Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
top secret
operational immediate
operational immediate
Tokyo, June 20, 1953—4:30
p.m.
CX 63227. Ref: CX 63170.1
- 1.
- Information considered reliable has been received that an attempt will be made tonight or as soon as ROK is ready to initiate action to release the remaining Korean non-repatriates POWs by use of force if necessary.
- 2.
- In all probability this action will be initiated by a demand on the Camp Commander for their release. At the present time there is one U.S. Inf co in control of each of the eight (8) camps involved. The ROK Security battalions who disaffected are presently in the immediate vicinity of the camps and other ROKA forces are capable of reinforcing these units promptly. At each location ROK forces presently outnumber U.S. forces three (3) to one (1).
- 3.
- Current instructions to Herren are contained in para 4 of ref msg in which I directed him to resist such attack with all the force at his disposal. These instructions were issued at a time when the situation was considerably more obscure than it is at present.
- 4.
- In view of the overriding importance at this critical time when we are still faced with powerful Communist forces in the battle zone, we must avoid to the best of our ability any armed clashes between US and ROK troops, the results of which would be tragic.
- 5.
- In view of above I have instructed Herren as follows:
- a.
- If demands are made upon him to release the POWs he will refuse.
- b.
- To warn the opposing commander making such a request that it should be apparent to him that it is in the best interest of all concerned to avoid an armed clash.
- c.
- Based upon the individual estimate of the situation by each camp commander and when he has determined in his own mind that the forces opposed to him are in sufficient strength to overwhelm his forces, that it is apparent that the ROK forces will attack and that his mission cannot be accomplished even with considerable bloodshed, the Commander is authorized to withdraw his forces from his current mission of guarding the POWs and retire in such a manner as to maintain the integrity of his forces.
- d.
- Each situation must be evaluated on the spot and complete authority given each camp commander to determine the proper course of action under the particular circumstances.
- e.
- This guidance is designed to bring about a situation whereby each commander can, for a time, indicate a definite show of force with the hope that this action will be effective, but when faced with actual combat, bloodshed will be kept to the minimum.
- 6.
- At this delicate time, faced with the continuing Communist capabilities for offensive action anywhere across the front, I can not afford to utilize more UN combat troops at these widely scattered POW camp locations. It would be impractical, if not impossible, to move these troops now with any expectation that they could be in place in time to insure a superior UN force at any of the POW locations. Likewise it is still impractical to attempt to concentrate the POW’s in fewer camps.