Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

Part I.

1. Concur time has come take positive steps to bring negots to head and best method to attain this objective is to present our minimum posns on basic issues with air of finality.

2. As stated in para 3 b of DA 938571,3 we did not consider ourselves bound by exact terms of UNGA resolution of 3 Dec 52 (Indian resolution); moreover, we did not consider this resolution forestalled our attempting to obtain better terms. However, it must be recognized that our vote in the UNGA in favor of this resolution leads Commies to conclusion that we are prepared accept principles of resolution and probably will not break on anything short of it. The tactics in the negots appear to bear this out. Moreover, we are under intensive pressure from our Allies to adhere closely to principles of the UNGA resolution. Under circumstances, believe any further attempt obtain agreement on markedly more favorable terms not only futile but also undesirable. Therefore, we now consider that minimum posn which we next propose shld be in general consonance with UNGA resolution. At same time under these conditions we consider it essential that terms of reference of custodial commission sustain the principle of no forced repatriation and insure that coercion and force not be used against non-repatriates. [Page 1083] If the Commies accept, we will have tolerable arrangement. On other hand, if they reject we will be in strongest possible posn to terminate negots.

3. Accordingly, PresUS has directed UNC set forth a final posn which incorporates folg essential elements:

a.

Maintenance of our present posn on accepting a five-nation custodial comsn, subj to condition that all armed forces and operating psnl be provided exclusively by India.

b.

Revise our present posn on immediate release Korean non-repatriates upon coming into effect of armistice so as to agree that Korean non-repatriates be turned over to comsn in same manner as Chinese.

c.

Revise our present posn that comsn will act on basis of unanimity on substantive matters, so as to agree that all decisions of comsn shall be by majority vote.

d.

Maintenance of all elements of present posn re terms of reference for operation of custodial comsn, which are nec to assure that right of Chi Commies and North Korean access to POWs is subj to conditions which will prevent use of coercion and force against non-repatriates. We consider folg elements essential:

(1): That provision be made that no force or threat of force shall be used against POWs to prevent or affect their repatriation.
(2): That there be limitation on number of staff assistants allowed to reptvs of 4 nations on comsn other than India. Exact number left to ur discretion.
(3): That UNC observers are present to observe operations of custodial comsn and subordinate bodies to include verifications and interviews as indicated in (5) below.
(4): That there be limitation on number of verifying reptvs permitted access to POWs. Exact number left ur discretion.
(5): That all verifications and interviews be conducted in presence of reptvs of each member nation of comsn.
(6): That there be provision along lines indicated in para 10 C 623854 amended to include provision that certificates submitted by POWs indicating desire be repatriated must be validated by majority vote of custodial comsn or subordinate body.
(7): That custodial comsn permit access of press to entire opn. Not considered essential press admitted to POW installations UNC area be restricted to reptvs accredited UNC. Present proposal in para 13 of C 62385 shld be amended accordingly.
(8): Para 14 of C 62385 providing for logistical support of POWs.
(9): Para 15 of C 62385 providing for cost of repatriating POWs be borne by detaining power in accordance with Art 118 of Geneva Conv.
(10): Para 22 of C 62385 providing that terms of agreement be made known to all non-repatriate POWs.

e.

Maintenance our previously planned final posn that period of access by each side to non-repatriates will be 90 days.

f.

To our previously planned final posn that we agree to submission to polit conf of question of disposition of remaining non-repatriates with [Page 1084] provision that failing determination their disposition within total of 120 days of their being handed over to custodial comsn they would be released (i.e. para 3 d CX 62456) add the alternative that question of disposition of remaining non-repatriates, after same 120 days, would be promptly referred to UNGA with custodial comsn retaining custody of non-repatriates until decision reached by UNGA. We would accept Communist choice of either alternative.

4. If we are to maximize possibilities of Commie acceptance, manner of presentation and public info handling most important. While it must be made clear to Commies that these are, in fact, our final posns, UNC shld avoid insofar as possible, the aspects of an ultimatum which would render Commie acceptance more difficult. We believe that this can best be accomplished by presenting our proposals in exec session, whereby UNC would be better enabled make clear that UNC posn is final while avoiding adverse effects of public ultimatum which would be inherent in presentation of final posn in open session. We further believe UNC presentation shld be from standpoint of using proposal of 7 May as basis along lines of UNC 13 May presentation. UNC shld avoid connotation that UNC proposal is counter proposal and shld avoid use of specific terms such as “final” “take it or leave it”, etc. In proposing exec sessions the UNC shld make clear that purpose of such sessions is not to bargain as has sometimes in past been the case when one side has requested exec sessions, but rather to reinforce the solemn, non-propaganda character of the proceedings. If Commies reject exec sessions, UNC shld proceed with presentation final posn, but bearing in mind desirability of avoiding ultimatum aspects.

5. If on resumption negots folg one week recess (referred to in para 4 of CX 62456) Commies reject UNC proposals, make no proposal of their own incorporating basic principles of UNC proposals, or otherwise provide no basis for further useful negots, we consider that negots shld be terminated rather than recessed, and agreements affecting the Kaesong–Panmunjom–Munsan area shld be voided. While we might at some future time be prepared to renew negots on basis of current draft armistice agreement and currently outstanding UNC proposals re POWs, we consider it undesirable for you to indicate that such might be the case. We do not wish place burden of decision to terminate either upon you or Gen Harrison, feeling that such responsibility properly rests in Washington. It is to be expected that Commie reply will be neither a flat rejection nor acceptance of UNC proposals and will require careful assessment before decision to terminate actually can be made.

Part II.

6. In accordance with foregoing you are directed: [Page 1085]

a.: At mtg scheduled 25 May propose exec sessions and submit proposal incorporating final posns set forth in para 3 above. If Commies do not agree to exec session proceed to submit proposal in open session.
b.: Having submitted proposal, UNC will recess, unilaterally if nec, for one week to allow Commies time for consideration.
c.: During period of recess you will submit ltr5 to Commies as envisaged in para 5 of CX 62456, designed to reflect and reinforce approach indicated in para 4 this msg. Desire you submit text of ltr for approval prior to delivery.
d.: If on resumption of negots folg one week recess Commies reject UNC proposals and make no proposal of their own incorporating basic principles UNC proposal, Harrison shld merely note Commie action and indicate such action poses a most serious situation which he feels compelled report to higher auth, and propose recess of 72 hours. You shld then submit promptly ur assessment of Commie reply along with ur recommended action. We will be prepared to act expeditiously.
e.: On other hand if on resumption of negots folg one week recess Commies accept principles of UNC proposal or give other evidence of willingness reach agreement on acceptable basis, you are authorized continue negots within framework of Part I this msg.

Part III.

7. When and if decision is made to terminate negots you then authorized to:

a.: Inform Commies, by means of ur own choosing and at earliest possible time, that agreements affecting Munsan–Panmunjom–Kaesong area are voided.
b.: Undertake mil action indicated in Part 2 a of C 62419.
c.: Effect prompt release of all non-repatriate POWs. Instructions will subsequently be transmitted you re procedures for release and disposition of Chi non-repatriates.

Part IV.

8. Re para 3 b above. We fully appreciate sit UNC faces with Rhee on issue release of Korean non-repatriates. However, immediate release of Korean non-repatriates upon coming into effect of an armistice, is not an essential element of our posn on no forced repatriation and has failed to comd any support outside Korea. It is not an issue on which we can permit negots to break down. By separate msg6 through State channels you are being directed to undertake joint approach to Rhee with Briggs. Desire that on morning of 25 May prior to reconvening of negots you inform Rhee of action UNC taking in negots and undertake with Briggs approach outlined in State msg mentioned above. For security reasons we believe it undesirable inform Rhee that we intend terminate negots if Commies reject UNC proposals, although you might indicate that Commie rejection would leave little grounds for further negots. However, this matter is left to ur discretion.

[Page 1086]

9. Ref para 3 c above. You shld bear in mind that our willingness to agree to simple majority vote for all decisions by the cmsn is subj to Commie agreement on the essential elements in terms of reference for cmsn as set forth in para 3 d. Method of handling this in negots left to ur discretion.

10. Re para 3 f. above. Assurances being sought from other UN Govts having forces in Korea that they will support immediate consideration of a resolution in UN calling for prompt release of non-repatriates to proceed to any available destination of their choice.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)