Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

JCS files

Memorandum for the Record, Prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Department of the Army (Eddleman)

top secret

Washington, June 1, 1953.

Subject:

• Conference on the Current Difficulties with the ROK Government due to Their Dissatisfaction with Armistice Terms

1. At a State-JCS meeting on 29 May 1953,¹ convened primarily for the purpose of discussing the current difficulties with President Rhee and his ROK Government, due to their dissatisfaction with the latest UNC proposals for an armistice with the Communists, and to consider Plan “Everready” submitted by General Clark,² a joint decision was reached to prepare a memorandum for the President setting forth the situation and the steps which General Clark proposed to take to meet any emergencies arising therefrom. In addition to the normal State-JCS attendance, Mr. Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, was among others present. The memorandum for the President, with a covering memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, is attached as Inclosure “A”.³

2. The above-mentioned memorandum was presented separately to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in the late afternoon of 29 May and neither of them concurred in it as written. As an interim measure it was agreed between State and Defense to dispatch a cable to General Clark informing him in essence that: The seriousness of the situation was appreciated and would be presented to the President on 30 May; he was authorized to take preliminary measures to meet any threatened emergency resulting from difficulties with the ROK Government; in event of a grave emergency he was authorized to take such action as he deemed necessary to insure the integrity of his forces. He was authorized to inform Rhee that the Secretary of State would strongly recommend to the President that the U.S. agree to negotiate a bilateral security pact with the ROK Government. This latter authority was to be used at his discretion if it appeared that, by so informing Rhee, he could avoid a dangerous and provocative situation. In addition, General Clark was asked to comment on whether the offer to negotiate such a pact at this time would reconcile Rhee to an armistice according to most recent UNC proposals. This radio (DA 940238⁴) was dispatched to General Clark near midnight of 29 May.

3. The reply (DA IN 272275) to the above-mentioned radio was received from General Clark early on 30 May.⁵ In it he commented on the merits of informing Rhee of our willingness to enter into a bilateral security pact with the ROK Government and Rhee’s possible reaction thereto. He also commented on the feeling of Rhee and his government toward giving Communists access to Korean non-repatriate POWs.

4. A meeting for the purpose of discussing the subject of the bilateral security agreement was convened in the office of the Secretary of State at 1100, 30 May, and was attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, representing the JCS, the Under Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, U.S. Army, Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Department of State, and Mr. C. A. Sullivan, OSD. At this conference it was agreed that General Clark should be notified that the U.S. could not concur in that part of his plan which would establish a UNC military government. It was also agreed to recommend to the President that the U.S. authorize the offering to the ROK Government of a mutual defense treaty, along the lines of our current Philippine and ANZUS treaties, and conditioned upon the ROK Government agreeing to acceptance of an armistice along the lines most recently proposed by UNC, to cooperating in implementation of an armistice agreement, and to leaving its armed forces under operational control of CINCUNC until mutually agreed between the U.S. and the ROK that such arrangements were no longer necessary.

5. All of the conferees listed in paragraph 4 above, except the Under Secretary of State, then proceeded to the White House and met with the President in his office. The Secretary of State presented the gist of the recommendation concerning the offer of a bilateral U.S.-ROK security pact to Mr. Rhee, and the President promptly approved this recommendation. The conferees departed from the White House at about 1155. In the immediately ensuing discussion of this same subject, Mr. Dulles indicated to General Collins that, in his opinion, the message to General Clark, which was to inform him of our disapproval of the establishment of a UNC military government, should be a brief message without going too much into detail. In event of internal ROK political or miltary disaffection against the present ROK Government, he should be authorized to take whatever other measures he as the military commander might deem appropriate to safeguard the integrity and security of his forces. Also it was agreed that General Collins, Mr. Johnson, and General Eddleman should prepare promptly the necessary messages to General Clark and submit them to the Secretary of State and to the Secretary of Defense for approval prior to transmission.

6. Shortly after the conference with the President, General Eddleman and Mr. Johnson met with General Collins in his office and agreed as to the format and contents of the messages to be transmitted to General Clark. It was decided to send the message pertaining to the bilateral agreement separate from the one pertaining to instructions for General Clark in the event of an emergency arising from difficulties within the ROK Government. The drafts of these messages were completed about 1330 and were concurred in by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. Nash, and Mr. Sullivan from OSD. In addition, Mr. Nash concurred for the Secretary of Defense in both messages to General Clark. Mr. Johnson departed for Mr. Dulles’ home about 1400 to clear both messages with him. General Eddleman apprised Admiral Libby of the Navy and General Harris of the Air Force of the nature and scope of these messages and offered them the opportunity to read them and comment thereon, should they so desire.

7. Mr, Johnson returned to General Eddleman’s office at 1500 and informed him of the changes Mr. Dulles wished to make in the messages. The changes were non-substantive in character and General Eddleman incorporated them into the messages, informing General Collins by telephone that he had done so.

8. The two messages were dispatched to General Clark in the late afternoon of 30 May with emergency precedence. The one pertaining to the bilateral treaty was numbered DA 940241;⁶ the other, pertaining to the security of his forces, was numbered DA 940242.⁷

C. D. Eddleman
Major General GS

1. See the memorandum of discussion, May 29, p. 1114.
2. Printed as a paper submitted by Taylor, May 4, p. 965.
3. Not found attached.
4. Dated May 29, p. 1119.
5. Printed as CINGFE telegram CX 62747, May 30, p. 1120.
6. Dated May 30, p. 1122.
7. Dated May 30, p. 1123.