Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/3–2452: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)¹

top secret
priority

Washington, March 20, 1952—2:18 a.m.

JCS 904101. From JCS.

1. Concur in your view that every effort should be made to determine whether our 2 objectives of obtaining prompt return UNC POWs and of avoiding forced repatriation can be attained by agreement with Commies prior to taking action directed in Para 1, JCS 902159.² Further concur that action proposed in CX 65424³ may offer some remote possibility of accomplishing this, and in any event, may serve as possible gauge of Commie reaction to action directed in JCS 902159. However, there is grave concern here over certain implications of your proposal on which we would like your addl comment prior to our making final decision.

2. We recognize that if Commies reject your proposal we have lost nothing. On other hand, if they accept, they could then have an agreed principle on which to base further reclassification and downward revision of lists of UNC POWs already furnished. That is, in spite of efforts made to avoid such result in proposed statement in Para 6 of CX 65424, UNC will have in effect agreed to Commie retaliation against UNC POWs, if such should take place, thereby seriously weakening our future position on this question. Thus, unless unmistakably clear that Commies, in accepting your proposal, will acquiesce to downward revision of our lists without similar action on their part, which would seem to be most unlikely, action proposed in CX 65424 may actually increase dangers of retaliation against UNC POWs. Of course, we recognize that if Commies do acquiesce to downward revision of our lists without similar action on their part, your proposal offers some advantages over action directed in JCS 902159; however, in this connection it should be noted that if Commies acquiesce in your proposal it appears likely that they would also acquiesce in action directed in JCS 902159 modified as proposed in JCS 903687.⁴

3. In addn to comments on foregoing, request your comments on folg specific questions raised by CX 65424:

A. Re second sentence Para 2. Do you now consider that list of 11559 POWs received from Commies includes all non-Korean personnel captured by Commies and now alive in their hands? Do you now consider that South Koreans included in list of 11559 POWs represent great majority of Koreans captured by Commies and now alive in their hands?

B. Re Para 4. Fully recognized here that no system of either covert or overt screening can be completely accurate and that some personnel will inevitably be classified incorrectly. We are prepared to accept this. Also recognize that circumstances existing in enclosures at moment of screening will inevitably influence choice of many individuals. However, consider that methods used should do all possible to minimize these factors and to distinguish to max practicable extent between those who would violently resist repatriation and those who would merely elect not to be repatriated if given completely free choice, with view of restricting those retained to former category. If you desire, we will make every effort to provide you with any technical assistance available to United States Govt in formulating polling methods to achieve these purposes.

4. Re Part 1 C 65430.⁵

A. As indicated above we concur fully that UNC should exhaust every reasonable possibility of obtaining Commie agreement to an exchange that will not involve forced repatriation and at same time not unduly jeopardize prompt return of UNC POWs, and we are prepared to give full consideration to any proposals you may have in this regard. It would appear from here that efforts to obtain Commie agreement on POWs can be taken within the broad terms of approach outlined in JCS 903687. It was not intent of this proposed approach to rule out any further efforts to obtain such an agreement by other tactics if this appeared possible. However, JCS 903687 was based on impression created here by your HNC 1033⁶ that further negot by subdels under then existing conditions was intolerable and that only by convincing Commies of our determination to stand inflexibly on minimum positions on the 3 major issues could we hope to make any progress toward an acceptable armistice. If you now feel that there is possibility of progress without adopting inflexible final positions we have no objection to your making further efforts in that direction, bearing in mind considerations set forth in Para 2 above.

B. If Commie position on forced repatriation is in fact unalterable it would not appear that any course of action can be devised that could result in successful conclusion of armistice based upon our minimum positions on outstanding issues. If, however, Commie position is not entirely unalterable, tactics outlined JCS 903687 would seem to offer best chance of success as they would permit Commies to interpret UNC position on airfields as clear concession and UNC position on inspection organ as reasonable compromise, while not requiring Commies agree to principle of voluntary or non-forcible repatriation. Also, our determination on issue of forcible repatriation of POWs would have been unmistakably demonstrated to Commies by prior screening and classification of POWs held by UNC. Also, if Commies are willing to agree to armistice on basis our minimum positions, proposal outlined JCS 903687 would appear offer best possibilities for expediting negots and thereby hastening return of UNC POWs held by Commies. If Commies are not willing to agree to armistice on basis our minimum positions, tactics proposed JCS 903687 would not in themselves appear to increase hazards to UNC POWs held by Commies. However, if you feel that there are clear advantages in making known to Commies our intent reclassify and segregate POWs who would violently object to repatriation prior to or at time action is taken we have no objection.

5. Re Part 2 C 65430.

A. We defer to your judgment.

B. Re Paras B and C. There appears to be misunderstanding with regard to irrevocable stand authorized you on Soviet issue. The irrevocable position authorized you in Para 1 JCS 902160⁷ referred to unacceptability of USSR as a mbr of a neutral supervisory commission. As indicated in Para 2 C 65430 we saw no objection to Soviet mbrship on a supervisory commission which was not designated as neutral. Our views on this question are further amplified in Para 2 D (1) (B) (1) JCS 903687. Considered here there would be definite advantages to having Soviet Union publicly associated with and forming part of armistice mechanism in position clearly identifying Soviets with Commie aggressors. While difficulties arising from presence Soviets in ROK full realized, it is not considered these should be markedly more serious than presence of satellite ofcrs among whom in any event at least some Soviet Natls will probably be included. Such difficulties should be more than offset by advantage of presence of United States personnel on inspection teams in NK in event Commies accept this alternative. Considered here any of three alternatives set forth Para 2 D (1) (B) JCS 903687 is acceptable and that our general position is much stronger if we put forward these three constructive alternatives for solving this issue rather than remain in an essentially negative position of simply opposing Soviet Union as a “neutral”. In view of above do you still believe it would be desirable to try to dispose of Soviet participation question prior to presentation of final positions on airfields and POWs?

6. If it becomes necessary to recognize that total impasse has been reached it would be to our advantage that Commies be forced to reject our proposals on several grounds and thereby emphasize their intransigence. For this reason we favor the package deal. We believe that proposed package deal does not increase danger of providing a new point of departure for negots beyond that which already is inherent in situation. For instance, if issue of USSR on inspection teams is disposed of, leaving only exchange of prisoners and airfields, and it becomes necessary at some point to propose compromise now contained in package deal on these points, this would offer as much of a point of departure as package deal itself. It would seem necessary to us in either case to insist that offer should be accepted or rejected as whole. If it is rejected, then it would be possible to recess daily mtgs until Commies wished to reconsider their rejection or have further proposals for final settlement. The package deal seems to us to have advantage of having such recess occur with 3 items open rather than merely the 1 issue of POWs.

7. Re Part 3 Para B, C 65430. It is possible we do not understand clearly your apparent view that final Commie position on Soviet issue will indicate whether Commies desire an armistice. It is view here that adamant Commie insistence on Soviet participation as neutral probably indicates they do not desire an armistice. On other hand, Commie recession on this issue does not necessarily indicate desire for an armistice so long as other issues, particularly POWs, remain unsolved.

8. Your further views are requested re JCS 903687 as amplified in foregoing pd [paragraph?].

1. This message was sent to the President in Key West as JCS 904095 on Mar. 19, 1952. On the assumption that it represented no change in previously approved policy and that the views therein expressed were subject to comments from Ridgway, Truman approved it; telegram from the U.S.S. Williamsburg, Naval Aide to President to Joint Chiefs of Staff, DA IN 118190, Mar. 19, 1952. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 27)
2. Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.
3. Dated Mar. 17, p. 91.
4. Dated Mar. 15, p. 89.
5. Dated Mar. 17, p. 95.
6. Dated Mar. 11, p. 80.
7. Dated Feb. 27, p. 71.