Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/4–252

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

secret

[Washington,] April 2, 1952.

Subject:

• Korean Armistice Negotiations

Participants:

• Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
• Mr. U. A. Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. A. B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

Mr. Tomlinson called on Mr. Johnson this afternoon at 4 o’clock by prior appointment. He asked Mr. Johnson whether there had been any developments in our thinking with regard to the future course of the negotiations at Panmunjom, with specific reference to the so-called “package” proposal.

Mr. Johnson replied that there were no major changes to report and that we were continuing to follow the general approach with which Mr. Tomlinson was already familiar. With regard to the “package” proposal, Mr. Johnson stated that we had not given up the idea of such a proposal if it became desirable to put it forward, but explained that at the time this formula was under consideration the negotiations then appeared to have deteriorated into a series of recriminations without immediate prospect of further progress along the lines then being followed at Panmunjom. However, since we had agreed with the Communists to go into executive session on the prisoners of war question there had been more hope that progress could be made and that for the present, therefore, we expected to leave the “package” proposal in abeyance. In other words, it was felt that all room for further maneuver in the negotiations along present lines on the outstanding issues had not yet been exhausted. There was to be a further meeting on Item 3 this evening and we might have a better picture of the situation on which to base a decision with regard to our future tactics when the results of this meeting were known.

Mr. Tomlinson then stated that it was assumed by his Government that in no event would the “package” proposal be put forward by the UNC delegation in such a manner as to constitute an ultimatum to the Communists. Mr. Johnson replied that this assumption was correct and that, while we had hopes that the “package” formula might at some point result in effective progress being made, we wished to keep the discussion of the various outstanding points of difference encompassed within the “package” from degenerating again into a series of individual issues. In any case, we would explain to the Communists that this was merely a formula which we hoped would facilitate progress and would in no way present it as an ultimatum.

Mr. Tomlinson then expressed the great preoccupation of his Government over the dilemma presented by the prisoner of war issue, stating that if the UNC delegation were either to abandon the principle of non-forcible repatriation or to make this principle an issue over which the negotiations would break down, there would in either event be serious political repercussions in Parliament for the British Government. He stated that his Government felt strongly that the other participating UN members should be consulted prior to any such decision on the part of the United States and asked whether he could provide his Government with such assurance. Mr. Johnson replied that he could in fact do so but that this, of course, must be without prejudice to the approach presently being followed in the negotiations by the UNC delegation, whereby we were seeking both to avoid forcible repatriation and, at the same time, to avoid prejudicing the safety and return of our own prisoners in Communist hands. Mr. Johnson pointed out that, of course, the developments resulting from further discussions with the Communists might necessitate some readjustment in our approach to this problem within the limits of the two extremes posed by Mr. Tomlinson.

Mr. Tomlinson stated that in a recent discussion with Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Allen of EUR concerning the constitution of the neutral inspection teams he had understood that we would not make an issue of the individual national representation on each of the teams.¹ Mr. Emmons suggested that what had evidently been meant was, while we insisted that the numerical representation on the inspection teams should be equal as between the neutrals nominated by each side, we would not necessarily insist that these representatives be paired off in such a manner that each of the individual neutral nations would all have exactly equal representation on each team.

Mr. Tomlinson then asked whether we believed that the proposal put forward by the Communists for Soviet participation in the neutral inspection was carried out under direct instructions from the Soviet Union or whether this proposal had been initiated by the Chinese Communists merely with Soviet acquiescence. Mr. Johnson replied that while it obviously must have had at least Soviet acquiescence, there was no firm indication whether or not the proposal had been initiated by Moscow. He stated that, in any case, the proposal seemed to have been presented as a propanganda move by the Communists to enable the Soviet Union to pose as a neutral, and that it is entirely unacceptable to us. Mr. Tomlinson then raised the question of whether, if the whole idea of neutral inspection teams were dropped and the Soviet Union were to participate in other than a neutral capacity, we would nominate non-neutrals on our own side. Mr. Johnson replied that in such circumstances we would undoubtedly do so but remarked that General Ridgway was opposed to the presence of Soviet observers in South Korea in any capacity, either as “neutrals” or otherwise.

Mr. Tomlinson then asked whether the Department had any further views on the suggestion which had been made earlier that India participate in the political conference on Korea to follow the conclusion of an armistice.² Mr. Johnson replied that we continue to be opposed to India’s participation, feeling that participation in this conference on the UN side should be on the basis of active support of the UN military operations in Korea; to include India would open up the field to a much broader group of nations which might have to include, for instance, some of the Arab and other Asian countries and that from our standpoint it was most desirable to limit the conference in this respect. Mr. Tomlinson referred to the Canadian interest in seeing India represented at the conference and reiterated his Government’s view that since India was the second most important country in Asia it seemed desirable from the British standpoint that it be included. Mr. Johnson replied that we would still be unsympathetic to such a proposal.

1. The discussion under reference took place on Mar. 13 at the Department of State. (Memorandum of conversation, Mar. 13, 795.00/3–1352)
2. On the specific instructions of the Foreign Office, the Counselor of the British Embassy had raised the issue of Indian participation in the future political conference on Korea with members of the Department of State; telegram 3645 from London, Feb. 21 and memorandum of conversation by Henkin, Feb. 22 (795.00/2–2152 and 795.00/2–2252, respectively). Almost a month later, the Second Secretary of the Canadian Embassy informed Department of State officials that Secretary of State for External Affairs Pearson thought India “ought to be invited to the conference”; memoranda of conversation by Allen and Henkin, Mar. 28 (795.00/3–2852).