Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, 19 May 1953.

Subject:

• Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea (Analysis)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that you are familiar with the various possible courses of action with respect to Korea, outlined in NSC 147¹ as follows:

• Course A: Continue for the foreseeable future military pressure on the enemy at substantially the present level, while building up ROK forces with a view to possible limited redeployment of U.S. forces from Korea.
• Course B: Increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action, with a view to making hostilities more costly to the enemy in the hope that he might agree to an armistice acceptable to the United States
• Course C: Continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launching a series of coordinated ground operations along the present line, followed by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea, with a view to inflicting maximum destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea and to achieving a favorable settlement on the Korean War.
• Course D: Extend and intensify military pressures on the enemy by states, including air attack and naval blockade directly against Manchuria and Communist China, and if required, increase ground operations in Korea, with a view to making hostilities so costly to the enemy that a favorable settlement of the Korean War might be achieved.
• Course E: Undertake a coordinated offensive to the waist of Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to inflicting maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea consistent with establishing a line at the waist, and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean War.
• Course F: Undertake a coordinated large-scale offensive in Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to the defeat and destruction of the bulk of the Communist forces in Korea and settlement of the Korean War on the basis of a unified, non-Communist Korea.

2. Course of action A, which is in accord with the national objectives outlined in NSC 118/2,² has been followed since the armistice negotiations began.

3. You have directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on NSC 147, and to make their recommendations as to which course of action should be pursued in the event that current truce negotiations break down. Before concluding this statement with our recommendations, there are several considerations that should be brought to your attention. Fundamentally, the course of military action recommended will depend on the broader political objectives involving Korea. If it is decided to extend the war in an effort to gain a military decision, after all the risks are considered, then the course of action, as rewritten and stated in paragraph 8 would be the best one, from a military viewpoint to attain the political objectives. The steps that the JCS believe should be taken to implement this course of action are outlined in the Appendix.

4. Comments on courses of action:

a. Course “C” and Course “E” both contain a limiting military factor of “a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea”, and in Course “E”, “inflicting maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea consistent with establishing a line at the waist” with the larger objective of achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean War. It should be pointed out that the military action of establishing a line at the waist does not preclude, under these courses of action, the pursuit and destruction of enemy forces beyond the waist of Korea if the offensive is successful. It should also be pointed out that in any mission given the UN Commander that the “waist of Korea” be clearly stated as a desirable end result, but that the main objective of either course of action is the “maximum destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea” in order to achieve a favorable settlement. Limiting his ground action to the waist in Korea might exclude his being able to inflict maximum destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea.

b. If Course “C” were undertaken, it would very likely require extending the war into Manchuria in order to counter enemy air forces which would have our troops within striking range as they advance.

c. Paragraph 21 of NSC 147 states “Each of the suggested Courses of Action (except Course “A”) permits but does not require employment of atomic weapons. In each case (except Course “A”), the use or nonuse of such weapons is left open for future determination”. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered this particular aspect of possible Courses of Action in Korea, and they now are of the opinion that all of the Courses of Action, except “A” and possibly “B”, would require the employment of atomic weapons in sufficient numbers to insure, insofar as is possible, a successful military conclusion of the Korean War. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that from the Military standpoint no Course of Action beyond “A” or “B” should be undertaken without a concurrent decision to employ atomic weapons on a sufficiently large scale to insure success. A piecemeal or limited employment, with the attendant risk of failure, or at best limited success, is not recommended.

5. Risks involved. NSC 147 does not clearly emphasize the risks involved in carrying out the various courses of action. Therefore, the JCS believe that you should point out that if it is decided to enlarge the Korean War for the purpose of gaining a decision in Korea, that the following risks are involved:

a. We may become involved with a larger, long-term, costly war with Communist China.

b. We may also become involved in a war with the Soviet Union in Asia.

c. We may also be risking the outbreak of global war. (Any one or all of these conditions may result from the circumstances pointed out in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, and 18, concerning the Relations of Korea to Over-all Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives. From a military viewpoint, if a course of action is selected which risks any or all of the above, then preparations must be made to continue the operations to a decisive end, no matter how involved we become.)

d. We may lose some of our allies in Korea.

e. Our enlarging the war in Korea may have a detrimental effect on our relations with our allies in other areas, including the North Atlantic Treaty area.

f. Most of these offensive actions will cost many casualties.

g. All of these courses of action except “A” will call for a greater industrial and military mobilization, and will necessarily enlarge the military budget, not only for current operations, but for the larger forces needed in view of the larger risks we are taking in the Far East.

6. The very sound and constructive comments contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of NSC 147, as a basis for our firm attitude on the prisoner-of-war issue which may be the cause of the breakdown of current truce negotiations, thus leading to an enlargement of the Korean War, should be forcefully and completely explained to the American public.

7. Pursuant to your instructions, and based on the assumption that it is decided to extend the war in an attempt to obtain a decision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to submit the view in the next paragraph to the National Security Council on 20 May 1953 as to the military courses of action which should be adopted in the event that current armistice negotiations fail.

8. In view of all the factors, it would appear that a combination of actions under Courses D, E, and F would be the most effective and the most economical in the long run for the United States to pursue in Korea. Such actions offer the most promise of success. Therefore, the course of action which should be adopted by the United States is restated as follows:

Extend and intensify military action against the enemy, to include air and naval operations directly against China and Manchuria, a coordinated offensive to seize a position generally at the waist of Korea and be prepared for further operations as required in order to:

a. Destroy effective Communist military power in Korea.

b. Reduce the enemy’s capability for further aggression in Korea and the Far East.

c. Increase possibility of enemy acceptance of an armistice on U.S–U.N, terms.

d. Create conditions favorable for ROK forces to assume increasing responsibility for operations in Korea.

9. In the event the above course is adopted, the major implementing actions set forth in the Appendix hereto will be required.

10. If the course of action in paragraph 8 (above) is adopted, the timing of the various operations and the implementing steps outlined in the Appendix hereto is an important consideration. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the necessary air, naval, and ground operations, including extensive strategical and tactical use of atomic bombs, be undertaken so as to obtain maximum surprise and maximum impact on the enemy, both militarily and psychologically. If undertaken piecemeal—for example, starting with a naval blockade, followed by gradually increasing air operations, and finally followed later by ground operations—we would minimize the chance of success of the course of action outlined.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

Major Implementing Actions

Initiation of the recommended course of action will require a broadening of national objectives and accomplishment of the actions listed below:

a. Obtain from the President authority to employ atomic weapons.

b. Obtain concurrence of as many of the United Nations participants in Korea as possible in a decision to employ offensive military measures.

c. Secure governmental approval of necessary increase in funds to support the recommended operations.

d. Defer critical items of equipment and ammunition from NATO and other MDA programs as necessary.

e. Increase U.S. military personnel ceilings and accelerate production rates for certain types of ammunition and critical items of equipment.

f. Augment U.S. and ROK forces as required.

g. Increase the military preparedness of Japan.

h. Initiate the necessary psychological, political, economic and unconventional warfare measures in support of the military campaign.

i. Intensify guerrilla operations against Communist China.

j. Prepare plans and make preparations for the use of atomic weapons.

k. Extend the area for pursuit and air-to-air action to include Manchuria and North China.

l. Undertake air reconnaissance of essential target systems in China and Manchuria.

m. Launch an air offensive to the extent of capabilities against the Communist air complexes and other targets north of the Yalu River to destroy the Chinese Communist Air Force and, as capabilities increase, intensify air and naval attacks against Communist LOCs in North Korea, China and Manchuria at times to be determined by CINCFE.

n. Be prepared to establish a naval blockade and conduct a mining campaign (including aerial mining) against Communist China, supplemented by air attacks against air base complexes and LOCs in China and Manchuria, at a time to be determined.

o. Institute deceptive measures, including amphibious and airborne feints and raids as feasible, with strong naval and air support, in order to draw the enemy off balance, to keep him confused as to U.N. intentions, and to insure maximum effect from massed air attacks in the battle area.

p. Launch an aggressive land campaign, in conjunction with strong amphibious attacks and supported by airborne envelopments to exploit enemy weaknesses, aimed at encirclement and destruction or neutralization of major enemy forces and leading to seizure and consolidation of Hungnam–Sinanju objectives. Following with pursuit and mopup operations as necessary in North Korea.

q. Prepare plans for support of operations by Chinese Nationalists, as feasible, to create diversions from Korea.

r. Maintain the security of Japan, the Philippines, Formosa, and the Ryukyus, consistent with the need to provide for the over-all security of U.S. forces.

1. Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 1382.