Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, May 29, 1953—7:38 p.m.¹

CX 62727. Refs: A. CX 62406.² B. HNC 1678.³ C. C 62143.⁴ D. C 62592.⁵ E. 8A 250539Z.⁶ F. 8A 250610Z.⁷

1. In refs A, B and C, I pntd out the firm and positive stand Rhee probably would take if the armistice agreement should fail to take into consideration the views of the ROK Govt on such matters as

(1) Handling of North Korean non-repatriate POWs,

(2) A bilateral security pact, and

(3) Provisions for withdrawal of Chinese Communist trps from Korea.

2. Ref D contained my recms for a UNC final position which had been prepared specifically with a view to including the provisions I believed should be acpt to our allies, would in no way sacrifice the principle of no forced repatriation, would not incur serious ROK resistance and passive disaffection, and would, if presented to the Commies in a sufficiently forceful manner, stand a reasonable chance of being acpt by them.

3. Rhee reaction 25 May and since to the UNC new proposal was not unexpected (ref E). It conformed closely to predictions contained in prev ref msgs. However, I am reasonably certain Rhee will take no action that will seriously affect the UNC capability of waging war against the Communists as long as the fighting continues. On the other hand, he has the capability of taking many other less drastic actions that can interfere with the UNC effort or at least prove extremely embarrassing to US.

4. Among such possibilities are the fol:

a. During the conduct of curr negotiations and any time before an armistice Rhee can:

(1) Take unilateral action to release the Korean non-repatriate POWs presently held by the UNC in South Korea.

(Comment: This immediate possibility is covered in ref F.)

(2) Offer a separate ROK proposal to the Communists, either at the conf table or by some other means: Such a proposal may include:

(a) An immediate ceasefire.

(b) Withdrawal of all foreign trps.

(c) All non-Korean POWs to be handled under the curr proposals.

(d) All remaining problems to be settled between the Koreans.

(Comment: Such a move could be made without our consent or prior knowledge.)

(3) Withdraw the ROK del and announce ROK unwillingness to comply with any provisions of the armistice if signed.

(4) Withdraw ROK forces from comd of the UNC.

(Comment: I believe such a sit can be controlled. If Rhee directs his forces to continue fighting, I can probably make a logical div of the front. Under these circumstances, I believe I can obtain reasonable ROK cooperation, including assurance that the UNC flank will not be exposed.)

(5) Initiate ROK inspired riots and demonstrations.

(Comment: I do not believe these will be directed against UNC forces or installations.)

b. On the signing of an armistice or any time subsequent thereto Rhee can:

(1) Withdraw ROK forces from comd of the UNC.

(Comment: With a cessation of hostilities and UNC and ROK no longer engaged in unified mil action, ROK units will undoubtedly look to their govt for guidance and direction.)

(2) There are several courses of action which the ROK may take in connection with the withdrawal of ROK units from comd of the UNC, among the most important of which are as fol:

(a) ROK refusal to withdraw from the DZ.

(Comment: The UNC can take no feasible action to force withdrawal.)

(b) Launch a ground atk with ROK trps.

(Comment: Such an atk would of necessity be limited in nature and for relatively short duration because of our control of the flow of ammo and supplies. However, it would be a violation of the armistice which could result in serious repercussions.)

(c) Use ROK AF and Naval units to atk enemy tgts, either in conjunction with ground atks or separately.

(Comment: Same as under (2) (b) above.)

(d) Conduct raids and guerrilla fighting.

(Comment: Concurrent with either (a), (b) or (c) above, sporadic raids and extended program of guerrilla fighting, using elements of 1 or all of the 3 ROK svcs, can be conducted for an indefinite prd. Even though limited, such action could eff interfere with our ability to carry out the terms of the armistice agreement.)

(3) Refuse or hinder admittance into Korea of the many foreign pers, particularly Communists, involved in the implementation of an armistice.

(Comment: This is a capability that will be most difficult to counter. ROK not only has a well organized police force that can be used to delay and interfere with the mvmts of representatives of the PW Custodial Com and Communist elms, but it can also launch propaganda atks and incite civil dmsts and riots that could be extremely embarrassing. This sit is obviously worsened in light of the guarantee the UNC must make for the protection of foreign elms while in South Korea.)

5. Either before or after an armistice, and acting separately or in conjunction with courses of action indicated in para 4 above, ROK can employ labor strikes as a wpn [weapon] to slow down UNC mil oprs. Almost all UNC elms in Korea use indigenous labor to varying degrees. Wide strike mvts through organized labor unions can seriously interrupt our log oprs and lines of comm, particularly ports of entry to Eighth A rear, in which areas the bulk of such labor is employed. There is a further possibility that ROK could withdraw or cause serious disaffection among KSC forces. By the use of mil pers, I can, on an emerg basis and strictly limited scale, offset the loss of indigenous labor support, but as you must realize, it would greatly reduce the UNC combat potential, especially if strikes were to cont for a long pd. We have plans to meet this eventuality insofar as practicable.

6. In submitting this summary of the possibilities which the UNC must be prep to meet, I must emphasize it is not done with the attitude of either an alarmist or a defeatist. I will handle any sit that develops to the best of my ability and with whatever force I believe is called for. My sole purpose in submitting these possibilities is to insure that my government is fully aware of them. Those of us who are in contact with key personalities in the ROK Government and have kept close watch on the devs of this increasingly explosive sit are convinced that the ROK fully appreciates its potential. Rhee’s age, his strong feeling that time is running out, and his deep conviction that the contributions he can make and the actions he initiates in the near future will determine the fate and future of Korea are compelling motives which must be fully considered in analyzing the ROK potential.

1. Due to the time difference between Washington and Tokyo, this message was received in Washington the morning of May 29.
2. Dated May 13, p. 1010.
3. Dated May 12, p. 1008.
4. Dated Apr. 28, p. 947.
5. Dated May 23, p. 1090.
6. Dated May 25, p. 1097.
7. Dated May 25, p. 1098.