Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 145th Meeting of the National Security Council Wednesday, May 20, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

May 20, 1953

Present at the 145th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the United States Representative to the United Nations; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger, USA (Ret.) (for item 2); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (for item 3); the Chief of Naval Operations (for item 3); General Twining for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (for item 3); the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for item 3); Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, USA (for item 2); Lt. Col. Edward Black, USA (for item 2); Col. Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security” and 2. “A Volunteer Freedom Corps”.]

3. Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea (NSC 147;² NSC Actions Nos. 759,³ 782⁴ and 787;⁵ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Future Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea”, dated March 30, 1953)⁶

General Bradley briefed the Council with respect to the choice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the most desirable course of action in Korea, among those set forth in NSC 147, from the point of view of all considerations, military and otherwise.

(The record of General Bradley’s statement which he read to the Council is filed with the Minutes of this meeting.⁷)

General Bradley’s statement indicated the necessity of expanding the war beyond Korea. General Bradley indicated that if a national decision were made to expand the effort in Korea, it would be necessary to conduct military operations outside Korea to achieve success.

General Collins took over from General Bradley and briefed the Council on the several phases of the course of action which General Bradley had outlined.

. . . . . . .

The President then inquired of General Twining about the means of protecting our own units from low-flying Chinese Communist planes after the action had been begun.

It was to obviate this danger, replied General Twining, that the plan chosen by the Joint Chiefs contemplated initially the complete destruction of the Communist air force.

After further discussion of various military aspects of the problem, the President summed up the views presented by the Joint Chiefs as indicating their belief that if we went over to more positive action against the enemy in Korea, it would be necessary to expand the war outside of Korea and that it would be necessary to use the atomic bomb. His one great anxiety, said the President, with respect to this proposal was the possibility of attacks by the Soviet Air Force on the almost defense-less population centers of Japan. This, said the President, was always in the back of his mind.

General Collins replied that there was no clear answer to the President’s anxiety, and added that for that matter, our own position in such places as Pusan and Inchon offered a very favorable target to the Soviets if they intervened with their Air Force.

The President next inquired the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to when we should have to begin to take the actions which would be required if the United States were to be ready to mount this operation, say, in May of 1954.

General Bradley said that we would have to begin at once to bring the ROK forces up to 20 divisions. We would also have at once to take steps to assure additional supplies of ammunition. This would involve cutbacks of ammunition programmed now for NATO.

General Collins said that the Marine division whose use was contemplated was ready to go. So also was the regimental combat team which would have to be made up from the 82nd Airborne Division. In a matter of three months from the time of decision to mount this operation, we should have to begin the selection and the movement of the American forces which would have to go to augment our strength in Korea.

The President observed that the quicker the operation was mounted, the less the danger of Soviet intervention. Everything, he believed, should be in readiness before the blow actually fell. He stressed his anxiety lest the United States become involved in global war commencing in Manchuria.

General Bradley confirmed that the Joint Chiefs were themselves convinced of the necessity of carrying out the proposed operation with great speed if it were to be done successfully.

There ensued a discussion of the disinclination of our allies to go along with any such proposal as this. It was the President’s view that we ought at once to begin to infiltrate these ideas into the minds of our allies. If the ground were prepared and the seeds planted in a quiet and informal way, there was much better chance of acceptance than if we suddenly confronted the allied governments with a full-fledged plan to end the war in Korea by military decision.

There was general agreement with the President’s point, and Secretary Smith said that in a sense he had already begun to plant these seeds. He has just called in the British and Dominion Ambassadors and made clear to them that the United States could not contemplate an indefinite continuation of the present stalemate if the armistice negotiations were broken off.⁸ He also re-emphasized his views expressed to the Council earlier, that a quick victory would go far to sell our allies on even the most drastic course of action in Korea.

The President inquired whether, if he had conversations in the near future with Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Mayer, he should not take the occasion to discuss this plan with them in an informal and exploratory way.

The trouble with this, replied Secretary Smith, was the prospect that Malenkov might very well issue an invitation to a conference before the President could.

In that case, the President queried whether he should not be the first to invite them all.

In response to this interchange, Ambassador Lodge warned the President that unless he did something quickly he was going to lose the initiative which he had gained in his great speech of April 16.

Speaking of the rumors of Prime Minister Churchill’s maneuvers to secure a meeting of the four powers, and his recent speech in the Commons, the President wondered whether Sir Winston’s faculties and judgment were not deteriorating.

Secretary Smith informed the Council that he would prepare a report to the Council setting forth the foreign policy implications of the military course of action which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had selected.

The President then indicated his anxiety lest the report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff go any further than those who were in the room, and stated his desire that a record should be made of those who had heard the military briefing. It was agreed, however, that the substance of the Joint Chiefs’ views, together with the State Department’s political annex, should be made available to those who were to participate in Project Solarium.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the President stated that if the members of the Council agreed, he wished the record to show that if circumstances arose which would force the United States to an expanded effort in Korea, the plan selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was most likely to achieve the objective we sought. His only real worry, said the President, was over the possibility of intervention by the Soviets. He feared the Chinese much less, since the blow would fall so swiftly and with such force as to eliminate Chinese Communist intervention.

The National Security Council:⁹

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on their choice of the most advantageous course of action for the United States to adopt in Korea in the event that current truce negotiations break down and it is decided to extend the war in an effort to gain a military decision.

b. Noted that the Department of State would prepare a political annex setting forth the foreign policy implications of the course of action selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Agreed that it was the sense of the National Security Council that, if conditions arise requiring more positive action in Korea, the course of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be adopted as a general guide.

d. Deferred further consideration of the subject pending completion of related studies now under way.

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

[Here follows discussion on items 4. “Negotiations with Spain” and 5. “NSC Status of Projects”.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on May 23.
2. Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.
3. For NSC Action No. 759, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892.
4. For NSC Action No. 782, see the memorandum of discussion at the 143d meeting of the NSC, May 6, p. 975.
5. For NSC Action No. 787, see the memorandum of discussion at the 144th meeting of the NSC, May 13, p. 1012.
6. Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 838.
7. The record was not attached to the source text, but see General Bradley’s memorandum, supra.
8. See the memorandum of conversation by Johnson, May 19, p. 1052.
9. The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 794.