State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Extracts]
. . . . . . .
Korea
General Bradley: I think you have seen the Ridgway telegram2 that he doesn’t want the Russians participating in the Truce Commission under any circumstances. The question is, should we accept his view or not. Ridgway appears to feel very strongly about this.
Mr. Bohlen: What the USSR really wants is to be designated as a neutral. This naturally, we don’t want. But if they are tagged as participants, I should think we would like it. The Russians would try to fuzz it up, but it would really be a concession from the USSR rather than from us. However, I don’t think the advantage to us is important enough to force it on Ridgway.
General Collins: I think it is a 100 per cent political question.
Mr. Matthews: I don’t think the issue is really very important.
Mr. Nitze: Shouldn’t we wait and see what the Communists do on the issue?
Mr. Bohlen: I think it would be useful to correct Ridgway’s feeling that our proposal represented a concession to the Russians, but at the same time making clear to him we don’t think the issue is important enough to press.
General Bradley: There is a new telegram3 just in from Ridgway which refers to an article in Newsweek of March 31. in which Ridgway [Page 129] thinks there must have been a security leak as well as criticism by someone of the U.S. negotiators. Ridgway would like an investigation and also wants some action taken to back up U.S. negotiators.
Mr. Nitze: How do you get an effective investigation?
General Bradley: Not with the present law.
Mr. Johnson: Ridgway’s request for backing up the negotiators has really already been met several times in many statements.
General Collins: It might be useful to arrange for a Presidential Statement backing up the negotiators.4
Mr. Johnson: We can work one out with Col. Matthews.
General Bradley: Coming back to the question of the Russians, I suggest the staff draft a reply to Ridgway and include Bohlen’s comments.
(Matthews at this point gave General Bradley a draft of the Indochina paper,5 commenting that he was giving it to the Chiefs informally for their information.)
General Bradley: The paper that we are preparing in response to an NSC request still needs some working over. We hope to have it for you soon.
. . . . . . .
Mr. Matthews: Another point, Senator McCarthy asked Mr. Hickerson, is it or is it not a fact that General Ridgway is bound from bombing the Yalu power plants.
General Vandenberg: I am not clear as to that. He may be under some restrictions.
General Bradley: Last time the question was raised was in a message to MacArthur. He said he didn’t want to bomb them.6 You might be able to use that as an answer.
[Page 130]General Vandenberg: We are preparing a list of targets we are going to query Ridgway about. Should we include plants on the Yalu? Is there any political reason for not including them?
Mr. Matthews: Are they militarily important?
General Vandenberg: My impression is no, but I would like to ask about them.
Mr. Matthews: I see no reason why you shouldn’t ask about them.
. . . . . . .
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A note on the title page read: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”
Generals Bradley, Vandenberg, and Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended for the Joint Chiefs while Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. In all, 15 persons attended. Matters other than Korea were discussed at this meeting.
↩ - The telegram to which Bradley was referring was C 65650 to JCS, Mar. 20, p. 109.↩
- The telegram under reference was CX 66304 to JCS, Apr. 2, not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 10)↩
- Truman made such a statement at a Presidential news conference on Apr. 3; for full text of the transcript of the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953, p. 230. Truman also sent Ridgway a personal message informing the Commander in the Far East that he viewed with grave concern the breach of security, that the article was not based on an authorized release, that the leak was being investigated, and that he was publicly reaffirming his support of the negotiators at Panmunjom at the news conference; Truman to Ridgway, telegram 031645Z, Apr. 3, not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 17)↩
- The reference was presumably to NSC 124/2, “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia”, June 25, 1952. For documentation on this subject, see volume xii, Part 1.↩
- Presumably a reference to the JCS query to MacArthur in JCS telegram 99713, Dec. 26, 1950 and MacArthur’s reply in telegram C 52125, Dec. 27, 1950, neither printed. (JCS files) MacArthur at that time indicated that the installations had no further military significance. See James F. Schanabel, Policy and Direction, The First Year (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 347–348. MacArthur subsequently submitted in telegram CX 56453 to the JCS, Feb. 26, 1951, the urgent request of Lt. Gen. George E. Strate meyer, Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, for permission to destroy the North Korean electrical power complex including the plants on the Yalu River, and requested instructions. The JCS in telegram 84577, Mar. 1, 1951, refused to give their approval. See Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vii, Part 1, footnote 2 on p. 202.↩