795.00/5–2853: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State
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1650. Eyes only for the Acting Secretary. I was with Molotov for half an hour this afternoon devoted entirely to Korean armistice talks (Embtel 1646).1 Molotov was correct throughout and did not make any attempt to challenge or even question exposition of the latest UN proposals. He was however quite noncommittal as to the Soviet official attitude thereto and merely said he would inform his government of my remarks.
I began by stating that I had been requested by my government to draw his attention to the main points of the latest UN proposals submitted May 25 at Panmunjom and in order that my subsequent remarks would be clear to him I was authorized to give him an unofficial memorandum setting forth the six main points. The interpreter then translated the six points (Deptel 855 as amended by Deptel 860).2 Molotov [Page 1110] listened with great attention, occasionally interrupting for points of clarity and on point 4 regarding essential elements for commission merely inquired to what this related. I answered that they were certain indispensable arrangements for the operation of the commission and the administration of the camps during this period designed to insure that no coercion, intimidation or force would be used against the prisoners refusing repatriation in order to compel them to change their minds. On point 6 he expressed particular interest in the reference to the political conference and inquired whether or not the composition of this conference had been decided saying he could not remember offhand whether this was still an open question. I told him that likewise I did not have in my head the exact composition of the proposed political conference but I understood it was not a point of difference in the armistice discussions.
I then told Molotov as instructed that this was a most serious and important proposal. I said as he was aware the fundamental principle on which the UN had been operating was that no force either direct or indirect should be used in order to compel the prisoners refusing repatriation to change their minds; that the present proposals go to the extreme limit of possible concessions and it would not be possible to go beyond these limits without direct violation of this principle, which the UN was not prepared to do in any circumstances. I then went through point by point the nature of these concessions pointing out how far they went to meet the point of views of the other side. I strongly emphasized the absolute necessity of providing as outlined in latest UN proposal some means of ultimate liberation of these prisoners who after the established period and procedures continued to adhere to their original opposition to repatriation.
He did not dispute my statement that if at the end of three months the North Koreans and Chinese had been unable to persuade these prisoners by explanation and assurances to change their minds it was clear that only some form of force would ever bring about their repatriation. I stated and Molotov did not disagree, that to offer merely the choice of either permanent imprisonment in camps or repatriation was in effect the use of force no matter how disguised against these prisoners. I told him that I was drawing his attention especially to this point since the initial reaction of the North Koreans and Chinese negotiators to these proposals had been to object to any reference to the UN or indeed to any other method which would involve release from captivity of these men.
In conclusion I told him that rejection by the North Koreans and Chinese of these extremely liberal proposals and an insistence on the position that the POWs still refusing repatriation could not be released from captivity would extinguish hopes for an armistice and a failure of the present armistice talks would lead to the creation of a situation [Page 1111] which the US Government was most sincerely and earnestly attempting to avoid.
Molotov inquired whether my government expected a reply to this memorandum to which I replied that it was not an official communication requiring a reply but for the purpose of directing the attention of the Soviet Government to the importance and seriousness of the UN proposals made on May 25. In this connection I made reference to that part of his statement published April 23 to the effect that the Soviet Union was ready to cooperate in the achievement of the armistice in Korea and to my remarks to Voroshilov on importance of Korean armistice (Embtel 1504).4 Molotov said he would inform his government of my remarks and he wished to assure me that the Soviet Government was indeed interested in the establishment of peace in the Far East. At the end he again reverted to the question of the political conference which would follow an armistice and said he would have to refresh his memory as to whether the exact composition had been agreed. He likewise inquired whether the negotiators at Panmunjom were meeting at present time and when I told him they were recessed until first of June he appeared to be doing some mental calculation as he remarked that today was the 28th.
He nodded agreement when I told him we planned to make no announcement of today’s visit but that should the fact leak out we would merely say it was a follow up on the concrete questions I had raised at my last visit. I inquired at this point when I might receive an answer to these concrete questions and he said Foreign Office was still studying these cases and he had nothing to tell me today.
As usual with Molotov I have no grounds for even attempting to forecast what Soviet Government may or may not do in regard to these proposals. I can only report that he listened with great attention and seriousness and refrained from any form of propaganda statement or question or even any attempt to defend or support the Communist position. His reference twice to the composition of the political conference may be some indication of where the present Soviet interest lies.
- Supra.↩
- Telegram 855 to Moscow is not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1096; for telegram 860 to Moscow, dated May 26, see p. 1103.↩
- Presumably this was a reference to Molotov’s radio broadcast of Apr. 1, 1953; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 13, 1953, pp. 528–529.↩
- In this telegram, dated Apr. 20, Bohlen reported on the conversation he had with Voroshilov after presenting his credentials. In this discussion, Bohlen made it clear that success or failure of the truce talks at Panmunjom would be the real test of whether, as Voroshilov suggested, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union could improve. (795.00/4–2053)↩