Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/4–152

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

top secret

[Washington,] April 1, 1952.

Notes for JCS Meeting, April 2, 1952¹

korean armistice negotiations

Summary of Present Situation:

Agenda Item 3

Agreement has been reached on all details except translation of “Korea”, where UNC Delegation has proposed that both the Communist version “Chosun” and the UNC version “Han Kuk” be used. Remaining outstanding issues are airfields and Soviet Union as member of neutral supervisory body. Communist Delegation has recently avoided discussing Soviet Union issue at staff officer meetings and has asked for a meeting of sub-delegations on this agenda item to which UNC Delegation demurred but has now agreed to such a meeting for April 3, Korea time. There are no firm indications as to position Communist Delegation may take at this meeting.

Agenda Item 4

In meetings up to April 1 Communists agreed to apply voluntary repatriation principle to all POWs who resided in South Korea prior to outbreak of hostilities but not to persons residing in North Korea nor to Chinese. However, there was little discussion of problem of North Koreans. Emphasis in Communist discussions was upon alleged activities of KMT personnel employed by the UNC in Chinese POW camps and charges that purpose of UNC was to turn Chinese POWs over to “Chiang Kai-shek’s brigands on Taiwan”. Beginning with meeting on March 31 there was a return to the Communist emphasis on “round figures” and at the meeting of April 1 Communist emphasis was almost entirely on this point, with no mention whatever of problem of Chinese. UNC Delegation has been pointing out that figures could not be given prior to screening prisoners, which has not been carried out by UNC.

Ridgway’s Instructions

On March 11 (HNC 1033)² General Ridgway requested a US Government statement as well as statements by principal Allies irrevocably to reject the Soviet Union as a member of the neutral supervisory commission so as to prepare the way for an offer to concede the UNC position on airfields for the Communist position on POWs.

On March 15 a radio to General Ridgway (JCS 903687)³ requested his comments on a “package proposal” which would involve:

(1) Prior screening out and reclassification of POWs who would violently oppose repatriation;

(2) Concession of the UNC position on airfields;

(3) Acceptance of the Soviet Union on supervisory commission subject to elimination of the “neutral” designation and US membership, retention of the “neutral” designation with commission to be composed of non-combatant countries acceptable to each side in which event UNC refusal to accept Soviet Union is firm, or inspection to be carried out by teams composed of representatives of belligerents from opposing sides;

(4) All-for-all exchange of POWs based upon lists revised by UNC in light of results of screening and reclassification.

General Ridgway expressed strong opposition (C 65430, March 17)⁴ to prior screening of POWs on grounds would gravely jeopardize safe return of UNC prisoners held by Communists, as well as to meeting at field commander level, package deal involving three unresolved issues, and any position which would accept Soviet Union as member supervisory organ. On March 20 (JCS 904101)⁵ we concurred with Ridgway that package proposal need not be presented at meeting of field commanders and amplified our position on acceptance of Soviet Union as member of supervisory commission and position on package proposal containing three issues. On March 22 (JCS 904385)⁶ it was suggested that the UNC Delegation explore thoroughly the Communist position on POWs in executive sessions and General Ridgway was informed that pending the outcome of such explorations a decision was withheld on the POW fait accompli and three-item package proposal outlined in JCS 903687, as well as on General Ridgway’s reiteration (C 65650)⁷ of his request for high level US Government statement on the unacceptability of the Soviet Union as a member of the supervisory commission.

Discussion:

At sub-delegation meeting on Item 3, April 3, Communists may adopt one of following courses of action:

1. Maintain present positions on airfields and Soviet membership on supervisory commission;

2. Offer to drop Soviet membership on supervisory commission in exchange for UNC position on airfields;

3. Offer to accept UNC position on airfields in exchange for Soviet membership on supervisory commission.

The second course of action might well be adopted as it would place maximum pressure upon the UNC position on POWs, leaving that issue isolated. While in this event UNC might well, at least for the record, maintain for time being its present position on airfields, the value of this is greatly weakened by the leaks that have already taken place concerning our willingness to concede the airfield issue. In view of the lack of emphasis upon the Soviet Union issue during recent weeks, any high level U.S. Government statement on this subject at the present time would appear out of keeping with the situation and, if the Communists are in fact now prepared to concede on this issue, introduction of the prestige factor by a high level statement might cause them to reconsider. Therefore, further consideration should not be given to such a statement pending the outcome of sub-delegation meetings on Agenda Item 3.

While in the executive sessions on the Agenda Item 4 the Communists have thus far taken a very firm position against the application of the principle of non-forceful repatriation of Chinese POWs, it cannot yet be said that there is no hope of further progress in these meetings and they therefore should be continued. The Communists have shown the greatest sensitivity to the activities of alleged KMT personnel employed by UNC in connection with the Chinese POW camps and to Chinese POWs joining the forces of the “Chiang Kai-shek brigands”. With respect to the first point, Admiral Joy has recommended to General Ridgway that all “Taiwanese” employed by the UNC be removed from the area of the camps. We have no information yet as to what action has been taken on this recommendation. With regard to the second point, if from subsequent negotiations it appears that the issue may be of major importance in achieving an armistice, consideration might be given to: (1) a pledge by the UNC, after consultation with the Chinese Nationalist Government, that any Chinese POWs who might eventually proceed to Formosa would not be incorporated into the Chinese Nationalist forces. In this connection it has already apparently been agreed that repatriated POWs will not be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict. (2) Alternatively, consideration might again be given to the possibilities of resettlement of Chinese in places other than Formosa. However, the possibilities in this regard appear to be almost nonexistent unless the U.S. Government would be willing indefinitely to guarantee the support of such persons.

While no decision need now be reached on whether the fait accompli principle shall be carried out with regard to POWs held by the UNC, it appears that the course of negotiations on POWs is such that the possibilities of obtaining Communist agreement to an armistice by application of the fait accompli principle are being reduced.

Also, while no decision need now be reached on presentation of the “three-item package proposal”, it is entirely possible that Communist moves in the negotiations may destroy or greatly weaken the value of such a package and that those moves may result in isolating the POW issue in the negotiations.

1. For a memorandum of the discussion of this meeting relating to Korea, see infra.
2. Ante, p. 80.
3. Ante, p. 89.
4. Ante, p. 95.
5. Ante, p. 104.
6. Ante, p. 116.
7. Dated Mar. 20, p. 109.