795B.5/5–3053: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
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GX 5478. (Army message) Sent CINCUNC for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy, State Department Washington DC from Briggs. Re Deptel 744 (to Pusan) repeated Tokyo 2804.2
Whether President Rhee would be reconciled to armistice by last-minute offer to negotiate bilateral security pact can only be answered by Rhee himself, who would be weighing disadvantages (to him) of armistice based on May 25 UN proposal against advantages of US-ROK security pact, on which he has placed such importance in past. If pact had been offered to him earlier, in conjunction with assurances re economic and military aid and satisfactory consultation on armistice and political negotiation, I would have had reasonable confidence in his willingness and ability to accept an armistice, on somewhat modified basis. In light of events of past two weeks however, and in particular presentation May 25 proposal without any prior consultation with ROK, I doubt whether Rhee would now accept armistice without significant [Page 1122] changes especially concerning non-repatriated North Korean prisoners. Obviously our willingness to negotiate mutual security pact (notwithstanding statements to contrary contained in aide-mémoire handed Rhee May 27) would be major step in direction acceptance Rhee’s basic objectives for Korea, but situation—whole situation—was greatly changed by May 25 proposal.
Furthermore, question arises whether Rhee might regard this as bargaining, piecemeal approach, encouraging him to renewed insistence on modifying armistice proposal.
We recognize that last sentence of General Choe’s May 28 letter to General Harrison (CINCUNC’s CX 62717 to DeptAr3) leaves opening for Rhee to change his position. Conceivably offer to negotiate bilateral security pact coupled with other inducements contained May 27 aide-mémoire might sway him (especially if fortified by firm statement of amount of economic aid to be made available), but my judgment at moment is that May 25 UN armistice proposal remains decisive point in Rhee’s thinking, and that some modification of that proposal would be essential element in any settlement with him.
I favor awaiting Communist reply June 1 before deciding whether to reopen question with Rhee. If Communists do not accept UN proposal, we should be prepared to move fast in capitalizing on that fact.
- There was no indication on the source text when this message was sent; it was received at the Department of State at 2:51 p.m., May 30.↩
- In this telegram, May 29, Briggs was urgently requested to inform the Department whether in his judgment an offer to negotiate a bilateral security pact would reconcile Rhee to the armistice. (795B.5/5–2953)↩
- In this letter to Harrison, ROK Delegate Major General Choi Duk Shin explained by means of a long policy statement opposing the UNC proposal of May 25 why he had abstained from attending the May 15 session at Panmunjom. The last sentence of the letter read: “In conclusion I wish to make clear the opinions expressed in this letter are from my personal point of view.” Telegram CX 62717 is in Matthews files, lot 53 D 413.↩