795.00/5–2253
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)
Subject:
- Korean Armistice Negotiations
Participants:
- Mr. F. S. Tomlinson—British Embassy
- FE—U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Tomlinson called at 8:30 this morning with the UK reply to General Smith’s conversation with representatives of the UK and the Dominions on Tuesday, May 19.1
Mr. Tomlinson stated that the message from the Prime Minister stated that he well recognized the difficulties with Rhee and the Congress and that he was obliged to the Administration “for having gone so far to meet our point of view”. The message stated that it was right that the revised proposal should not be put forward as an ultimatum. “Our object is to get the most advantageous terms by the process of negotiations”. The Prime Minister stated that as he saw it the questions at issue are of three kinds. First, the point of honor to safeguard the principle of no forcible repatriation; then, points of substance (introduction of Czech and Polish troops and the time limit) and finally, those of procedure (rules for access to prisoners and voting in the commission).
On this basis the Prime Minister expressed the view that “we should stand firm on the question of the use only of Indian troops at this stage. But we should not go so far as to let Syngman Rhee’s attitude be decisive. A possible alternative would be a commission of one neutral power—India—providing the troops. Alternatively it would be better in the last resort to agree to send all prisoners to a neutral state outside of Korea rather than have no armistice.”
The message went on to state that the Prime Minister said that the position on turning over the Koreans to the commission was correct and that he agreed.
With respect to the 4 to 1 voting formula the Prime Minister stated that he agreed we should try the revised formula. He went on to state that while he understood the US difficulties he was “sure the Administration did not contemplate making this a breaking point if all other questions were resolved”.
With respect to the terms of reference for safeguarding the prisoners against coercion and force he stated that we should “try for the best terms available” but that “these are procedural matters and should not be a breaking point”.
With respect to the question of the referral of the disposition of the remaining prisoners to the political conference and, alternatively, failing agreement in the political conference, to the UN, the Prime Minister stated he agreed.
I told Mr. Tomlinson that I was naturally disappointed in the reply but that I would at once inform General Smith of its content. I asked that he immediately telephone London and obtain clarification as to whether the UK was committing itself to support a prompt resolution in the UNGA for the release of the prisoners to proceed to any available destination of their choice in the event the Communists accepted [Page 1073] this alternative. He promised to do so and inform me later in the morning.2
- See the memorandum of conversation, by Johnson, May 19, p. 1052.↩
- According to a memorandum of conversation by Henkin, May 22, Tomlinson called the Department of State at 10:50 a.m. to say that he had telephoned London and received clarification on the question of disposition of the prisoners of war. The British Government would certainly sponsor and support a General Assembly resolution for referral of the prisoners to the United Nations following 30 days of unsuccessful consideration by the political conference. (795.00/5–2253)↩