FE files, lot 55 D 338, “South Korean Attitude Toward Armistice, May 1953”
The Commander in Chief Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1
top
secret
emergency
emergency
Tokyo, May 30, 1953—9:02
p.m.
CX 62747. ReuradDA 940238.2
- 1.
- I note the authority you have given me in Para 2, reference message and I will govern myself accordingly.
- 2.
- With reference to the authority given to me in Para 3:
- a.
- This authority might be helpful and I will use it if the gravity of the situation requires. However, it would obviously be better, if I have to use this authority, to make the firm statement that the President is ready to negotiate such a pact.
- b.
- As to timing, I do not believe Rhee will take the more serious unilateral actions we fear without prior warning; he will threaten before he acts. Since we have delivered to him the aide-mémoire3 covering Briggs and my conversation with him, he will, in my opinion, give careful consideration to the cold facts and circumstances fully and clearly stated therein. Certainly we should wait until Rhee’s intentions are indicated, which I feel will not be before the Armistice meeting on Monday.4 By that time Rhee will not only have an indication of whether we have changed our position but will also have an indication of Communist reactions. After Rhee’s intentions become known, I will be in a better position to evaluate and analyze them and can determine whether and to what extent he is bluffing.
- 3.
- Reference your Para 4, to answer your question as to whether to
offer to negotiate a security pact with the ROK Government at this time would reconcile Rhee to an Armistice according to
most recent UNC proposals, I have
the following comments:
- a.
- If Rhee could be told at the appropriate time that the President is now willing to enter into such negotiations, he may feel that such action is coming late. Nevertheless, I believe it would improve our relations with Rhee and the ROK Government materially and diminish active opposition to the new UNC armistice proposal.
- b.
- I doubt very much that this offer alone would overcome all ROK objections but it is certainly worth trying.
- c.
- As you realize, Rhee and his government feel strongly that the Korean non-repatriate prisoners of war should be released on the effective date of an armistice; they should not be turned over to a custodial group composed in part of Communist representatives, and neither should they be guarded by Indian armed forces. Rhee is likewise adamant about hundreds of Communist “indoctrinators” having access to these POWs for a long period of time.
- d.
- I believe we could overcome Rhee’s objections to the access of Communist indoctrinators, provided the safeguards we have already insisted upon are agreed to by the Communists. I am not at all optimistic, however, as to his willingness to accept Pole and Czech administrative representatives on the Custodial Commission or to permit Indian troops in South Korea. These will be bitter pills for him to swallow.
- e.
- As you know, I have continuously felt that Rhee’s primary goal is a security pact signed, sealed and delivered before an armistice becomes effective. Such a pact, in my opinion, would not reconcile Rhee to the new UNC proposal but would at least diminish his active opposition. In presenting such offer to him, naturally it would be contingent upon guarantees that he will fall into line on the UNC armistice proposal and on such other matters as retention by UNC of complete control of ROK forces.
Murphy concurs. As Briggs is in Seoul and in view of the urgency, I have had no opportunity for prior consultation with him.