Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
operational immediate
250610Z. Refs: A. DA 939673.1 B. HNC 1678.2
In par 8, part IV ref A, you indicated you fully appreciate the situation I face with ROK on issue of turning over non-repatriates to the five nation custodial commission. Separate joint msg from Briggs and me3 gives details of our conference with Rhee today. In view of Rhee’s completely uncooperative attitude, there is now more than a remote [Page 1099] possibility he may, either covertly or overtly, initiate action to cause the release of all Korean non-repatriates. He has the capability, and should he attempt this action, there are few effective steps that I can take to counter it. Accordingly, I am bringing this matter to your attention, for such an eventuality would be most damaging to the UNC cause. It would be practically impossible to avoid charges of UNC duplicity, not only from the Communists but from our Allies as well.
- 2.
- At the present time, each of the nine separate locations on the mainland holding Korean non-repatriates has a US Commander with a small staff of US administrative and technical personnel. ROKA security battalions provide the overwhelming majority of actual guard forces. While there would be a better chance of maintaining control of the situation if these ROKA units were replaced with US troops, I feel any action to that end now would only irritate an already sensitive situation. In addition, it would be particularly unfortunate if US troops were employed in forceful action against Koreans whose only motive is to resist return to Communist control.
- 3.
- Yesterday, in discussing the overall POW situation with Taylor, Herren and McGarr (POW Commander), I pointed out the many possibilities
that might materialize, including the action Rhee might take discussed in par 1
above. In order to alert key commanders concerned and to take steps
to circumvent sudden action among the non-repatriates, I issued the
following instructions:
- a.
- McGarr will meet with each of his mainland camp commanders
in Pusan today. After emphasizing that the information to be
discussed will be held in strictest confidence, he will
alert them to the several possibilities confronting US.
Specifically he will tell them:
- (1)
- To make maximum use of every available source of intelligence within respective camps to keep close touch on the temper of the non-repatriates and to determine if any action is planned by the prisoners, with or without the assistance of local ROKA forces for [or] civilians.
- (2)
- Develop plans immediately to counter any possible action by POWs.
- (3)
- In the event it becomes necessary to use force in order to maintain control, normal riot control measures, including the use of non-toxic gases, may be used. Small arms will not be used directly against prisoners, and every precaution will be taken to insure that there is no loss of life. In my opinion this prohibition is fully justified, even if some non-repatriates do escape. I do not feel it is possible to use maximum force against processed anti-Communists without endangering the principle of no-forced repatriation or without causing strong unfavorable public reaction.
- b.
- In addition, the normal orientation program in each Korean
non-repatriate camp will include and emphasize the overall
objectives of the UNC in the
POW question. The
following points will be emphasized to Korean
non-repatriates:
[Page 1100]
- (1)
- The UNC is continuing its efforts to effect a just and honorable armistice, but nothing in any agreement that might be reached with the Communists will change our repeated assertion that POWs will not be forced against their will to return to Communist control.
- (2)
- Non-repatriates are assured that neither force nor coercion will be used against them and the UNC will protect their decision on repatriation, whatever it may be.
- (3)
- After an armistice, non-repatriates may be confident they will be released in South Korea within a reasonable period, certainly within a few months, provided they do not, of their own free will, decide to return to Communist control.
- 4.
- I shall continue to follow developments closely and keep you informed.