Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, May 29, 1953—11 a.m.

[Here follow brief and inconclusive discussions on the Greek offer of an increase of its forces in Korea and a French request for loan of a light aircraft carrier.]

Possible Emergency Actions in South Korea

General Collins: There is one particular point I would like to raise before we get into Clark’s general plans and that has to do with the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, General Paek, who is here now. Clark has prepared as an extreme emergency measure to take Rhee into custody.² My understanding is that Clark has the feeling that Paek has tacitly indicated that he would be prepared to back us if anything should happen which involves a split with Rhee. I have raised the question informally with the Chiefs and have sent a telegram to Clark asking Clark what he thought as to the desirability of having Paek return to Korea immediately so that he would be on hand if things came to a head with Rhee. Clark has replied saying that Paek has already had some difficulties with Rhee which, however, seem to have been cleared up but that to send him back before he was due to arrive would naturally arouse Rhee’s suspicions. Although Clark feels it would be advantageous to have him on hand if trouble really comes, he thinks that on balance the disadvantages of sending him back early outweigh those of having him come back on schedule. I have now found out that Paek’s plans have been changed so that he at present is not due to leave till June 23. I think there are two questions. I think it might be useful to send Clark another message telling him of the change of plans and seeing whether he thinks we should try and abide by Paek’s original schedule and the other question is whether it wouldn’t be useful for Paek to see the President. If he does see the President, I think there is a question as to whether it should be an open meeting or a secret meeting.

Mr. Matthews: We would have to fit it in to the President’s dates. He is going to be away a couple of times in June and of course there are the tentative dates for the Bermuda Conference.

Mr. Johnson: On the question of seeing the President secretly it might be very difficult to keep a call on the President secret and if it did come out after an attempt was made to keep it secret, it would probably arouse more suspicion than if there had been a meeting openly arranged.

Mr. Matthews: There are two points of information I would like to raise. The first is as to whether the Acting Chief of Staff is reliable from our point of view. The second is whether or not we know anything about the content of the conversations that Rhee has been having with his Cabinet and the Defense Ministers having with the ROK Commanders.

General Eddleman: According to our information the Acting Chief of Staff would be more likely to go along with Rhee in a bustup than he would with the U.N. Also, Rhee is trying to set up a Provost Marshal separately so that he and the military police will not be under the Eighth Army.

General Cabell: I don’t think we have any specific reports on what Rhee and his Defense Ministers have been saying to their own people.

General Collins: (At this point Collins read a message telegram from Clark³ in which he said that he thought Rhee’s reaction to the U.S. message to him was not unexpected. Clark was reasonably sure that Rhee would take no action which would interfere with U.N. capabilities while fighting was going on. He could, however, follow a number of courses of action of varying degrees of embarrassment or danger. He could release the North Korean POWs; he could offer a separate armistice; he could withdraw ROK delegates from armistice negotiations; he could withdraw ROK forces from the U.N. Command; and he could stimulate riots or attacks on the foreign personnel agreed to under the armistice terms. Clark thought that if Rhee were to order the ROK forces to take independent action it might be feasible to divide up the front between ROK and U.N. forces and secure some agreement that would prevent the ROKs from uncovering the U.S. flank. If after an armistice the ROK forces refused to withdraw from the demilitarized zone, there appeared to be no feasible action which the U.N. Command could take. If the ROK were to independently launch a ground attack, they would probably run out of supplies within about three days. The ROKs might use their air force and navy force for harassment of Communists independently either before an armistice or after an armistice. This would be difficult to stop. The ROKs also have the capability of making guerrilla raids against the Communists, hindering admission of any foreign personnel to South Korea, of causing disaffection in Korean Service Corps on which the UNC was highly dependent, and of calling labor strikes which would interfere with the UNC operations.)

I don’t think it is necessary to go into the details of Clark’s plans,⁴ but perhaps Eddleman could give them to you in broad outline.

General Eddleman: Clark takes as his mission the safeguarding of U.N. forces and his assumption that an armistice is concluded and that U.N. forces stay where they are. He deals with three possible conditions. First, that the ROK troops might not be responsive to UNC orders—second, that the ROK forces might undertake independent action against the Communists and third, that the ROKs might undertake action overtly hostile to UNC Command. Clark lays out a series of courses of action which he might take to meet the varying contingencies. The most serious ones would be to take Rhee into custody, to proclaim martial law, to have ROK Army authorities enforce martial law, to place dissident civil and military commanders under custody of those who are loyal to the Commanding General of the Eighth Army, and as a possible final measure to establish military government under the U.N.

Mr. Robertson: Under what authority would we take over the Korean Government? Wouldn’t we really be putting ourselves in a position of being the aggressors? I would like to raise the question as to whether from a purely military point of view it would be possible for us to consider a course of action of just pulling our troops out of Korea. We might then talk to Rhee in terms of his holding up any action for at least long enough for us to get our forces out of there.

General Collins: It would be very difficult for us to get out if the Commies should decide to launch an attack while we were withdrawing. The authority for taking action against Rhee and the Korean Government would have to be purely that of military necessity. In taking such action we would have to consider whether Rhee was actually speaking for the Korean Government and Korean people and also we would have to take into consideration the reaction that we would meet if we decided to pull all our forces out of Korea. The real nub of Clark’s plan, it seems to me, which we should discuss, is whether Clark should have authority to proclaim martial law, take dissidents, which would probably include Rhee, into custody, and proclaim a military government. Another question, it seems to me, we should look into, is whether or not it would be useful to give Rhee the promise of a security pact in order to forestall the actions that he might otherwise take.

Mr. Johnson: It would be most important if we did take action against Rhee that it should be done by South Koreans and that any military law or military government should be set up under the cover of South Koreans.

General Collins: In the last analysis it seems to me that we have three alternative courses to choose between. The first is the question of proposing a security pact, second is a question of authority for taking over the South Korean Government, and third is the question of pulling our forces out of Korea.

Admiral Duncan: The problem of getting our forces out of Korea is not just a military problem.

Mr. Matthews: That is perfectly true. There would be serious political implications if we gave up South Korea after having fought three years to protect it, but if this course of action were not militarily feasible, then we couldn’t even consider it.

General Collins: We could quite possibly pull back into the old perimeter and then evacuate from there. The number of casualties we would suffer would depend almost completely on what action the Communists took.

Mr. Robertson: It seems to me that we must at least make it very clear to Rhee that his actions would involve him in going completely on his own.

General Collins: Personally I think we should be prepared to take Rhee into protective custody rather than try to sweeten him up with a security pact.

Mr. Robertson: It would be a question as to what we were taking him into protective custody for—whether it was protective custody while you took over the Korean Government or protective custody while we prepared to get our forces out of Korea.

Mr. Matthews: Would Clark call the military government, Military Government or would he call it a Provisional Korean Government?

General Collins: I think that Clark will try to do as much as possible through the Koreans. The main thing, however, is to get a message to Clark giving him authority to take what actions we think he should have authority to take.

Mr. Matthews: It would be highly important that any military government should be under ROK cover and whatever authority we give Clark we should emphasize that point strongly.

General Collins: I think we should frame an additional paragraph pointing out the necessity of doing as much as possible through the Koreans.

Mr. Matthews: Does your present draft of the message include authority to propose a security pact?

General Collins: No it doesn’t, but I think we should discuss that.

Admiral Duncan: It seems to me that if Rhee is not brought into line we will be faced with the possibility of a disastrous military defeat. If the final issue between Rhee and ourselves appears to be whether or not we would give him a security pact it might well be worth giving Rhee such a pact in order to keep him in line. I have proposed to the Chiefs that the Embassy and CINCFE should be authorized to negotiate a bilateral pact if in their view it was essential to prevent a break with Rhee.

Mr. Robertson: When we talked to the President last week we talked about this very point.⁵ At that time he decided that we would not offer Rhee a security pact. Of course he may change his mind.

Mr. Johnson: I am not sure that the President has been in the position hitherto to fully appreciate the capabilities of the ROK for causing trouble as Clark has laid them out in his message.

General Collins: I think we should have a brief paper for the President which would lay out the three alternative courses of action and then let it be up to him for decision. I personally don’t like the idea of a bilateral pact. It seems to me that this would be an open admission on our part that Rhee has the whip hand.

Mr. Matthews: However, the President should be enabled to decide whether he thinks it is worth it to prevent a break with Rhee and to secure his agreement to an armistice.

Mr. Johnson: It actually could be and really would have to be only a promise to negotiate a pact rather than the actual conclusion of a pact. We would have some time before a pact could possibly be concluded and could continue to use this as a pressure point with Rhee.

General Collins: I think we should get up a paper and present it to the President not later than tomorrow.⁶

Mr. Johnson: We will work on it with your people right away.

1. A note on the title page read: “Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”

   Of the JCS, Generals Bradley and Shepherd attended as well as Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Duncan. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Gleason represented the NSC, General Cabell the CIA, and Nash the Department of Defense. In all 19 persons attended.

2. See the paper submitted by Taylor, Outline Plan Everready, May 4, p. 965.
3. The reference was to telegram CX 62727, supra.
4. The reference was to Outline Plan Everready, see footnote 2 above.
5. For a report on this discussion with the President, see telegram 723, to Pusan, May 22, p. 1086.
6. For a report on why that paper was not submitted to the President, see memorandum for the record, by Eddleman, June 1, p. 1126.