State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Extract]
. . . . . . .
General Collins stated that the Joint Chiefs had a draft reply2 to General Ridgway’s cable3 which they would like to discuss with the State Department representatives. (They provided copies of the draft cable for discussion. The draft cable authorized General Ridgway to proceed to discuss with the Communists the possibility of exchange of revised lists of POW’s.)
Mr. Johnson stated that in general he believed the State Department position was not far apart from that of the Joint Chiefs. He thought the answer to General Ridgway should be considered in the light of the hints that the Communist correspondents had been dropping at Panmunjom and also in the light of the minutes of the last meeting at Panmunjom. The Communists seemed to be trying to say something to us. It is possible that what they were trying to say was that they couldn’t agree to the principle of no forcible repatriation but that if they could get something in the order of 132,000 prisoners and if there were no further talk about principles involved, some sort of arrangement might be possible. The Communists probably might not be willing to make a clear cut agreement to accept lists of prisoners which were revised explicitly in accordance with the principle of voluntary repatriation. They might, however, agree to some sort of an approach in which we stated to them they must realize we had a problem in that we have some people who just wouldn’t go back, that we had some people who would go back who were not on our present lists, and that a revision of the Prisoner of War list, which added up to approximately the same numbers as were now involved, might be a useful thing to do.
General Vandenberg thought that General Ridgway was making two particular points. First, that if segregation were postponed until the question had been discussed with the Communists, there was no reason why in case of Communist rejection the UN could not proceed later [Page 113] with unilateral reclassification. Second, that if we would proceed now with unilateral reclassification, we might endanger UN prisoners who were in Communist hands.
Mr. Johnson stated that in general the State Department was in agreement with this point of view. However, the State Department was worried about giving General Ridgway authority to make the specific statement which he had proposed in his earlier telegram.4 This statement seemed to be too precise and almost too cut and dry. Because of the Communist hints that they might settle on a basis of approximate numbers without any agreement as to principle, it might be useful to use somewhat more finesse in exploring enemy intentions.
General Collins asked whether we could arrive at a figure of 132,000 prisoners after screening out those who would forcibly resist repatriation.
Mr. Johnson thought it might be possible.
General Vandenberg queried the possibility on grounds of General Ridgway’s estimate that about 70,0005 people did not want to go back.
Mr. Johnson stated that the staff study6 which had been prepared in Tokyo for General Hull and himself had arrived at a figure of between 3,000 and 4,000 Koreans and 11,000 Chinese who would not want to be repatriated. He personally, although he was obviously in no position to question the estimates, felt that the Chinese figure might be high. We had added possibly 500 prisoners since the lists were exchanged and there might also be a possibility of making some substitution from the approximately 7,500 civilian North Koreans who want to be repatriated.
General Collins pointed out that the possibility of substituting either civilians or recently captured prisoners had not been presented to General Ridgway. He felt that General Ridgway should have an opportunity to comment on such a possibility before anything in the nature of instructions along these lines were sent to him.
Mr. Ferguson stated that the point really was not to make any promise to the Communists of meeting a given figure of POW’s, but to find a way to probe Communist intentions in the light of their recent hints without presenting them with a proposition which they would be called upon either to accept or to reject.
General Vandenberg interpreted General Ridgway’s earlier telegram as indicating his intention to probe Communist intentions.
General Collins felt that the State Department had reason to be concerned over the way this probing was carried out. He suggested that it might be useful to explore the possibility of holding confidential discussions [Page 114] with the Communists on the POW issue, and thought that Mr. Ferguson’s language of probing Communist intentions without presenting a specific proposition for acceptance or rejection might well be used in a message to General Ridgway. (It was agreed that Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews would draft a message7 along these lines for circulation early in the afternoon of the same day.)
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A note on the title page of the source text read: “State draft. Not cleared with any of the participants.”
Generals Collins and Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler attended for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Allison, Ferguson, Johnson, and Stelle attended for the Department of State. These seven men were the only participants. Matters other than Korea were discussed at this meeting.
↩- This draft was sent out in final form as JCS 904385 to Ridgway. For the text, see p. 116.↩
- Supra.↩
- The telegram under reference was CX 65424, Ridgway to JCS, Mar. 17, p. 91.↩
- For Ridgway’s estimate, see telegram CX 65424, ibid.↩
- See footnote 4 p. 78.↩
- In final form this draft was transmitted as JCS 904385 to Ridgway. For the text, see p. 116.↩