795.00/5–2553: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
251230Z. (Army message) Sent Department rptd info Pusan, CINCUNC Tokyo for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy. From Ambassador Briggs.
To assist State Department in understanding current ROK position, following comments supplement joint message today from General Clark and me summarizing meeting with President Rhee this morning.1 This message relates exclusively Rhee’s reception of exposition contained Deptel 723 (2740 to Tokyo)2 since Clark may make separate comment on President’s attitude toward UN armistice proposals. In this connection, however, it is my opinion that Rhee was so shocked by those proposals that this affected his attitude toward all subjects subsequently discussed. Rhee was personally courteous throughout session even though at times he spoke under much emotional strain. Meeting accordingly tense throughout, and various comments offered by Pyun generally unhelpful and sometimes provocative.
Taking section 2 Deptel 723 seriatim, Rhee’s first comments were concerning “greater sanctions statement” which he proceeded to belittle, especially as allegedly far below bilateral pact in value to Korea. Comment included long attack on effectiveness of collective security via UN. President at one point declared “ROK made mistake believing democratic nations would keep faith”. Notwithstanding efforts point out unique value and tangible meaning of greater sanctions statement, Rhee continued deny proposal has more than marginal utility.
[Page 1101]Concerning agreement on military assistance and related matters (paragraph 3) Rhee declared agreement this character has been discussed by us “since 1947 or 1948” and nothing effective has yet been done in that direction.
Concerning political conference (paragraph 4), Rhee indicated interest in and satisfaction with statement concerning US opposition to “any dissolution ROK”, but with reference to “any formal political agreement which leaves Korea permanently divided” he charged US partly responsible for present situation by having agreed with Soviets on 38th Parallel division.
Paragraphs 5 through 8 initially evoked statement mentioned previous telegram that Rhee was glad President Eisenhower’s intentions and attitude in present situation now clearly understood. He declared it would be impossible give assurances suggested and on contrary, he is now forced consider making public statement expressing disappointment at situation exposed this morning together with declaration of ROK intention to fight on, alone if necessary. “Withdraw UN forces and terminate economic aid—do that tomorrow if you must” declared Rhee “but even so we shall go forward alone”.
With reference mutual defense treaty (paragraph 9) President did not attempt to argue against points mentioned but declared with reference last paragraph that assurances desired now out of question.
I then conveyed orally text of President Eisenhower’s message. Rhee expressed appreciation of message but said he could not agree with final sentence concerning Korean POWs especially in light of long period during which they would be exposed to “Communist persuaders”. Pyun at that point not only denounced lengthy period of additional detention facing Korean non-repatriates but also declared impossible protect them, within new armistice terms of reference, from coercion.
While Rhee’s attitude was altogether negative with respect purposes visit, he conveyed throughout impression of burning sincerity and unshakeable conviction. He defended, at times with very considerable eloquence, his belief that by proposing armistice terms which fail meet “Korea’s minimum requirement of withdrawal Chinese Communists” free world is failing solve Korean problem, by playing into Communist hands, and is bringing appreciably closer World War III. As to withdrawal Chinese Communists as sine qua non, Rhee in my opinion believes this passionately and steadfastly. He declared repeatedly that on no basis short of withdrawal Chinese Communists could ROK national aspiration be met.
Although aide-mémoire suggested in separate message should be submitted soonest in order that Rhee may have clear and unmistakable record of US position, I do not believe that this will significantly alter Rhee’s attitude already adopted, described herein and in previous telegrams.
[Page 1102]In fact, it now seems probable that at early date Rhee may issue public statement, perhaps along line indicated previous telegram, denouncing today’s armistice proposal and reiteration ROK determination fight on alone.