795.00/3–2452: Telegram
The Commander in Chieft Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
operational immediate
CX 65592. This msg in 2 parts.
Part 1. Fol msg received from CINCUNC Adv on 20 March 52 is quoted for your info, without any evaluation here, and without altering in any way the recommendations contained in CX 65424 and CX [C] 65430:1 “This msg in 2 parts.
“Part 1.
“Para 1. For past several days Communist correspondents at Panmunjom have been casually vague but persistently optimistic over early settlement of remaining issues of armistice. They have also dropped frequent veiled hints to UNC newsmen that ‘secret discussion’ might be one way of resolving current problems.
“2. On an individual basis responsible UNC correspondents have attempted to firm up Commie hints with some degree of success. Fol is a reasonably complete compilation made by UNC Adv as result of conversations with above mentioned UNC correspondents:
- “A. Communist correspondents feel item 3 as good as settled but won’t say so specifically. Communists give impression they are prepared to yield on nomination of Soviet Union at appropriate time, or alternatively, USSR will ask that her name be withdrawn. No mention made or hints given on airfield rehabilitation issue. Three to 4 weeks is time period most frequently mentioned for complete armistice.
- “B. Communist correspondents are more specific on item 4, and indicate March 5 proposal means they are willing to forget about 44,000 names they have submitted to UNC if UNC forgets about 53,000 figure mentioned frequently by UNC.
- “C. They also hint they would be agreeable to having Staff Officers work out new prisoner of war list from which would be eliminated all those not desiring repatriation. One Red correspondent says new lists should total same figure as Dec 18 list, and he hints the deletions presumably would be made up for by inclusion of similar number of names of prisoners taken since that time. They appear to be highly sensitive to idea of NK or Chinese PW publicity denouncing Communism at exchange point as we have suggested in our voluntary repatriation concept and will do much to avoid this possibility. They also appear to recognize as a practical fact that there are PWs in UNC camps who will resist repatriation, violently if necessary.
- “D. The Communist newsmen’s tentative exploration on ‘secret discussions’ could be a sounding out of UNC correspondents to attempt to determine feelings of UNC Press on accepting this possible restriction on the hitherto free flow of news.
“Part 2.
- “1. The preceding information indicates that at the proper time the solution of remaining issues might be facilitated by maintaining secrecy of subject matter of truce discussions for a limited period. A change from the current press policy is an obstacle which is not considered serious if tactfully handled. It is believed it could be handled by a tacit understanding on temporary press policy by the Communists and the UNC delegation and possibly a carefully worded statement of policy to the correspondents.
- “2. Although UNC correspondents here represent working level press rather than executives and policy makers who are in Tokyo and/or Zone of Interior, feeling at press train is that a postponement in the flow of detailed daily info would be completely acceptable if by so doing an armistice could be hastened. In fact, they are incorrectly but quietly speculating amongst themselves that the absence of any hard news on PW staff discussions during past 3 days means that ‘secret talks’ are already under way. Furthermore, they are accepting their inaccurate assumption with good grace. Signed Harrison.”
Part 2. In view of the fact that disclosures of above information would probably prevent success of the plan, it is mandatory that every possible security precaution be taken to prevent leakage.