795.00/9–1953: Telegram
The Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) to the Department of State
priority
3958. No distribution. From Murphy. As Department may be aware, there remain in camps approximately 9,400 North Korean non-repatriate prisoners of war after mass outbreaks of June 18 plus escape during last night of some 900 prisoners of war.
Up to present General Clark, having fully informed Department Army, adopted policy of using all means, including toxic gas, short of use of firearms in preventing escape of non-Communist prisoners of war, suppressing disorders, et cetera. This was policy in force at times of mass outbreak and I believe was generally known to Republic of Korea personnel making up bulk of guards.
Clark has now raised with me question whether he should continue that policy now that Republic of Korea personnel has been replaced exclusively by United States personnel if, as it is entirely possible, further mass outbreak should be attempted. He expressed concern over effect on public opinion abroad in event use of arms including machine guns would result in large scale mortality among non-Communist prisoners of war.
I offered opinion that it is essential under circumstances that United Nations Command maintain its authority. United States personnel having assumed responsibility for guarding prisoners of war camps to permit Republic of Korea forces to permit prisoners of war to escape in collusion with Republic of Korea authorities would create impossible situation for future and would definitely give rise to opinion that there is active collusion between United States and Republic of Korea in permitting [Page 1213] escape as has been suggested in London and perhaps other places. We are as yet unaware of Communist reaction which we hope to ascertain this afternoon. If, in order to avoid loss of life by prisoners of war in clear-cut defiance of United Nations Command authority, we lose sight of our objective to conclude an armistice, loss of life involved in continuance of war would make prisoner of war incident very small in contrast.
I, therefore, urged Clark firmly to assert his authority even at risk of substantial casualties among prisoners of war if further attempts at outbreak occur. There is also possibility of increased incidents involving Republic of Korea personnel as there are reports of United States soldiers being fired upon individually and threats of attacks on United States personnel such as that attributed to Republic of Korea Provost Marshal.
I consider particularly unfortunate that my recommendation for inclusion of other United Nations personnel in contingents assigned to prisoner of war camps has not been implemented and that United States under circumstances if (is) obliged to bear brunt, whatever criticism and risk are involved, and have so informed General Clark (see my telegram 3859, of June 102).