795.00/6–1953: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
niact
13. Repeated information niact Pusan 11, niact Tokyo 11 for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark. Reference Deptels 32 and 4.3
Supplementing message despatched via Army communications,4 following report is submitted on forty-five minute meeting with President Rhee this noon, Acting Prime Minister Pyun present.
On delivery President’s message, Rhee asked Pyun to read it aloud and at end he said “if it becomes necessary for your country to go your way while I go mine, then let us at all events part as friends”. We thereupon embarked on long restatement of Korean position approximately as set forth his June 17 letter to President Eisenhower.5 He requested me to emphasize that Korea is permanently and profoundly grateful to US Government and people for aid and comradeship in arms but that he cannot accept armistice leaving Chinese Communists in Korea because “that would be death warrant”. Rhee declared only history can tell whether he is right but “even if it is suicide, that is our privilege”.
Rhee next referred to General Clark’s letter delivered to him last night6 and declared that only assurance he had given was that if he [Page 1222] contemplated removing ROK Armed Forces from UNC, he would (“not because I have any obligation to do so but as matter personal friendship”) inform General Clark in advance of such action. Pyun then took over for several minutes in usual argumentative vein, amplifying Rhee’s point and asserting that commitment to discuss in advance was limited to event of removing ROK forces and did not refer to “general unilateral actions”.
Furthermore, Pyun said, there is nothing in July 1950 agreement that calls for advance notification, and anyway, action taken was by Korean forces acting under Provost Marshal General who is not subject “anybody’s orders except President Rhee”. I told Pyun I unable agree with his statements but saw no point in arguing further.
Rhee said that both he and Pyun had written letters to General Clark yesterday,7 before receipt of Clark’s message, and that he would give me copies for information my government. (He did so but I did not have opportunity read them until later.) Rhee added that he would prepare further letter to Clark, answering Clark’s of yesterday “and setting record straight about misunderstanding over advance notification”.
After several attempts to pin Rhee down in regard to unequivocal assurance requested in President Eisenhower’s message and after several vague replies, Rhee suddenly said “Please inform President that I cannot change my position. Signing of armistice will automatically mean withdrawal of ROK Forces from UNC”.
With reference to Secretary’s message, Rhee’s only comment was to effect that Assistant Secretary Robertson would be “very welcome” whenever Secretary Dulles might see fit to send him to Korea.
Conversation conducted by Rhee in “more in sorrow than in anger” vein and he referred repeatedly to “two friends who seem to have reached parting of ways but who must remain friends”. I received impression that Rhee had carefully considered result of action before embarking on freeing prisoners, and also that he and Pyun had decided well ahead with reference to “misunderstanding” over Rhee’s assurance.
During course of his remarks, Rhee made very bitter denunciation of India and declared that even if he allowed Indians to enter ROK territory, it would be impossible to keep ROK people from attacking them as “Communists and enemies”. However, he said, question now academic because he will not permit “even one Indian soldier to enter ROK territory in connection with POWs”.
When I rose to depart, I reminded Rhee that President’s message is not now to be made public. I added with view preventing Pyun from rushing into print that if questioned by correspondents I would confirm [Page 1223] fact of my call on President but would withhold further comment. Rhee said he would be guided accordingly.
- This message was received at the Department of State at 7:07 a.m., June 19.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1209.↩
- In this telegram, the Department instructed Briggs to deliver an enclosed message from Eisenhower to Rhee; for a text of the communication, see Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 185–186.↩
- The reference was to an unnumbered telegram from Seoul, June 19, 1953, in which Briggs reported that he had delivered the messages of Eisenhower and Dulles to Rhee, who remained opposed to the armistice and went so far as to declare that “signing of the armistice will automatically mean withdrawal of ROK forces from the UNC”. (795.00/6–1953)↩
- Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 1192.↩
- For a text of this letter, see Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, p. 907.↩
- For the text of Pyun’s letter, dated June 18, see Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, p. 906; for Rhee’s letter, also June 18, see p. 1197.↩