State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Extract]
2. . . . . . .
Korean Armistice Negotiations
(At this point Messrs. Robertson and Johnson joined the conference.)
Mr. Matthews: Robertson and Johnson have just spent three hours with a group of representative Congressmen on our Korean armistice proposal.3 Perhaps they might like to report the gist of the meeting.
Mr. Johnson: The meeting was concerned with the question of our instructions to Clark on armistice terms. The general sense of the meeting, [Page 1076] very briefly, was that we should go to a position of accepting a majority vote for decisions of the Custodial Commission provided that our Allies agree to stand with us on detailed terms of reference for protecting the prisoners.
Mr. Robertson: In general they were ready to go along on treating the Korean POW’s the same as the Chinese, on the question of referring the problem of the POW’s to the U.N. for eventual disposition, and on the 3 to 2 vote, but all providing that the Allies would stand with us on the terms of reference for the Custodial Commission. Originally there was some support among them for standing on a 4 to 1 system of voting, but when it came to the question of whether or not we should break off the negotiations if we could not get a 4 to 1 position, the majority of them agreed that we could not break on it.
Mr. Johnson: It had already been made clear that the English and Canadians would not support us on a position of a 4 to 1 vote.4
Admiral Fechteler: From my personal point of view it seems to me that the U.S. is going to maintain its principle of non-forcible repatriation but that if it goes along with concessions like this it will in practice let a situation develop in which all prisoners will eventually go back.
Admiral Libby: It seems to me that by giving way on all points of issue we are merely postponing the final decision. Agreement to a 3 to 2 vote is just putting off the evil day. We can’t really negotiate our terms of reference which will protect the POWs. The Commies will wrangle around to terms of reference that will lead to a situation where the prisoners will not be protected.
Mr. Robertson: Three of the Senators felt like you do. The other Senators agreed that the important thing was to secure clear terms of reference. One primary difficulty is that of negotiating out our position with our Allies. Without their support we can’t break on a 4 to 1 vote position.
Mr. Bowie: Aren’t there really only two essential points in the points of reference, one of them being that all the members of the Custodial Commission should sit in on any dealings of the Communists with the prisoners and the other one that there should be a procedure for the prisoners saying that they don’t want to go back. If the Swiss and Swedes are present they can always yell if they think duress is being applied.
Mr. Robertson: But if the Swiss and Swedes think that POWs shouldn’t go back and the Commission is operating under a 3 to 2 vote, then the POWs might be sent back anyway. (At this point the discussion [Page 1077] proceeded on a draft telegram from the JCS to Clark, which is attached.5)
General Bradley: On the first page of the telegram shouldn’t we clarify the language to make it clear that we are referring to the General Assembly Resolution as it was adopted and not the Indian Resolution. The Indian Resolution was amended before it was passed as the General Assembly Resolution.
Mr. Matthews: Why don’t we change the language to read General Assembly Resolution of December 1952 and then put in in parenthesis “The modified Indian Resolution”.
General Bradley: My other question is that supposing the Communists agree to the general principles but don’t buy our terms of reference. Are we going to permit them to drag out negotiations?
Mr. Robertson: Our feeling was that the terms of reference were just as important as the general principles.
General Collins: The language of this draft doesn’t make it clear as to what terms of reference are essential. I should think we would have to spell out the terms of reference and that the last sentence of paragraph 3d should be omitted.
Mr. Robertson: We should also add the point which was brought out in the discussion with the Senators this morning that a certificate to the effect that a POW wanted to return must be approved by a majority vote of the Custodial Commission before he is actually sent back.
Mr. Johnson: Should we go through the terms of reference and pick out those that are essential?
General Collins: I think we should tell Clark just what he must put forward.
Mr. Bowie: I agree. He should be told from here what terms of reference we believe to be essential.
General Collins: The mere fact that we are debating here now as to what is and what is not essential indicates that we shouldn’t make Clark responsible for that decision.
General Bradley: Have we gone over the terms of reference in detail with our Allies?
Mr. Johnson: They know them in general but we have not gone over them in detail. Maybe we had better go through the terms of reference now. (At this point Mr. Johnson read the terms of reference as they were spelled out in Clark’s previous instruction.)
General Bradley: On the question of the number of staff assistants, it seems to me that we should say that what was essential would be that there be a limited number of staff assistants but that we would leave the determination of the exact number to Clark.
[Page 1078]Admiral Fechteler: Can’t we leave the determination of all the essential elements to Clark?
General Collins: In fairness to Clark I think we should tell him what we think are essential.
General Bradley: On the point of having a UNC observer it seems to me that the Communists would balk on this. Is there any substitute that we could propose or assist [insist?] on?
General Collins: I think we ought to insist on having an observer.
General Bradley: If we do insist on it, it should be spelled out to Clark clearly that we consider this essential.
Mr. Bowie: I am not so clear myself on why a UNC observer is essential. What could they do? All they could do would be to yell if they saw anything going on that they didn’t like. If the Swiss and Swedes are there they can also yell.
General Bradley: It might be that we should insist on either having the UNC or on having freedom of access for the press.
General Collins: I would agree to that.
Mr. Johnson: (Reading further from previous instructions to Clark.) The provisions that the Indians could secure assistance in the form of military personnel from the UNC if they desire it does not seem to me to be essential.
General Collins: Actually there might even be some question as to the legality of putting U.S. troops under foreign control.
Mr. Bowie: Just how would this thing work if there is a riot. Who would actually call out troops?
Mr. Johnson: We suppose it would be the Indian Commander. (Reading further.) It seems to me that the point of limiting the number of interviewers might be necessary but that the exact number should be left to Clark’s discretion. Then there is the question of the hours of access to the POWs which the interviewers would have.
General Collins: The hours of access don’t seem to me to be essential.
Admiral Libby: On the point of leaving the observation of the proceedings of the Custodial Commission to the press as an alternative to UNC observers, I think it should be pointed out that after all the press has no obligation to observe the activities of the Commission and I don’t see how we could guarantee that the newspaper men would cooperate.
General Collins: All this discussion only convinces me that this is not really the province of the JCS. These are 90 per cent political problems. Right now a lot of people are saying that the JCS are responsible for holding up the Armistice and we will take the rap for it. But these questions are really not military questions, they are political questions.
General Bradley: To get back to the question of the UNC observer, I think we should put that as an essential position.
[Page 1079]Mr. Johnson: OK, we will include that. Then we have already discussed the question that any certificate of a POW indicating that he wants to go back should be validated by a majority vote.
Admiral Fechteler: Paragraph f in the present draft is not clear to me. I think it will need redrafting.
Mr. Johnson: We will redraft that paragraph.
Admiral Libby: I have another question on the point of the admission of the press. How can we insist that it should just be press accredited to the UNC?
Mr. Bowie: I can’t see that that would be a tenable position.
Mr. Matthews: I agree that we would be hard put to defend admission of the press on the grounds of freedom of the press and then attempt to keep out the Communist Press.
Mr. Robertson: Why don’t we just make it that the press should have access.
Mr. Johnson: The points that deal with logistics, hospital services, protection of verifying officials, communications, etc., don’t seem to me to be essential in terms of protecting the POWs.
General Collins: I have a question on paragraph 5 of the present draft which says that Clark should take measures to enlist maximum press cooperation in support of the executive session. It seems to me that that is ambiguous.
Admiral Libby: We have had no trouble with the press on previous executive sessions.
General Collins: Then why don’t we just cut out that paragraph.
Admiral Fechteler: On page 5 Clark is instructed that if the Communists reject the UNC proposal to propose a recess until the following day. Will we be ready to have Harrison go back the following day?
Mr. Matthews: We will have to do some talking with our Allies as well as make decisions within this Government. I think the time period should be three days.
General Bradley: Can we have a drafting team get up a revised message and then maybe we can clear that by telephone.
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A note on the title page read: “Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”
Of the JCS, Generals Bradley and Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Gleason and General Gerhard represented the NSC, General Cabell the CIA, and Nash and Admiral Page Smith the Department of Defense. In all, 21 persons were present.
↩ - In addition to Korea, Indochina, Yugoslavia, and Latin America were topics of discussion at this meeting.↩
- For the list of congressional leaders at this meeting, see footnote 2, infra.↩
- For the British view, see the memorandum of conversation by Johnson, May 22, p. 1071; for the Canadian view, see the memorandum of conversation by Hickerson, supra.↩
- The draft was not attached to the source text; it was transmitted in final form as telegram JCS 939673 to Clark, May 22, p. 1082.↩