following, again reiterating that it was merely a suggestion, not to be discussed with anyone, and I had no idea whether my government or the Commies would accept it. My ideas follow:

(1) That the 8600 Korean non-repatriate POWs must remain under UN custody, that I could not submit to ROK demands for their release.

(2) I asked his cooperation, with the understanding that, while these POWs are in UN custody, his representatives would have full opportunity to explain to the POWs the manner in which the terms of reference applied to non-repatriates; they could urge the POWs to understand that it was their own individual determination which would decide whether they return to Communist control or not; that with a little patience and a few more months the ROK could guarantee that they would be released in South Korea.

(3) I would be willing, if he accepted this condition, to attempt with his cooperation and after an armistice, to move these 8600 remaining prisoners to the demilitarized zone where they would be taken over by the NNRC; while they were in the hands of the NNRC and subjected to the efforts of the Communists to persuade them to return to Communist control, ROK members of the UNC would be present as our representatives and could sit in and act as observers to make sure no force or intimidation were used.

(4) I would recommend to my government that we be authorized to attempt to obtain agreement from the Commies that the 14,000 Chinese non-repatriate POWs be moved to, and delivered into the custody of, a neutral state for final disposition.

(5) If these conditions are acceptable to all concerned, the result would be that no Indian troops, no Communist indoctrinators, and no Communist members of the NNRC would be in South Korea rear areas.

Rhee was interested but did not commit himself. He stated that he would give my comments his careful consideration and would give me an answer tomorrow (23 June). At this time he indicated that it would be impossible for Korea to sign the armistice agreement because that would be tantamount to accepting the division of his country; however, he could support it. This latter statement I consider significant. In this connection of course, there is no requirement that he should sign it.

6. There were many other subjects discussed having to do with provocative statements by individuals alleging that ROK was not cooperating. He seemed very sensitive to what the press had said about him of late. He stressed the necessity of mutual cooperation between the ROK and the US. During the conversation I had an opportunity to explain to him my military analysis of the impotency of the ROK Army, that it had no chance whatsoever of standing alone, defensively or offensively at the present time; that through an armistice, he would be given the time and the means to build up his Army. He probably would be given economic support by my country. During this post-armistice period his country would enjoy a real opportunity to develop economically. The standard of living of his people would undoubtedly be raised to the point at which they would be in much better position to combat the Communists infiltration which he fears.

7. I purposely avoided raising any question about the functions of the inspection teams of the NNSC. However, I did raise with him the absolute necessity of ROK forces remaining under the UN Command, and he replied that under an arrangement of this kind, if it were worked out, that issue would not arise. He asked me to tell my press that he decried the alarming stories which have suggested that actions on the part of ROK troops might lead to clashes with those of the UNC. I asked him what, if anything, I could tell the press about our conversation. There were correspondents waiting outside. We agreed that we should describe our discussion as “friendly and encouraging”.

8. Prior to proceeding further with Rhee, it is essential that I receive your guidance. Although my suggestions in para 5d above would require some minor modification in the terms of reference it would eliminate an overwhelming obstacle in the mind of Rhee—that of having Indian armed troops and Communist NNRC representatives in South Korea. In this connection I saw Harrison today and discussed this new POW angle with him. He believes there would be reasonable chance of securing Communist agreement. In my discussion with Rhee I made it crystal clear that these suggestions were my own and had not been discussed nor approved by my government. It is therefore essential that I be advised ASAP of your thinking along these lines.

9. This is dictated hurriedly at Seoul in order to get it to you expeditiously. I invite your attention to the comment Rhee made that, under the proper conditions, he could support an armistice without being a party to it.

1. This telegram also was sent to Harrison and Briggs for their exclusive information.
2. Dated June 9, p. 1159.
3. This telegram was passed to the JCS in telegram C 63236, June 21, p. 1227.