Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1
operational immediate
CX 62781. 1. Rhee’s msg2 is milder in tone and restraint than was expected and he has omitted any ref to the Korean POWs or to the 5nation custodial comm. It seems to us that the obvious care with which it was drafted is indicative of decision on his part to avoid plunging into reckless adventure. The 4 maj conditions to which he limits himself are:
- a.
- Mutual Def Pact.
- b.
- Mil and economic support.
- c.
- Retention of US air and naval forces. (Note: In view of his fourth point we interpret this to mean in the immediate area but outside Korea.)
- d.
- Simultaneous withdrawal of UN and Chinese and Communist forces from Korea.
2. On the basis of our present instr, we apparently are prepared to give satisfaction on 3 of them. The fourth—the simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and UN forces—is worthy of careful examination. Our immediate reaction (we only recd the text of Rhee’s msg in Tokyo 2 June at 1200) is that depending on Communist reply to UN 25 May proposal, Rhee’s fourth condition re withdrawal of forces might be met by offering at an aprop time in plenary sessions a proposal for the simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and UN forces. If this order is made, it should be understood, and this should be frankly explained to Rhee and our allies, that this issue will not be permitted to become a breaking point in negotiations. If this offer is not acptd by the Communists and there is little hope the Communists would acpt, we would announce [Page 1133] in plenary session our determination to support such a proposition ASAP at the polit conf where a peaceful settlement of the Korean ques is to be sought. We are confident that Rhee has no faith whatever in the ability of a polit conf to settle this or other maj issues involved in the Korean ques.
3. We remain convinced that offer to negotiate scty pact with Rhee should be deferred until after Panmunjom meeting scd 4 June. If Communists reject UN 25 May proposal, it would then be nec to review entire sit and our difficulties with ROK would no doubt be absorbed in whatever decision we then take. If on the other hand, it appears we are close to an agreement on PW issue, Briggs and I agree that we should meet with Rhee on 5 June and give him aprop assurances on scty pact, mil and economic aid, and retention outside Korea of US air and naval forces in status quo.
4. In summary, while Rhee shows determination to gain his objectives, and manifests unconcealed disdain for what he chooses to term appeasement, modulation of tone of his msg and circumspection with which he personally had acted alleviate some of apprehension as to emotional and reckless acts. Rhee’s msg although premised falsely on proposition that UN started to settle the Korean problem by mil means is relatively more favorable than we had feared.
5. It is our opinion that Rhee should refrain at this stage from public announcement his psn just as we are refraining on our side during period of exec session. In this connection, I concur in steps taken by Briggs to avoid publicity.
6. Murphy concurs in this msg.