Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, June 19, 1953—11 a.m.

Korea

Mr. Johnson: We met with Congressional leaders this morning and went over the Korean situation. The alternatives that were discussed were either going ahead with the armistice now or of not entering into an armistice agreement at present until we could bring the ROK Government around to cooperating in an armistice. The general sentiment among the Congressional leaders seemed to be for continuing attempts to change the policy of the Korean Government without entering into an armistice. In the discussion with the President the general decision seemed to be not to enter into an armistice now and to hope that the present difficulties could be ironed out. I think that is about the sum of the results of the discussions both with the Congressional leaders and with the President.

Mr. Nash: There was also the point made that if the offer of concluding a security pact before an armistice would be effective in making Rhee change his mind, we should go ahead and do it.

Mr. Robertson: Rhee has already talked to the point in his reply to the President. He said that a security pact in itself would be a fine thing but that he could not accept it as the price of an armistice settlement which he could not agree to.

Mr. Johnson: Congressional opinion seemed to be fairly general against taking any direct action against Rhee.

Admiral Duncan: What are the possibilities that if we went ahead with an armistice and signed it that Rhee would back down?

Mr. Johnson: He has made it perfectly clear to Clark that he wouldn’t back down but has notified Clark he would withdraw his forces from the UNC Command and order the ROK forces not to withdraw the 2 kilometers which the armistice calls for.

Admiral Duncan: We really only have one way of finding out, in fact, whether Rhee would actually torpedo an armistice and that is to go ahead and sign one. This is the only way of really testing Rhee’s position.

Admiral Fechteler: If the Commies should come up and say they would agree to sign an armistice and we don’t sign one, we can be sure that fact will be on the Peiping radio in 15 minutes—and what effect will this have on the soldiers of the Eighth Army?

General Hull: There might be a possibility that the Communists may drag their feet on the armistice negotiations, although if they were smart they would have probably asked us if we are ready to sign.

Mr. Robertson: The only good thing that has happened in the past few days on this whole thing is the change that took place in the Korean Prime Minister, Paek, while he was here. The President talked with him for 50 minutes and at that session he was adamant in supporting Rhee’s position on the armistice. The Secretary talked to him that evening and he was still adamant in supporting Rhee’s position, but yesterday when he went off he was really a changed man. We don’t know how much influence Paek has on Rhee, but Paek says very clearly he is going to try his very best to get Rhee to change his position on an armistice.

Admiral Duncan: Now on the question of going ahead with an armistice it seems clear to me that no representations that anybody makes to Rhee before an armistice is actually signed will bring any change in Rhee’s attitude. If an armistice is actually signed and Rhee then does what he says he is going to do, that is the only way he can really be tested. In that case the blame for violating the armistice and making it inoperable will rest very clearly on Rhee.

Mr. Robertson: I can’t quite see how in good faith the UNC can sign an armistice agreement when they are on notice from Rhee that 350,000 troops will be withdrawn from UNC Command and won’t obey the armistice terms.

Admiral Duncan: Clark is operating under instructions from the United Nations with the U.S. as executive agent for the United Nations. He doesn’t really know for sure that Korean forces won’t abide by armistice terms until an armistice is actually signed.

Admiral Fechteler: There is another unknown. We won’t know until an armistice is signed what Rhee will do and we won’t know until then whether or not the Korean Army will obey Rhee.

Mr. Matthews: The question of what the Koreans will do seems to me to be the crucial question. Is there any way that we can find out what the attitudes of the Korean Commanders will be?

Admiral Duncan: When the Chief of Staff was here he said pretty clearly that he would have to obey orders from his own government. If Rhee remains in authority, Paek will obey him.

General Ruffner: Rhee has a very good intelligence system, and I think he must be pretty sure of his Army, Navy, and Air Force backing him or else he wouldn’t be so adamant in his position.

General Hull: It really boils down to the problem of what we are going to do about Rhee, whether we are going to accede to his wishes, fight along without an armistice, or whether we are not.

Mr. Matthews: And if we don’t accede to his wishes, what do we do then, pick him up?

General Hull: That certainly is one possibility.

Mr. Johnson: We do have the immediate problem of getting some instructions out to Harrison not to sign.

General Hull: Harrison won’t agree to sign anyway. It will take 5 or 6 days and Clark is under instructions already not to go ahead and sign the armistice without clearance from Washington.

Mr. Matthews: If it’s going to be a week before the armistice is signed anyway and if the armistice terms have to be referred back here before any signing, why do we have to instruct Harrison to say that we are not prepared to sign an armistice?

Mr. Johnson: It probably is not a question of signing an armistice but it might be a question of setting the date for signing an armistice.

Mr. Bowie: Setting a date for signing the armistice is different from actually signing an armistice. What would there be against setting a date.

Admiral Duncan: I think we should proceed on the basis that we are going to sign an armistice, otherwise there will be no pressure on Rhee to change his position.

Mr. Robertson: I would like to ask if any of you think that it will be desirable to give Rhee a security pact before the armistice is signed.

Admiral Duncan: I don’t see how we can. The security pact is something that we will have to discuss at some length with the Koreans. Some of the points that Rhee has already asked for, such as a provision that we will undertake to keep our forces within a certain distance of Korea, are clearly unacceptable so that we will have to talk out the terms of the security pact very carefully. It seems to me that the best course for us to follow would be to sign an armistice and have our plans ready as to just what we will do if Rhee actually goes ahead with what he says he is going to do.

General Hull: Clark will have to have very clear instructions as to just what he is to do in that event. It seems to me that if there is no possibility of bringing the Korean Government around to our wishes, that then we will just have to dissolve our partnership.

Mr. Matthews: What would dissolving our partnership consist of?

General Hull: I should think it would mean we had no business in Korea and we should be prepared to pull out. It is not just the U.S. or Korea that is concerned in this thing, Rhee has actually defied the whole Western world. The question really is whether we are going to accede to his whims, or are we going to get out, or are we going to break him.

Admiral Duncan: If we say that we are not going to sign an armistice we are going to be in no position to make Rhee change his mind.

Mr. Bowie: I think we must be clear before we sign an armistice that if we do sign it there are really only two possible alternatives. The first is that the policy of the Korean Government is changed so that they agree to the armistice and the second is that we get out of Korea.

Admiral Duncan: I think that is about it.

General Hull: If we knuckle down now and accede to Rhee’s wishes we are going to be in Korea indefinitely.

Admiral Duncan: I don’t think it will be helpful if we say we are not going to sign an armistice.

Mr. MacArthur: We wouldn’t be able to hold our Allies on the position that we won’t sign an armistice.

Mr. Bowie: We also wouldn’t be in a position to bring pressure on Rhee if we say we aren’t going to sign an armistice.

General Twining: It seems to me the only thing to do is to go ahead and sign the armistice. If Rhee blocks it then we should take him into custody, go on ahead with an armistice, and then get our forces out.

Mr. Nash: It was the Congressional reaction that there were two unacceptable alternatives—the alternative of deposing Rhee and the alternative of armed conflict betwen American forces and the ROKs.

General Everest: I don’t see why there should be armed conflict between the Americans and the ROKs. If the Communists attack on the line they will be too busy handling the Commies. There might possibly be some trouble in the rear areas if we start sorting out the ROKs from our troops but by and large I should think there was relatively little danger of armed conflict between the ROKs and ourselves.

Admiral Duncan: There is the present possibility that there might be fighting between our troops and the Korean security forces around the prison camps. Won Yung Duk has issued statements that his men should shoot anybody that attempted to detain or resist the escape of Korean prisoners, so we may face the possibility of having to clap Mr. Won Yung Duk in jail.

Mr. Johnson: Won Yung Duk is Rhee’s man. Would it be possible for us to take action against Won Yung Duk without having first made the decision that we were prepared to take action against Rhee.

Admiral Duncan: I think it would be possible purely on grounds of the security of our own forces. There probably would have to be an overt action. I should think that authorization should be given Clark along the lines that in the event there were an open attack against our forces by Won Yung Duk’s people Clark was authorized to take him into custody.

General Eddleman: Wouldn’t it be better if the ROKs took such action?

General Hull: It would put the ROK Army men in a very difficult position because in their case it would be an open declaration of hostility to Rhee.

Mr. Matthews: I think in a case like that it would probably be better if we did it ourselves.

Mr. Nash: In the discussion with the Congressmen they made a very real point of the question as to whether Van Fleet might not be able to do something with Rhee in this situation. We told them that Van Fleet had been in communication with Rhee urging him to go along with the armistice terms but Senator Knowland felt that it might be possible that because of Rhee’s personal friendship for Van Fleet it would be a good idea to send Van Fleet out to see if he couldn’t persuade Rhee to be reasonable. The question wasn’t raised with the President, but I have the feeling that support of Congress is going to be very important in this situation and since this suggestion was strongly urged by them we should consider it carefully. Do you have the feeling that Van Fleet’s going out would undercut Clark?

General Hull and General Twining: Yes it would.

Mr. Bowie: Nevertheless it is important to give not only Congress, but also the American public, evidence that we are leaving no stone unturned in attempting to find the satisfactory solution for these problems. I think the suggestion has some merit.

Mr. Nash: Wouldn’t it be advisable to ask Clark for his views on Van Fleet coming out? You could put it in the framework which we have just been discussing, that of a suggestion which has been strongly urged by Congressional leaders and of the necessity of doing everything possible to secure Congressional and public support.

Mr. Matthews: I would like to raise another question. Are there any military steps in terms of dispositon of his forces which Clark could take without weakening his front line position which would serve to give the impression that we were preparing to pull out our forces.

General Hull: He does have a division in reserve that could conceivably be moved about or it might be possible merely to alert a division that they should be prepared to move to an embarkation point and the word of that would get around immediately.

Admiral Duncan: It would have a pretty grim moral effect on our troops if they expect to be embarked and then it turned out that this was just a rumor. It might work the wrong way and it might make our forces pretty sore at the ROKs.

Mr. Bowie: Unless we are prepared to go along with Rhee and continue fighting along the present line, don’t we really have to make a decision that we will in the last analysis be prepared to withdraw from Korea? We have to think in terms of other Koreans as well as Rhee in this situation. The only convincing alternatives that we can present to the other Koreans would be based on a willingness on our part to accept the necessity of withdrawal if worse comes to worse. We will have to be able to present them with the alternatives of our getting out or of there being a change in the policy of the ROK Government which would make it possible to have an armistice on present terms. We can’t expect any action either from Rhee or from the Korean military to change the policy of the ROK Government so long as they think we may be prepared to continue fighting along the present line. If however, we can say the two alternatives that we face are: first, our getting out with the obvious almost immediate consequence of a Communist takeover, or second, a change, by whatever methods, in the policy of the ROK so that it will support an armistice, there might be a chance that as patriotic Koreans they will prefer to change their policy or the military might prefer to take action against Rhee rather than to face national suicide.

General Hull: From the military point of view the only part of Korea that is important is the southern part. The Russians already are strongly positioned in the North above Hokkaido. If the Communists occupy Southern Korea, they would be looking down the Japanese throat. Korea is like a dagger right at Japan. For this reason we would hate like the devil to withdraw, but under the circumstances we might have to face that decision.

Mr. Johnson: Don’t we have to think about the position we would be in if we actually sign an armistice and then because of the ROK position found ourselves unable to carry out the armistice. If we went on fighting then we would be doing it in the worst possible position as the Commies would have signed an armistice agreement and we would be the ones who would be responsible for the shooting going on.

Mr. Bowie: Isn’t the question of whether to go ahead with the signing of the armistice really secondary to the question of whether in the last analysis we would be willing to withdraw. If we are not willing to withdraw then we have no maneuverability in our position. We would really have to decide that question before we decide whether to go ahead with signing an armistice.

Admiral Gardner: It seems to me that the Korean Army is the key to this situation. As far as we know the majority of the Korean Army leaders are willing to take UNC orders. They naturally worry about doing anything contrary to Rhee’s orders. Isn’t the question therefore what action we should take against Rhee?

Mr. Johnson: I am worried about the accuracy of our assessment of the loyalties of the ROK Army officers in the light of what happened at POW camps. The American Commanders of the POW camps, all of them reported just the night before the outbreak that they felt that the Korean guards were responsive to their orders. There just seemed to have been a real failure of intelligence on what was going to happen and a mistake in assessment of who the Korean guards would take orders from. We can’t really test the Korean Army leaders until we have made a decision on whether or not we are willing to get out of Korea if worse comes to worse.

General Hull: Our allies will get out whether or not we do.

Mr. Johnson: I think the important difference between our discussion here this afternoon and that which we had with Congressional leaders and with the President hinges on the question of whether or not we are willing to get out of Korea. In the discussions of the Congressional leaders and with the President it was almost taken as a starting point that we were not willing to get out of Korea.

Mr. Matthews: One immediate important point that has come out of our discussion is that it would be inadvisable for the Secretary this afternoon to tell the 16 Ambassadors that we have adopted the position that we will not now sign an armistice.²

General Hull and Admiral Duncan: We agree. That would play right into Rhee’s hands. It is just what he is looking for.

Mr. Matthews: We should get back to the Department so that we can talk with our Secretary. Is it your general consensus that if there is an armistice and if Rhee does go ahead and do what he says he is going to do and if no other Koreans succeed in changing his mind or in changing the policy of the ROK Government, that it would be better for us to withdraw from Korea?

Admiral Duncan: That is one important part of the questions that we have to look at in making our decisions as to what we do if Rhee actually is not bluffing. It is not something that we can decide this afternoon and it is something we would want to think about very carefully. Personally I can say however that if we sign an armistice and Rhee goes ahead and there is no change in the Korean Government, then I would think we would have to pull out.

General Hull: The only alternative would be to go all out to drive the Commies out of Korea.

Mr. Robertson: Which would you prefer?

General Hull: That’s a $64 question. If we were forced by the Commies to take more drastic military action, we would do it. We would have to put in more forces and we would have to step up production here at home, but if the Commies forced us to it we would put in whatever was necessary to do the job. But if we were forced into more drastic military action purely because Rhee was not willing to go along with an armistice, it would put the question in an entrely different light. I, personally, have the feeling that under those circumstances we should pull out.

Mr. Robertson: Unless the President changes what he has expressed so far, we will not be ready to pull out.

General Hull: Is there any point in going ahead with the political conference first?

Admiral Duncan: I don’t see how it would work with fighting going on.

Mr. Bowie: On the other hand if our decision is that we are not ready to pull out there may be something in the question of an immediate political conference. We won’t have any maneuverability either with Rhee or with the Communists in the present situation and it might be the only tack we could take would be to open political negotiations on the basis that we can’t settle the question with our own Allies in the present framework of the armistice terms.

Mr. Nash: Before we break up could we decide on whether we are going to ask Clark about the possibility of Van Fleet going out. Robertson is going out there. If Van Fleet went out with him as a civilian, would that undermine Clark’s position?

General Hull: That might not be so objectionable if Van Fleet went out together with Robertson, but there is one thing which I feel I should tell you which has a real bearing on this and that is simply that Van Fleet hates Clark. The feeling isn’t quite as strong on Clark’s side, but there is real personal difficulty between the two men. We should certainly ask Clark’s opinion.

General Eddleman: I have a telegram drafted which will have to be changed to make the point of Van Fleet’s coming out with Robertson,³ but we can take care of revising it.

1. A note on the title page read: “State Draft. Not cleared with any participants.”

   Admiral Fechteler attended for the JCS as well as Vice Chiefs Generals Twining and Hull and Admiral Duncan. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent, while Nash represented the Department of Defense, General Cabell the CIA, and Gleason and General Gerhard the NSC. In all 23 persons were present at this meeting; Korea was the sole topic of discussion.

2. A report on what the Secretary told the Ambassadors of the 16 nations with troops in the United Nations Command at a special briefing on June 19, is in circular telegram 1221, June 19, 1953, not printed. (795.00/6–1953)

3. Sent as telegram JCS 941571, June 19, exclusive to Clark, not printed. (JCS records, CCS files, 383.21 Korea (3–14–45))

   Van Fleet did not accompany Robertson; see the editorial note, p. 1237.