Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/3–2452: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, March 20, 1952—11:13 p.m.

C 65650. Para 8 requires immediate consideration.

Comparison of JCS 904101 with CX 65424 and C 65430² reveals differences in understanding rather than disagreements in principle. With this in mind I make the following comments:

1. Re para 2: There is no intent to accept any substantial downward revision of numbers of UNC POWs already furnished by Communists. It would be made very clear to them that the agreement to exchange POWs is contingent upon acceptance by each side of the revised lists of POWs to be exchanged. This agreement to revise the lists and the checking of the revised lists before accepting them as the bases for exchange is a safeguard which would eliminate the chance of Communists retaliation against UNC POWs, whereas implementation of plan set forth in JCS 902159³ provides no guarantee whatever and would leave our POWs at the mercy of the Communists. The UNC Delegation feels that Communists might agree to an exchange based on revised lists, but would never accept a fait accompli. The basic difference in plans (JCS 902159 and CX 65424) is one of approach.

2. Re Para 3A: It is possible that there are a small number of non-Korean POWs alive in Communist hands who have not been reported on the Communists list. We also believe there are a considerable number of South Korean POWs in Communist hands who are not included on POW list, most of whom have been incorporated into the North Korean Army. We believe that the list of 11,559 is all the POWs which the Communists will ever admit are in their hands. We know of no procedure or plan yet conceived which would increase the number to be exchanged. The foregoing of course excludes POWs captured subsequent to 18 December.

3. Re Para 3B: It is felt here that no screening either covert or overt can be undertaken without such action becoming quickly known to the Communists. We therefore feel it essential, in order to avoid jeopardy to our own POWs, to seek Communist agreement to plan proposed in CX 65424 which would necessarily include screening of the POWs we hold. We are giving detailed study to the method of screening prisoners of war so as to insure, insofar as practicable, the selection out of only those who would oppose violently return to Communist control. If our detailed plans reveal a need for technical assistance we will make our requirements known to you. The offer contained in JCS 904101 is greatly appreciated.

4. Re Para 4B:

A. The whole basis under the plan (CX 65424) is to obtain prior agreement with the Communists to elimination of forced return of POWs without thereby jeopardizing our own POWs. This appears to us to be the course of action which would expose our POWs to the least possible chance of retaliation. It would avoid a unilateral and covert reclassification made without prior agreement with or notice to the Communists and would likewise avoid forcing the Communists publicly to agree to voluntary repatriation.

B. Only by allaying any possible Communist suspicion that the UNC is adopting under-handed and unilateral methods, can we protect ourselves against their taking retaliatory measures against UNC POWs in their hands. The UNC Delegation has found by experience that the Communists are extremely sensitive toward any proposal or action on our part which is unilateral or arbitrary. They insist on bilateral agreement on even unimportant matters. We feel strongly that arbitrary action by us on such a vital issue as this would be a grave mistake.

5. Re Para 5B:

A. Essentially I object, both ideologically and practically, to the acceptance of the USSR as a member of a supervisory organ under any circumstances. From a practical viewpoint acceptance of Soviets in a privileged status in our rear areas presents an intolerable problem of control. In essence, the admission of Soviet personnel to membership in any organ created by the Armistice Agreement confers upon them a measure of authority unaccompanied by any restraining responsibility. I cannot agree with the thesis that this membership would identify the Soviet Union with the Communist aggressors. Neither do I agree that Soviet membership would be no worse than Czech or Polish membership. We are already committed to accept the latter. We are totally uncommitted to accept the Soviet Union.

B. I feel we should never concede on this point and believe there is an excellent possibility the Communists will concede subsequent to the action recommended in my HNC 1033,⁴ which I strongly reaffirm.

6. Re Para 6: In the last analysis it may become necessary to resort to a “package” proposal involving unresolved major issues. However, the probability of acceptance of a package is enhanced by any reduction of the number of issues involved, particularly if the concessions involved in acceptance are more equalized. Consequently, we are seeking the resolution of as many issues as practical and possible prior to presentation of the “package” draft of the Armistice Agreement. Based on experience the UNC Delegation feels this approach is that most favorable to eventual attainment of an armistice.

7. Re Para 7: I consider that at this stage in negotiations, the resolution of the Russian issue as well as any other major issue involving Communist concession would be an additional indication of a desire to attain an armistice and a step towards its attainment. It must be fully realized, however, that the Communists possess the capability of introducing at any time additional issues and then of magnifying them to major proportions.

8. The virtual standstill in discussions on Agenda Item 4 dictates urgent action. Accordingly, I plan to present to the Communists at Staff Officer level, at the meeting scheduled for 1100I March 23, the proposal outlined in CX 65424. I interpret the final sentence of your Para 4A JCS 90401 [904101] as authority for this action. Does this interpretation reflect your view?⁵

9. The view contained in this and referenced messages are the result of the full collaboration of the UNC Senior Delegate and key US members of the Delegation and represent unanimity of opinion.

1. A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.
2. For text of JCS 904101, Mar. 20, see p. 104; both other telegrams are dated Mar. 17, pp. 91 and 95.
3. Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.
4. Dated Mar. 11, p. 80.
5. The President was favorably impressed with Ridgway’s views in paragraph 5 of this telegram and approved the proposal in paragraph 8; telegram, Naval Aide to the President to JCS, DA IN 118977, Mar. 21, 1952. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 37)