Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/5–2553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State¹

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Seoul, May 25, 1953—2:39 p.m.

250539Z. (Army message) From CGArmy Eight (General Clark) to Department Army Washington D.C. (for JCS), information AmEmbassy Pusan CGArmy Eight, CINCUNC and Secretary of State.

We met with President Rhee this morning from 10 a.m. to 1210, with Foreign Minister Pyun (Acting Prime Minister) likewise present. Rhee’s response to our presentation was completely uncooperative. Instructions carried out to letter. We divided Department telegram 723 (2740 to Tokyo)² on basis contents respective paragraphs, this presentation being preceded by description by Clark of new UN armistice proposals. Clark also emphasized important security aspects re latter.

Armistice proposals apparently profound shock to President Rhee who declared them unacceptable to ROK. Attitude equally negative toward balance of exposition and proposals. Rhee reiterated disappointment at action being taken by US Government both on armistice proposals and position in security pact, although he stated he was glad President Eisenhower’s intentions and attitude in present situation now clearly understood.

Although declaring repeatedly that armistice proposals unacceptable and that he could accordingly give none of assurances referred to in numbered paragraphs 6 (public declaration by Rhee) and 7 (three-point Korean assurances to US), Rhee requested this part of US statement be given him in writing, together with text of President’s message, which was conveyed orally, on receipt of which he would make known officially ROK views. Inference was that pending receipt of foregoing in writing Rhee will take no precipitate step; this may, however, be wishful thinking, in which connection Department reminded that yesterday Pyun issued still another statement reiterating ROK will “never accept armistice leaving Korea divided and letting Chinese Communists remain in Korea”.

Rhee informed us after lengthy discussion of US position and Korean opposition thereto that he would now have to consider making separate ROK proposal containing following:

1. Immediate cease-fire.

2. Simultaneous withdrawal of all Chinese Communist and UN Forces from Korea.

3. North Korean POW’s would accordingly be “no problem” presumably Rhee would order the release of non-repatriates.

4. Chinese would be turned over to UN Command for disposal as latter sees fit.

We believe Rhee entitled to written statement based on Department telegram 723, part II and will shortly transmit for Washington consideration text aide-mémoire³ based thereon.

With reference to President’s statement, request authorization give copy to President Rhee with one minor change in first sentence; namely substitution of “we cannot be too arbitrary in our demands on the Communists” by “we can not appear to be too arbitrary in our demand et cetera”. Signed Briggs and Clark.

1. This message was transmitted from Seoul via Army communications channels.
2. Dated May 22, p. 1086.
3. The text of this aide-mémoire from Briggs was transmitted by Clark to the JCS in telegram C 62630, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) The JCS considered this a Department of State matter and the Department of State instructed Briggs to give Rhee the aide-mémoire after suggested minor changes were made. (Telegram JCS 939869 to Clark, May 26, 1953; Matthews files, lot 53 D 413, and telegram 730 to Pusan, May 26, 1953; 795.00/5–2653)