611.80/5–2953
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
[Extract]
2India, ST D–8
Participants:
- Prime Minister Nehru
- Secretary Dulles
Subject:
- India
. . . . . . .
- 8.
- We discussed the Korean armistice. I stated that our latest proposal contemplated the exclusive use of Indian troops to take custody of prisoners not desiring to be repatriated and that I hoped that India would accept this responsibility. Mr. Nehru indicated acquiescence. Mr. Nehru urged the importance of concluding an armistice, stating that he feared otherwise the fighting would extend. I agreed with his estimate, stating that if the armistice negotiations collapsed, the United States would probably make a stronger rather than a lesser military exertion, and that this might well extend the area of conflict. (Note: I assumed this would be relayed.) I said that we were, however, sincerely trying to get an armistice and that only crazy people could think that the [Page 1069] United States wanted to prolong the struggle, which had already cost us about 150,000 casualties and 10 to 15 billion dollars of expenditures. Mr. Nehru said that he completely accepted the proposition that we wanted an armistice and not to prolong the war. I said that the problem of dealing with the Republic of Korea was one which apparently most people overlooked. It could not be overlooked because the ROK had a moral interest and also a material position which could not be ignored. If in disgust their troops stopped fighting, that could presage not an armistice but a great military disaster for the United States forces there. Also if they decided to go on fighting, there could be no armistice. That is why we had introduced the proposal for an immediate freeing of the North Koreans who did not want to be repatriated. This was strongly desired by President Rhee, and would make the armistice more acceptable. In fact the North Koreans had already acted in this same way as regards South Korean POWs. We were, however, still striving to find an acceptable armistice formula. We could not, however, abandon the concept of political asylum. That was something in which President Eisenhower and the American people believed strongly. Perhaps in this matter we were idealistic, but the one thing for which Americans had been willing to fight and die was their ideals. We did not apologize for this.
- 9.
- It was agreed to meet again the next day to complete the discussion of other items.
Secretary of State Dulles and his accompanying party arrived in India on May 20 as part of a 12-nation tour of the Near East and South Asia. For more information on this trip, see volume ix and the Department of State Bulletin, May 18, 1953, p. 707, and ibid., June 15, 1953, pp. 831–835. This meeting took place in Nehru’s office.
There has been considerable speculation that at this meeting Dulles passed a warning to the Chinese through the Indian Government that unless an armistice was agreed upon, the United States would expand the war. The best summary of the evidence supporting this view prior to the publication of this volume can be found in Rees, Korea: The Limited War, pp. 416–420.
↩- Nehru and Dulles also discussed the following topics: Indian internal unity and economic development; India’s relations with the Soviet Union; Chinese expansionism and the inevitability of a Sino-Soviet split; Indochinese border strategy; the convergence of Indian and Chinese influences in Indochina; the need for a high-level conference of world leaders to ease tensions; and disarmament. For a complete text of this memorandum of conversation, see volume ix.↩