Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/5–2253

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 22, 1953.

Subject:

• Final UNC Proposal In Korean Truce Negotiations

Participants:

• Mr. Ignatieff, Canadian Embassy
• Mr. Campbell, Canadian Embassy
• Mr. Hickerson, UNA
• Mr. Henkin, UNP

At 9:25 AM, Mr. Ignatieff called Mr. Johnson’s office and left the following message: Mr. Pearson is prepared to accept the alternative proposal and agree to a private understanding that Canada would sponsor and support immediate consideration by the General Assembly of the problem of the non-repatriates through a resolution providing for the prompt release of the prisoners. This agreement by Canada was on condition that the U.S. would not insist on the other alternative i.e., automatic release of the prisoners if their disposition is not settled by the political conference. The message said that the Canadians insist that this new counter proposal should not be regarded as the breaking point.

In the afternoon, at 4:45 PM, Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Campbell called and said that in view of our courtesy in consulting fully with their government, they felt that the Department should have a fuller explanation of the Canadian point of view than could be given in a telephone message. Mr. Ignatieff then stated the Embassy position as follows: Mr. Pearson has authorized the Embassy to agree to cosponsor and support immediate consideration of the problem of the non-repatriates by the GA through a resolution providing for their prompt release. This agreement however was made on the condition that having obtained this agreement, the UNC will put forward a proposal along the lines of the final paragraph of the Indian resolution and will not insist on automatic release of the non-repatriates.

I explained to Mr. Ignatieff that what we had in mind would appear to satisfy this condition since we would put forward both alternatives simultaneously. We would tell the Communists that we believe the non-repatriates should be released outright. At the same time, we would indicate that if the Communists preferred a reference of the problem of the disposition of these persons to the UN it would be acceptable to us. Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Campbell seemed to agree that this met Mr. Pearson’s condition.

Mr. Ignatieff then stated that Mr. Pearson made the following additional points:

(1) the Canadian agreement to cosponsor a resolution of the kind indicated must be considered as a private agreement and no publicity should be given to it.

(2) Mr. Pearson continues to believe that the Communists should be given advance assurance that they would be allowed to participate in the consideration by the GA of the disposition of the non-repatriates, since if this were done there would be no reason for Communists opposition to this plan, and that argument could be made to them.

On this point I told Mr. Ignatieff that we do not share Mr. Pearson’s belief on this subject and we will therefore not give the Communists any such assurance. This question we believe should arise if at all in the GA, and not at Panmunjom; in the GA, I added, judging by our position in the past, I was confident that we would continue to oppose any form of participation by the Communists. In reply to Mr. Campbell’s question whether, if the Communists accept the entire plan on condition that they be allowed to participate in UN discussion of the disposition of non-repatriates, we would continue to oppose such participation, I stated that that was a hypothetical question on which I was not prepared to comment at this time. We would have to consider it if that contingency developed.

(3) Mr. Pearson also stated that it should be made clear that Canada has not altered its fundamental position on the counter proposal as a whole. Mr. Pearson said “we continue to regard them [the new UNC proposals]² as a satisfactory basis for negotiating the next step, but we cannot accept being pinned down to agreeing to them as a final position nor to support any move to break off the negotiations if the proposals are not accepted.” Canada, he said, could not agree to be identified with any statement that these proposals represent a final position.

I told Mr. Ignatieff that the proposals we are discussing represent all the concessions that we feel can be made. Indeed, we are not sure that we can get public support even for these concessions. Further consultations with Congressional leaders, I said, have indicated very strong feelings on this subject on the part of certain members of Congress. I asked Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Campbell what further “give” there could be in our position and what Mr. Pearson had in mind in refusing to agree to this as a final position. Mr. Campbell stated that there was of course the disagreement on the voting procedure in the proposed custodial commission. However, if he understood his Government’s position, it was Mr. Pearson’s feeling that it is premature to talk about any final position until the Communist reaction is obtained to the UNC proposals. Mr. Ignatieff added that this government perhaps feels that the Indian attitude would be important, and that present discussions between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Nehru might be pertinent in any firm decision as to what the final position ought to be.

Asked where matters now stood I told the Canadian representatives that I really did not know. We had been hoping to be able to say that our key allies have agreed to accept this as a final position if the U.S. made the concessions indicated. Since that is not in fact the case so far as Canada is concerned, I did not really know where we stood so far as making the proposals in question. In reply to Mr. Ignatieff I stated that while I had not seen the UK response the replies of the other Common wealth countries³ consulted went along with our position, and Canada alone resisted agreement that our proposal should be final.

JDH

1. This memorandum was drafted by Henkin and initialed by Hickerson.
2. Brackets in the source text.
3. The replies of the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa are reported in the following documents: memorandum of conversation, by Robertson with Spender, May 22; memorandum of conversation, by Robertson with Munro, May 21; and memorandum of conversation, by Johnson with Jarvie, May 21, none printed. (795.00/5–2253, 795.00/5–2153, and 795.00/5–2153, respectively)