S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 118 Series
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council
top secret
Washington, June 1, 1953.
Subject:
- Additional United Nations Forces for Korea
References:
- A.
- NSC 118/2 (Paragraphs 2-a(3) and 2-b(7))1
- B.
- NSC 147 (Paragraphs 168–180)2
- C.
- NSC Action No. 759-b3
At the direction of the President the attached letter from Ambassador
Lodge is circulated herewith
for the consideration of the Council at an early meeting.
The current policy of the United States on the subject is as follows
(NSC 118/2):
- a.
- In the event an armistice is achieved: “Exert vigorous efforts
to continue the contribution by UN members of forces to the UN
command in Korea so long as UN forces are required in
Korea.”
- b.
- In the event that armistice negotiations clearly fail: “Exert
vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from those
countries already participating as well as to obtain
contributions from UN countries which have not yet contributed
military forces”.
On April 8, 1953, the Council considered changing current practice with
respect to seeking reimbursement from nations maintaining forces
[Page 1130]
in Korea for the costs of
logistical support furnished them by the United States. The Council
agreed that “current practice regarding reimbursement by the United
States for logistic support of other UN forces in Korea should be
continued for the time being” (NSC
Action No. 759-b).
The arguments for reconsideration of the Council’s decision on April 8,
and for undertaking now a renewed effort to secure additional forces
from UN members for service in Korea are set forth in Ambassador
Lodge’s letter.
The Council’s attention is invited to the importance of the question of
the timing of the proposed effort.
[Attachment]
The United States Representative at the United
Nations (Lodge) to the President
secret
New
York, May 19, 1953.
Dear General: The purpose of this letter is
to propose that the United States start a renewed and vigorous
campaign to get more troops from other members of the United Nations
for service in Korea.
The reasons are as follows:
- 1.
- We would thereby reduce our own part in the load of
combat.
- 2.
- Respect in this country for our allies and other members
of the United Nations would be increased.
- 3.
- Respect for the United Nations as an effective instrument
against aggression would be increased because the unjust
criticism of the United Nations for not having supplied
enough allies—and which was not the fault of the United
Nations—would be lessened.
- 4.
- A larger number of countries would become committed by
deeds to the United Nations principle of collective
resistance to aggression, which would be of great value in
case of any future aggression.
- 5.
- Additional troops would thus become available for
occupation duties in Korea.
- 6.
- Thus larger numbers than otherwise of our own troops could
be returned home and made available for service
elsewhere.
- 7.
- It would also facilitate carrying out our military program
within the limits of prospective economies.
- 8.
- There are real reasons for believing that more troops could be obtained so that this effort
would, therefore, be a success. For example, I received a
wholly unsolicited hint from Colombia to this effect.
- 9.
- Such a policy would be pleasing to countries which can
send troops, but cannot send dollars or matériel.
- 10.
- The country expects leadership to secure additional
effective allies and to lessen the drain on American
manpower in Korea.
- 11.
- Assuming a successful outcome of the current armistice
negotiations, this would be a good time to approach other
governments since
[Page 1131]
their troops sent to Korea would presumably not run the
usual risks of active military operations.
The steps to be undertaken are as follows:
- 1.
- The Defense and State Departments should revise policy
decisions taken on this matter under the previous
Administration which made unrealistic requirements
concerning the providing by foreign governments of financial
and logistic support. As I have already pointed out to you,
these requirements in effect eliminated foreign troops which
might otherwise have become available. In one policy
statement the Defense Department justified this decision on
the ground that there was no longer urgency about the war in
Korea—a position which, I think, was not supported by the
electorate last November.
- 2.
- The Defense Department should also determine what would be
the smallest unit that would be militarily bearable rather than desirable. In negotiations with other governments
we might initially ask for more, but should be prepared to
take less (down to the bearable unit) if forced to do
so.
- 3.
- The State Department should undertake a bilateral approach
to all members of the United Nations who have not
contributed forces and even to many of those who have, but
could contribute more. A resolution in the United Nations
General Assembly should not be introduced initially as it
could be used by the Communists to cause friction among free
nations.
- 4.
- I should help vigorously in my relations with other
delegations here and, if my contemplated trip to Korea and
Indochina in July takes place, might take it up with the
governments of the countries which I visit.
- 5.
- General Van
Fleet might be sent on a trip to selected
capitals around the world to help out.
The timing of the matter can be judged by an
event which occurred recently when I received more than eighty
members of Congress and their families at the United Nations for
breakfast sightseeing, and a session at which I agreed to answer all
questions. The question which made by far the greatest impression
was that of Representative Widnall of New Jersey who said that: “The
greatest disappointment of the American people seems to be in the
minor participation of other countries in the Korean war”, and who
asked whether any steps were currently being taken to try to secure
a greater participation on the part of other nations both with
respect to personnel and matériel.
This was not only the outstanding question of the session, but it was
also the question which the press stressed above all others.
Senator McCarthy has just announced that he will
sponsor an amendment to the Bill making appropriations for the
United Nations, reducing the United States contribution in inverse
ratio to the amount of troops contributed. While this is a
thoroughly fallacious proposal, it does reflect a strong public
feeling that our allies are not doing enough—a feeling which will
surely be raised in Congress.
[Page 1132]
Public announcement can be made when the issue
arises in Congress that the Administration is actively working to
develop more troops. Later it should be possible to make press
releases on actual troop increases. A public appeal by the President
should be carefully studied.
For all the reasons stated above, I recommend that you move promptly
to take the lead.
Faithfully yours,
P.S. I am sending an information copy of this letter to Foster Dulles, with whom I have
discussed the subject generally in the past, to Bobby Cutler and to Jerry
Persons.
