Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

[Extract]

top secret

[Washington,] March 19, 1952—11 a.m.

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Message on Package Proposal to General Ridgway

(Note: Almost the entire meeting was devoted to a revision of an army draft message to General Ridgway² commenting on General Ridgway’s reply³ to the first Washington message⁴ on a package proposal on outstanding issues. This summary of the meeting does not attempt to record most of the discussion at the meeting but attempts to set out the principal points of interest to State.)

General Vandenberg: When we had the meeting with the President it was my impression that he had a slight reservation in his mind on the POW issue. I felt that he wanted to consider this matter once more before finally going ahead with the segregation of prisoners who do not want to be returned.

Mr. Matthews: That was not my impression. I thought a final decision had been taken; in fact, I thought we had so stated in the outgoing message.

Mr. Johnson: That was also my impression.

General Vandenberg: We did put a statement to that effect in the outgoing message; however, Secretary Lovett has the same idea that I do. We both felt that there was a reservation.

Mr. Matthews: If there is any doublt about it, we can ask him.

Admiral Fechteler: I had the same impression as General Vandenberg.

Mr. Matthews: We took this matter up because General Ridgway had asked for a final and irrevocable position and because everyone thought he was entitled to such a position.

General Vandenberg: In my view the Administration, particularly Defense and State, are going to find themselves in the middle of a fine political situation. It is a situation in which we can’t win. Regardless of what the opposition says we will be in a difficult position.

General Bolte: Is there not real doubt concerning the attitude which the U.S. public will take on this matter? No one knows which position they will most strongly support. Will they advocate leaving our boys in communist hands or will they want to insist on the principle of no involuntary repatriation? I think that is the question which the President is up against.

General Vandenberg: Secretary Lovett and I spoke to the Senators about this problem and told them of the decision that had been taken. We urged them to go ahead with the resolution on this matter. I think it is noteworthy that no resolution has been forthcoming. This may indicate that there is a shift in their thinking.

General Bolte: Of course that may be because the President has taken the initiative by making the decision. He has taken the ball and run with it and they may have lost interest for that reason.

Bacteriological Warfare

Mr. Matthews: I would like to raise one question with you regarding a message we have received from New Delhi relating to bacteriological warfare.⁵ The Indian Ambassador in Peking has sent Nehru a message on this subject which Foreign Minister Bajpai has showed Ambassador Bowles. Among the points the message makes is that the Chinese Communists have specifically charged that on 6 March three U.S. planes dropped cannisters containing germ-laden flies on Tsingtao. The Chinese Communist Foreign Office states that these cannisters and their contents are now being scientifically studied in the Peking medical center. The Chinese Communists state that this is the first time U.S. planes have attacked China proper. They further state that similar cannisters have been picked up near Panmunjom and elsewhere in North Korea.

Mr. Johnson: The Chinese Communist radio has elaborated this theme. It has reported that a U.S. plane flew over Tsingtao and that all kinds of bugs were released—ants, beetles, flies, fleas, etc.

Mr. Matthews: Of course we know that no bugs were dropped but we wanted to be sure before replying to New Delhi that no U.S. planes were over Tsingtao on reconnaissance missions.

General Vandenberg: Certainly no such flights have been authorized. If you wish I can query to determine whether any flights were undertaken on local authority.

Mr. Matthews: Do they have local authority to make such flights?

General Vandenberg: They are doing some reconnaissance over Manchuria.

General Lee:⁶ They have no authority locally to fly over the area you mentioned.

Mr. Johnson: It would be helpful if we could state categorically that no planes were over that area.

Admiral Fechteler: I think you should make such a categorical statement in any event.

General Vandenberg: If any were flying over they were only taking photographs. I doubt that there were any there.

Mr. Matthews: Is it your answer that there were no planes there?

General Vandenberg: I recommend that you state categorically that none were there whether or not any were there. I do not think any were there.

Message on Package Proposal to Ridgway

The first point to be discussed was the section of the message querying General Ridgway about his proposal on POWs.

Mr. Johnson said that it was important to know whether General Ridgway thought that the list of 3100 U.S. POWs included all of the U.S. POWs alive and in communist hands. He thought that our decision on the POW issue would be affected if we thought that General Ridgway’s proposal would really secure the return of all American POWs. It might be that we were not going to obtain the return of all American POWs in any event. He also thought we should obtain General Ridgway’s view as to whether the communists would reclassify some of the ROK POW’s.

Admiral Fechteler thought there was no point in querying General Ridgway on these matters because he couldn’t possibly answer the questions.

Colonel Matthews pointed out that General Ridgway had stated that his plan would result in getting back all of the non-Korean POW’s and most of the Korean POW’s. That was the basic argument in support of General Ridgway’s plan. Colonel Matthews stated that there was some doubt in Washington about this judgment. He therefore thought that General Ridgway ought to be queried on the point in order to determine whether or not he could back up his statement.

Admiral Fechteler thought that it was unnecessary to have a long explanation as to why we concurred in General Ridgway’s desire not to meet with the top communist general. He suggested that we merely state that we deferred to his judgment. After some discussion this suggestion was accepted. In the course of this discussion Colonel Matthews stated that we in Washington were all becoming aware that a Congressional investigation of these matters might lie ahead and that General Ridgway was building up a terrific case for the record. He thought that if we merely deferred to General Ridgway’s judgment on this point it would make the JCS look like a “bunch of stoops” since the JCS had advocated a top level meeting strongly in its outgoing message. Admiral Fechteler replied that this possibility had never entered his head and he didn’t give a damn about it anyway.

The next point discussed concerned the advisability of a three part package as compared to a two part package. Admiral Fechteler was inclined to think that we should accept General Ridgway’s view on the advantages of getting rid of the Soviet representation issue first, which would leave two issues outstanding. He took this view because he thought that General Ridgway was in a better position to judge the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches from the point of view of the negotiations.

Mr. Bohlen stated that General Ridgway probably was in the best position to judge the negotiating problem but pointed out that our recommendation rested on our view that it would be preferable from the point of view of world opinion to suspend negotiations with three issues outstanding than with two issues outstanding. He said that some doubt had already been cast on the firmness of our position with respect to airfields. Therefore, General Ridgway’s proposal, if accepted, would focus world attention on the POW problem which, as everyone recognized, presented many difficulties from the point of view of world opinion.

Mr. Ferguson pointed out that General Ridgway did not understand Washington’s position on Soviet representation and that there might be only two issues—airfields and POW’s. Mr. Matthews said that General Ridgway had never told us why he thought we should not accept Russia under any circumstances on the inspection teams.

Admiral Fechteler asked whether we would still favor a three part package if it would be possible to dispose of the Soviet representation issue either by making them a member of the inspection commission or by rejecting them as a neutral. Mr. Matthews indicated that we still would favor a three part package because we felt that there were great advantages in having three outstanding issues, in order to avoid overemphasis on the POW problem. It was agreed that it was important to explain fully to General Ridgway why we favored a three part package and then to query him as to whether, in light of our explanation, he still favored disposing of the Soviet representation issue first.

Later in the meeting there was again a discussion of the POW matter. Admiral Fechteler asked the State representatives to explain once more why they favored a three part package. Mr. Bohlen stated that there was general agreement that the POW issue was a very tough issue for us to handle. We all felt that there would be a great uproar if this was the only issue preventing the conclusion of an armistice and the return of our own prisoners. If the negotiations were to collapse in any event, it would be advantageous for us to show that there were three good reasons why an armistice could not be concluded. It would be advantageous, in other words, that the communists were intransigent with respect to airfields and Russian representation as well as the POW’s.

Admiral Fechteler said that a number of fellows in Tokyo and Korea felt that if Washington would only give up its altruistic concern for a lot of worthless Chinese there wouldn’t be any problem about POW’s. Mr. Bohlen took issue with Admiral Fechteler and stated that there was nothing altruistic about our position. We had attached great importance to the POW issue and the communists knew that it was repugnant to us to force the return of prisoners who did not want to return. If, having taken this strong position, we should now cave in on it it would be convincing to the Communists that in a pinch we will cave in on anything, even if it is of great importance. The communists and other totalitarians work on the basis of test, test, test, to find out how solid the opponent’s position is. If we should now change our position we would greatly weaken ourselves vis-à-vis the communists. It would be interpreted as a real sign of Western weakness.

There was some discussion of General Ridgway’s belief that the communist position on Soviet representation would definitively clarify whether or not the communists want an armistice. It was agreed by the conferees that an adamant communist stand on Soviet representation would probably show that the communists did not want an armistice; however, it was also agreed that a communist revision of their position on Soviet representation would not necessarily indicate, as General Ridgway thought, that the communists want an armistice—especially while other important issues remain open.

Mr. Bohlen, referring to the package problem, said that perhaps General Ridgway’s objective was to obtain a deadlock on the Soviet representation issue alone. It was possible that General Ridgway felt that the communists were not going to budge on this one and that our position would be best if a deadlock arose on this issue before we ever got to the POW and airfields issues. At the same time Mr. Bohlen thought that we should not predicate our position on a break—rather we should take the point of view that if it becomes necessary to recognize that a total impasse has been reached, it would be desirable to break on three issues rather than one or two.

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1. A note on the title page read: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants.” Of the Chiefs of Staff, General Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler attended, as well as Vice Chief of Staff General Bolté. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent, General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense, and Lay for the National Security Council. Altogether 17 persons were present. Matters other than Korea were discussed at this meeting.
2. The revised telegram under reference was sent as JCS 904101, Mar. 20, 1952, infra.
3. The telegram under reference was C 65430 to JCS, Mar. 17, p. 95.
4. The message referred to was JCS 903687 to Ridgway, Mar. 15, p. 89.
5. The reference was to telegram 3381, from New Delhi, Mar. 18, 1952, not printed. (611.0026/3–1852)
6. Maj. Gen. Robert M. Lee was the Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, U.S. Air Force.