Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark)¹

top secret
emergency

Seoul, June 20, 1953—9:13 p.m.

201213Z. Defense pis pass State. I have been considering actions we might take to meet situation posed by Rhee’s attitude on armistice. Since they involve important military considerations I am forwarding them to you initially and suggest that you, Gen Taylor, Murphy, and I meet at earliest possible moment to agree on joint recommendations to Washington. It would seem best for us to meet at some relatively unfrequented place, for example K–8 since news of our meeting in Seoul, Pusan, or Tokyo, could hardly be kept quiet. Following are my views.

Rhee’s principle aim is to torpedo armistice which fails to provide for withdrawal of Chinese Communists. Goal of our government and those of other UN countries supporting us in Korea is to obtain armistice which leaves problem of unification of Korea for future political negotiation. Since these views are opposed, show-down with Rhee over armistice seems unavoidable and should in my opinion take place before our position vis-à-vis Korean people is further weakened by Rhee’s appeal to Korean nationalism. Release of Korean anti-Communist prisoners had very widespread support among ROK people, and Rhee is capitalizing on this.

Rhee’s unilateral action in releasing Korean POWs and his statements, orally to me and in writing to you, that he will withdraw ROK forces from UNC upon signing of armistice pose immediate question of exactly how far we should go in countering him in order to keep control of situation. Parenthetically I note that this general problem is also raised by letter from Communist delegation delivered at Panmunjom today.²

Our alternatives include trying to bring Rhee into line or, if he is adamant (as now seems probable), trying to effect his removal. (I am aware from DA 940238³ and DA 940242⁴ that plan “Ever Ready” has been prepared in your headquarters and considered in Washington.⁵ I am not familiar with that plan but agree with JCS that establishment of UNC Military Government in ROK should if possible be avoided).

There may be certain other possibilities, feasibility of which would depend ultimately upon our military capability to carry them out. In connection with most immediate aspect, implementation of armistice if signed, believe determination should be made of specific action which ROK Corps and Division Commanders would take if ordered to comply with armistice by UNC and ordered to contrary by President Rhee. In order to follow through on armistice implementation if certain or all ROK Army Commanders refuse to obey UNC command, UNC would presumably have to be capable of taking over frontline positions from such ROKA units and at same time of carrying through military take-over of ROK Government. If our mil, combined with such of ROK forces as would obey UNC over Rhee, is not considered sufficient, we should clearly not undertake them and should investigate other means of influencing situation.

Above all, I believe it would be ruinous to imply threat of extreme measures and then not be prepared and able to follow through if this becomes necessary.

Although I am convinced Rhee’s motivation is sincere and from his point of view patriotic, I have come to conclusion we have reached point in our relations with him at which we must be prepared to take drastic measures to remove his opposition if he does not give in, or else let Rhee win ball game. Alternative of picking up armistice fragments only to have Rhee once again run out on us (as he yesterday declared he will do) would be intolerable. Our knowledge of elements in Korean political life upon which we can successfully erect new and cooperative government is incomplete, but dependable elements undoubtedly exist.

I have just read Deptels 5 and 6 (2974 and 2937 to Tokyo).⁶ Although I hope Paek’s intervention with Rhee will be helpful, I am not in the least confident he can dissuade Rhee from present course.

1. This telegram was also addressed to Murphy and an information copy was sent to the Counselor of the Embassy at Pusan.
2. For text of this letter, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, pp. 906–907.
3. Dated May 29, p. 1119.
4. Dated May 30, p. 1123.
5. The JCS, in telegram JCS 941567, June 17, 1953, not printed, informed Clark that the final review of Outline Plan Everready (see p. 965) had been completed in Washington; they considered that the instructions furnished by telegrams DA 940238 and DA 940242 and Clark’s reply in telegram CX 62756, June 1 (not printed), constituted the final JCS action on Everready. (JCS records, CCS files 383.21 Korea (3–19–45))
6. In the first telegram, dated June 19, the Department of State summarized Paek Tu Chin’s discussion with Dulles together with Robertson and Nash (see p. 1206). In the second, also June 19, the Department of State reported the confidential and personal views of the South Korean Prime Minister, which were to the effect that Rhee had been badly misled by inflammatory advisers. Paek was therefore cutting short his U.S. visit to return to Seoul to use whatever influence he had to calm down Rhee. Paek assured U.S. officials that he understood the gravity of the ROK unilateral release of Korean POWs and that he agreed that Korea and the United States must work together. (Both 795.00/6–1953)