Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/5–1853: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

top secret
priority

Washington, May 22, 1953—10:49 p.m.

723. Tokyo for Ambassador Murphy and CINCUNC. Deptel 713 to Pusan, 2694 to Tokyo,² Pusan’s [Seoul’s] unnumbered May 17³ and Tokyo’s 3620.⁴ Joint State–Defense message.

• Part 1. The President seriously concerned over deliberate agitation being developed by President Rhee against armistice. Korean Aide-Mémoire (Deptel 673⁵) represents particularly unsatisfactory situation which could seriously jeopardize US interests Korea unless modified.

  While Rhee may be motivated in part from anxiety ROK future security, US Government cannot overlook fact Rhee’s requests also stem his belief he can bargain with US at this time to gain his maximum conditions. The President considers it necessary President Rhee clearly understand there are limits on what US can agree to or tolerate. President also believes appropriate attempt should be made so far as practicable allay ROK fears regarding future security in effort bring about cessation ROK agitation and opposition to armistice agreement.

  However, President cannot consider Rhee’s repeated requests for mutual security treaty at this time for reasons outlined below. President is willing consider steps below if Rhee provides sufficient assurances.

  Accordingly, President on advice State and Defense desires Ambassador Briggs and CINCUNC make joint approach to Rhee, as outlined Part II below, same day as next meeting armistice delegations at Panmunjom when UNC delegation will present its final position. President further desires Rhee be informed of final UNC position being despatched by separate message.

• Part 2. In joint approach to Rhee, President desires you strongly emphasize following points, making clear to Rhee they represent President’s views. As broad suggestions for your general guidance in meeting the general purpose of this joint approach is outlined above. The use, order and manner of presentation of these suggestions is left entirely to your discretion.

  (1) US fully aware ROK feeling of insecurity regarding future status and defense against aggression. US will do utmost allay these fears as in past, through years fighting side by side with ROK for its defense against aggression and helping build up military strength, economic position, and international status ROK. US fully sympathizes and agrees ROK desire for total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces Korea. US endeavoring conclude armistice agreement achieve such withdrawal through political means after an armistice.

  Rhee should also understand that, in view long-term interests US in security Western Pacific, US will take strong stand against any developments from any quarter that affect political stability, economic progress and military security of free countries that area, including Korea. As Rhee aware, US intends maintain armed forces in Western Pacific on long-term basis, viz. Okinawa. Just as proximity of American forces to Korea at time original North Korean aggression was major factor stopping that aggression, in future whether or not large numbers US troops actually in Korea, proximity to Korea of American forces will clearly be deterrent to renewed aggression as well as major factor in US attitude towards and reaction to any such aggression. You can also assure Rhee USUN forces will remain Korea long as circumstances permit. US people are not prepared see their three long years sacrifice in Korea dissipated.

  (2) President convinced that pending political settlement and establishment any wider system of security in Pacific area, armistice agreement itself taken in conjunction “greater sanctions statement” Deptel 619,⁶ represents strongest possible guarantee security for ROK. It should be pointed out to Rhee that under Article 62 armistice agreement remains in effect until expressly superseded by amendments acceptable to UNC or by specific provision of political settlement. It should also be pointed out to Rhee that “greater sanctions statement” remains in effect for duration of armistice. “Greater sanctions statement” is, under present circumstances, clearly preferable from standpoint ROK security to bilateral defense treaty with US. Statement aimed directly at Korea’s nearest potential aggressors for it plainly indicates hostilities will not be necessarily confined Korea. It has more tangible meaning than would bilateral security treaty with US for it is unprecedented international undertaking by UN members which will have profound effect discouraging future aggression Korea. Rhee can be assured “greater sanctions statement” will be issued by US and other signatories immediately upon conclusion armistice agreement. Statement will remain in effect as long as armistice and the President wants Rhee to know that we will not go back on it as long as it is in force.

  (3) In addition to substantial undertaking for Korea’s future security in “greater sanctions statement” US prepared begin discussion with ROK looking towards conclusion comprehensive agreement on military assistance and related matters. These would presumably include disposition USUN forces Korea; strengthening, training, and maintenance ROK armed forces; and usual administrative questions. Such agreement would represent further affirmative US determination provide continuing assistance ROKs in future defense Korea; agreement, however, could not be formally concluded until present hostilities terminated by armistice.

  (4) US Government intends proceed promptly and vigorously in political conference attempting achieve unified, democratic and independent Korea and rapid withdrawal Chinese Communist forces. We will insist on continued recognition integrity and sovereignty ROK Government and will oppose any dissolution ROK. US intends consult with ROK both before and during such conference and confidently expects full ROK participation in it. You may assure Rhee we will not acquiesce any formal political agreement which leaves Korea permanently divided.

  (5) We prepared assist development and maintenance ROK ground forces to level of in the order of more or less 20 divisions (plus one Marine Brigade) so long as necessary for ROK defense provided ROK assurances received of cooperation in armistice agreement and in future UN efforts achieve unification peaceful means. We are not prepared however make commitments expansion ROK forces beyond present level if agitation against armistice and non-cooperative attitude ROK persists, since such US assistance would be useless under such conditions. Rhee should bear in mind heavy US defense commitments throughout world and increasingly heavy burden these responsibilities upon American people.

  (6) While US intends fully cooperate with ROK in strengthening it against future aggression, effectiveness such assistance will inevitably depend upon ROK willingness and ability cooperate with US efforts and ensure assistance has maximum effectiveness. Public declaration by Rhee of determination his government fully cooperate with USUN will greatly strengthen mutual position against renewal aggression.

  (7) Before the President approves US opening discussions concerning political conference, mutual assistance agreement and strengthening ROK forces outlined paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) above, he desires receive from Rhee firm assurance that ROK will cooperate fully with USUN Korea. Such cooperation must include: (a) ROK will henceforth refrain from opposition and agitation against armistice and use its influence restrain all segments Korean population from so doing; (b) ROK will cooperate fully in armistice implementation; and (c) ROK armed forces will remain under operational control CINCUNC until US and ROK Governments mutually agree such arrangements no longer necessary.

  (8) If satisfactory assurances not received Rhee should be clearly told US will be compelled take all necessary measures ensure security US and other UN forces in unfortunate event before or after armistice he orders ROK forces take unilateral military action and withdraws them from UNC.

  (9) US has most carefully considered Rhee’s April 30 letter to General Clark.⁷ However under present circumstances the President cannot consider conclusion mutual defense treaty with ROK now. This does not in any way imply lack of concern over ROK security. It is simply that the following real practical difficulties stand in the way of such treaty at this time:

  (a) If entered into under present circumstances, bilateral treaty would detract from UN aspects action Korea. It might lead some governments to desire reduce their present military participation in Korea, and to reconsider joining in issuing greater sanctions statement. Any weakening of effectiveness of this statement would be intolerable in view its great importance. Support of free world for Korea is support that must be most carefully preserved. From standpoint both of US and ROK it is vital UN remain seized with problem of Communist aggression in Korea until there is appropriate UN determination aggression ended. In view longstanding US dedication principle of collective security, it is important that no impression be created that US and ROK, through bilateral defense treaty, now consider UN as ineffective instrument against actual aggesssion in Korea.

  (b) Formal agreement requiring Congressional approval would of necessity not apply to territory in North Korea not under ROK control, as Secretary fully explained to Yang April 8. It most undesirable from both ROK and US standpoints lead Communists believe US not interested in unification all Korea under free government, or acknowledge and give legal effect Communist control over any part Korea. Thus treaty not appropriate at least until results our mutual efforts at achieving political settlement Korea clarified.

  (c) In view recent ill-considered ROK official statements re armistice and threat remove ROK forces from UNC, it now particularly difficult explain US people and Congress such far-reaching undertaking as represented by treaty. Such statements and continued agitation against armistice are undermining ROK position in free world opinion and cutting ground from under US efforts build up international support Korean security and economic future.

  When above difficulties no longer insurmountable, US will be in better position consider appropriate formal defense arrangements with ROK, provided assurances contained paragraphs (5), (6) and (7) Part II above have developed satisfactory basis for such consideration.

  (10) If Rhee asks whether President, in view our position on treaty, would issue public statement similar his personal message April 15 (Deptel 653)⁸ you may inform him that the President is willing consider appropriate way meet his request.

• Part 3. The President personally requests that you convey the following personal message from him to President Rhee: “In view of extremely heavy load on free world in struggle against communism with which it is now engaged, we cannot be too arbitrary in our demands on the Communists and expect at the same time to retain the support of free people. I personally request that you accept my assurances in my continued interest in the economy and defense of Korea. For this reason I do not see how we can object to North Korean prisoners of war, who were taken with arms in their hands fighting against ROK and UN forces, from receiving the same treatment as other prisoners of war opposing repatriation. This seems to me particularly true since we intend to make certain that the Korean prisoners of war will not be subjected to any coercion of force and will in any event be released within Korea within a definite time period if they so desire.”

Smith

1. This telegram, which was drafted by Young, Emmons, and Johnson and cleared with the Department of Defense and the following offices, G, S/P, P, and L in the Department of State, was also sent to Tokyo as telegram 2740.
2. Dated May 15, p. 1029.
3. Ante, p. 1036.
4. Dated May 18, p. 1048.
5. This telegram transmitted to the Embassy in Korea the text of the aide-mémoire, which is printed as an attachment to a memorandum of conversation by Robertson, Apr. 24, p. 935.
6. Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 61.
7. Ante, p. 955.
8. Ante, p. 912.