Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
top
secret
flash
flash
Tokyo, June 19, 1953—1:03
p.m.
C 63176. Ref A CX 63170,1 B CX 63138,2 C HNC 1678,3 D DTG 250610Z.4
- 1.
- I have just received information that there is every indication that the Korean non repatriate POWs will attempt further escapes tonight, with continued direct connivance of ROK authorities.
- 2.
- I have repeatedly given to you my appraisal of the capabilities of Rhee and the ROK Government to instigate the release of Korean non repatriate POWs. I have also repeatedly indicated to you my feeling that maximum force, including rifles and machine guns, against a mass outbreak of these POWs should not be employed for reasons previously stated. Having received no instructions to the contrary, I assume that my course of action has your approval.
- 3.
- As I have indicated to you in my message CX 63170 this morning, US troops today will have taken over complete charge of the remaining approximately 9400 Korean non repatriate POWs at 8 mainland camps. Their present orders are to use every effort short of shooting to kill, to prevent escape of these POWs.
- 4.
- I realize a different situation is presented by the replacement of ROKA troops by American troops as full responsibility now rests squarely with the latter. I feel strongly, however, that in spite of the changed situation, I should not change the course of action indicated in cited messages. In view of the world wide repercussions on armistice negotiations and the added propaganda value accruing to the Communists when POWs make further escapes with US troops in charge, I feel I am entitled to your approval and support of the action to avoid use of fire arms with inevitable bloodshed and high loss of life, or clear cut instructions to the contrary directing the use of maximum force. In this connection, an additional factor to consider is that the use of maximum force may lead to open armed conflict between ROKA troops and US Security Forces. (See para 4 ref A).
- 5.
- As I have pointed out before, the escapes which have recently taken place and those that may occur again tonight are bringing embarrassment to the UNC and are having an undetermined influence upon the Communists willingness to proceed with armistice negotiations.
- 6.
- In view of the urgency of the situation, request that I be advised immediately in order that I may issue appropriate instructions before 1800 hours I tonight. In absence of receipt of such instructions, I will assume my proposed course of action has your approval and support.
- 7.
- In this connection Briggs has just phoned me that he has delivered the President’s message; that Rhee indicated plainly that if an armistice is signed he will remove ROK forces from the United Nations Command; that he will refuse to withdraw ROK forces from the demilitarized zone; and that he is making a demand upon me to turn loose the remaining Korean non repatriate POWs. I am more than ever convinced that it would be tragic to use maximum force against these non repatriate POWs under these conditions.