Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795B.11/3–2752

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Truman¹

confidential

Pusan, March 21, 1952.

My Dear Mr. President: Your good letter of March 4, 1952² was handed to me personally by Amb Muccio and I am exceedingly sorry to realize how I have caused you so much concern by my open statement re the cease-fire negotiations. I need not remind you that it is you who have saved us by your momentous decision to defend Korea against aggression and that we owe you our very lives. My people have been given at least, a fighting chance. Not only Koreans will remember you with deepest gratitude but all the peoples of the free world will always acclaim you as the greatest leader in world history in the cause of human freedom and security. Indeed I am the last person to raise voice against any change you may deem necessary to pursue in your efforts to settle the Communist problem in Korea as well as in the entire world.

Mr. President, allow me to express frankly what I have had in mind for some time past. Please accept this as a sincere personal conviction of one of your grateful admirers, whose only desire is to see you succeed in completing the greatest service you undertook to render to all humanity by checking the expansion of Communism. You will remember how spontaneously the entire free world responded to your call for a joint action against the Communist aggression in Korea and against the possibility of another world war. The cease-fire talks have, however, dampened the morale and high spirit you so inspiringly and effectively aroused among all free men everywhere, besides allowing the Communists to build up to dangerous proportions. I always believed in a strong American leadership in the Orient and I was strengthening the American hand against the middle ground groups in the United Nations. I counted upon a final positive direction coming from the United States at the last moment. Now I simply cannot persuade myself to believe that it is your own opinion and conviction that this change is a right course to follow.

If it is truly your personal conviction that armistice of some kind must be agreed upon and if you want my cooperation in it, there is no question of my doing my best to rise to your expectation, even if I have to do so against my own judgment. But my personal cooperation wld not mean much unless I won a solid support from my people. It is my deep belief, therefore, that my collaboration with you in this matter wld be more effective and more heartily embraced by my people, if the following suggestions could receive your favorable consideration.

(1) A mutual security pact between our two nations, I sincerely believe, is an essential thing. Since your desire has been, as we all know, to defend Korea against Red aggression, there can be no reason for objecting to such a pact which alone wld give the Korean people the supporting assurance they would badly need during a hazardous armistice. With a mutual security pact backing me, I am sure Mr. President, I can succeed in persuading my people to accept an armistice. The absence of any pact of reassuring nature, on the other hand, wld dangerously accentuate the prevalent dread that Korea will be abandoned, if the worst comes to the worst. In that case, the Koreans wld rather fight to death.

Among various current reports, some of which I expect to turn out as groundless rumors: There is a persistent story that certain high US authorities are of the opinion that Koreans cannot defend their country without aid from their neighbors and that the neighbor that would help them is Japan. Should this rumored idea be translated into policy, the Communist cause wld be boosted as being patriotic, native forces fighting Communism utterly demoralized. From bitter past experiences, many non-Communist Koreans wld be forced to hug Communism as preferable to Japanese domination.

(2) The ROK army expansion program should be speeded up, I believe. The Communists keep building up their fighting forces wherever possible and by all available means. We cannot afford to lag behind the Communist tempo in building up our own defences. The dependability and fighting capability of Korean boys have been amply proved in the present conflict in Korea. I willingly place the Korean manpower at the disposal of the free world. If you could commission proper authorities to train, equip and arm an adequate number of Koreans, part of whom wld serve as UN police force anywhere in the world, if so required, it wld be a wise plan for world security, apart from the security of Korea. I very much wish your govt explicitly to commit itself to a definite well-worked-out program for expanding ROK army. I do not doubt that my people thus assured of their national safety, will be more readily persuaded to cooperate with you in the matter of armistice.

Let me say a few more words to assure you that this nation is one in perfect unity, so far as our struggle against Communism is concerned, which assurance you seem to like to have, as a certain passage in your letter indicates. There is nothing that will shake this national unity. It is true that we have political controversies from time to time. But it is a distortion to represent these controversies as disunity. As a matter of fact, controversies are inalienable from free discussion, just as free discussion is inalienable from democracy. Stamp out controversies and we shall stamp out democracy.

Recently, an amendment of the Constitution was proposed to the effect that the President be elected by popular vote instead of the Assembly vote, as provided for in the present Constitution, and that the National Assembly be made bicameral.³ The proposal was made with a view to broadening as well as perpetuating the basis of the republican form of govt. The developments around this problem of constitutional amendment have been misrepresented as something threatening the national unity. But, I assure you, Mr. President, that they do not affect unity, so long as they take place in the free atmosphere of open discussion. It is my faith that the will of the people will be the ultimate arbiter of all political matters.

With sincere wishes and prayers for your good health and success.

Yours cordially,

Syngman Rhee

1. This letter was transmitted to Washington in telegram 937 from Pusan, Mar. 27. The original letter, dated Mar. 21 but handed by President Rhee to Muccio on Mar. 27, was pouched to the Department.
2. Ante, p. 74.
3. This amendment to the Republic of Korea’s constitution was the focal point of conflict between President Rhee and his opponents in the National Assembly. In an effort to assure his own reelection, Rhee attempted to force the amendment through the Assembly with the required two-thirds majority. Failing this, Rhee tried to go over the heads of the Assembly members by suggesting that the issue be settled by popular referendum. The National Assembly members countered with an amendment of their own calling for a parliamentary system with the cabinet responsible to the Assembly rather than the President. For more details on this constitutional crisis, see UN document A/2187, pp. 5–6.