Office of the Historian

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate
Tokyo, June 20, 1953—5:37 p.m.

CX 63228. Refs: A. CX 63214 (HNC 1791).1 B. CX 63138.2 C. Eighth Army 250610Z May.3 D. 1CX 62727.4

1.
In ref A the Communists have asked the fol ques:
a.
Is the UNC able to control the South Korean Gov and Army?
b.
Does the armistice in Korea include the Syngman Rhee clique?
c.
If it is not included, what assurance is there for the implementation of the armistice agreement on the part of South Korea?
2.
In light of the curr sit as reptd to you in ref B and subsequent msgs on same subj, to which you were alerted in ref C, and in view of Rhee’s additional capabilities as set forth in ref D, I believe it must be clear to you as it is to me that the ans to the first two ques asked by the Communists must at this time be an unqualified no. I am also certain that you must realize any ans to ques three above must be qualified and could only state that the UNC will make every effort to secure ROK cooperation and support for an armistice.
3.
The Communists statement to the effect that if the armistice includes the Syngman Rhee clique, then we must be responsible for recovering [Page 1225] all POWs who are at liberty, might be construed to mean that if Rhee is not included then the UNC is relieved of the responsibility of recovering the POWs. There might also be the implication that they would consider concluding a separate agreement with the UNC. I am inclined to believe the second implication does not exist, rather they recognize our difficulties in admitting that Rhee cannot at this time be considered as being included in the armistice, and anticipating that we may be forced to make a statement to the effect that he is included, have immediately placed responsibilities on the UNC for recovering the prisoners who have been released.
4.
In view of the national and international implications involved in any ans to the ques asked by the Communists, I rqst guidance from governmental level in preparing my reply to the Kim–Peng ltr as contained in ref A.5
  1. In this telegram, June 20, 1953, CINCUNC relayed the text of a letter from Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai to Clark, posing the questions described in CX 63228. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) Text of this letter is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, pp. 906–907.↩
  2. Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1210.↩
  3. Dated May 25, p. 1098.↩
  4. Dated May 29, p. 1112.↩
  5. In a joint State–Defense message, JCS 942083, June 23, 1953, Clark was informed that it was undesirable to answer the questions posed by the Communists prior to clarification of the situation with the ROK; furthermore, the Departments of State and Defense felt no compulsion to answer them at this time. Therefore the guidance which Clark requested was withheld.↩