Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

695.0029/5–2253: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

top secret
niact

Washington, May 22, 1953—10:49 p.m.

1663. Personal for the Secretary (eyes only) from Smith. Code clerk: When you decode this message carry it by hand to the Secretary of State personally, or in his absence, to the Ambassador or Mr. MacArthur.

After entire morning conference with Congressional group which met with you day of your departure,² with addition of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Judd, general understanding of our position and surprisingly general opinion on procedure was attained. This evening President dispatched following message to Prime Minister Churchill³ and instructions to Clark which are summarized immediately thereafter.

Begin message from President to Prime Minister Churchill:

“I have carefully considered your message⁴ in reply to discussions which Bedell Smith had with representatives of H. M. Embassy on the Korean armistice negotiations. I feel that the position Bedell set forth was eminently reasonable especially in view of the fact that we are the parties who are resisting an unprovoked aggression. I had hoped his proposals could have provided the basis upon which we all could have taken a final stand. It is essential that a firm unified stand be taken if the Communists are to be convinced that the United Nations will never forsake the principle of non-forcible repatriation either in statement or in fact. Upon this there can be no possibility of misunderstanding. The matter has been thoroughly discussed and considered by members of my administration and with Congressional leaders in the light of your message. Although we have grave doubts concerning the conviction of some of the allies that we can depend upon a simple majority vote, we are prepared also to agree to such a voting formula for the commission provided that the terms of reference for the commission are such as to insure beyond any reasonable doubt that coercion and force will not be used against the prisoners. This is not a question of detail of procedure but involves the integrity of the basic principle for which we have so long fought and stoutly defended.

The terms of reference and basic procedures which will be set forth by the UNC at Panmunjom on May 25 will be clear, simple and essential for the maintenance of the principle upon which we are all agreed. If an armistice is to be obtained upon any acceptable basis it will be essential that the Communists clearly understand that there can be no deviation from the essential elements of the position to be taken by the UNC. Any sign of weakening in our unity of resolve would again be exploited by them to the disadvantage of all of us. I am sure that you will appreciate that any failure on the part of our principal allies fully to support a position so clearly reasonable and fair and going so far to meet the views of those allies, would have most adverse effects upon American public and Congressional opinion at this critical time.

With respect to Syngman Rhee’s attitude I quite agree that we cannot allow him to dictate policy to our two countries. Yet I beg of you not to forget that Korea is the one place where we have an inspired resistance by the peoples themselves to the Communist enemy. The Koreans are valiantly resisting in numbers that far exceed the combined contributions of all of us. The inspiration for that struggle largely comes from President Rhee.

I believe that a prompt public and unequivocal statement that the UK was fully consulted and fully supports the position which the UNC is taking in the forthcoming executive sessions would assure an armistice promptly, if in fact the Communists want one on the basis acceptable to us.”

Essential elements instructions of President to Clark:

“Clark is to present in executive session on May 25 Korean time a final UNC position on POWs incorporating following points:

1. Maintenance present position on accepting five-nation custodial commission subject to all armed forces and operating personnel being provided exclusively by India.

2. Agree Korean non-repatriates will be turned over to commission in same manner as Chinese.

3. Agree that commission will act on all matters by majority vote.

4. Maintenance essential elements in terms of reference for commission to assure coercion and force will not be used against non-repatriates:

(a) Limitation on number staff assistants allowed Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland, exact number being left Clark’s discretion.

(b) UNC observers present at operation of custodial commission and subordinate bodies.

(c) Limitation on number North Koreans and Chinese permitted access to POWs, exact number left to Clark’s discretion.

(d) All verifications and interviews in presence of representatives of each member nation of commission. Requests by prisoners for repatriation be validated by majority vote of commission.

(e) Press be permitted access to all operations.

(f) Logistical support for prisoners to be provided by UNC.

5. Period of access to prisoners by North Koreans and Chinese to be ninety days.

6. Agree to submission to political conference question of remaining non-repatriates with provision that failing determination their disposition within 120 days (90 days access by Communists and 30 days for consideration by political conference) they will be released with alternative that if political conference does not reach a decision, question disposition will be referred to UN General Assembly. We will accept Communist choice these alternatives.

Presentation will do all possible minimize ultimatum aspects.

Following presentation negotiations will be recessed for one week. During this week Clark will transmit letter to opposing commanders reinforcing Harrison’s presentation. Letter will be submitted to Washington for approval.

If on resumption negotiations following one week recess Communists reject UNC proposals, make no proposal of their own incorporating basic principles UNC proposal or give no other evidence willingness reach agreement on acceptable basis, Harrison and Clark would submit their recommendations to Washington and if Washington concurred negotiations would be entirely terminated rather than recessed.

If Clark authorized to terminate negotiations this message authorizes him to:

1. Void agreements on neutralization and immunity Munsan–Kaesong–Panmunjom area.

2. Bomb Kaesong, step up air and naval action.

3. Release Chinese and Korean non-repatriates (instructions with regard to Chinese will be sent later to Clark but it is anticipated most if not all will go to Formosa).”

Also Briggs and Clark are being instructed to make a joint approach to Rhee to ask his cooperation and to assure him of the President’s desire to do everything feasible to allay Korean fears.

Smith

1. This telegram was drafted by Smith and cleared by Johnson.
2. This group included Senators Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper (Iowa), Knowland (California), George (Georgia), and Sparkman (Alabama) and Representatives Chiperfield (Illinois) and Richards (South Carolina).
3. In telegram 7547 to London, May 22, not printed (695.0029/5–2253).
4. See the memorandum of conversation by Johnson, May 22, p. 1071.