795.00/5–1953: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan1
2707. No distribution. For Murphy from Johnson. For your personal background only we are urgently considering recommendations Clark’s CX 62456.2 Position with our Allies on negotiations has rapidly deteriorated. Particularly lack support for position on immediate release Korean non-repatriates and for unanimous decisions by custodial commission on substantive matters. There is general feeling among Allies that UNC position should be close as possible Indian GA resolution. On other hand much influential Congressional opinion is strongly opposed any procedure which gives India deciding vote on commission. We thoroughly appreciate problems we face with Rhee regarding release Koreans but consider our present position on this insupportable. Communists are using it to becloud fundamental issue which is their failure agree on acceptable ultimate disposition remaining prisoners. If Rhee’s purpose is to sabotage and forestall an armistice we cannot tolerate. If purpose is to improve his bargaining position for security pact and increased economic aid doubt there would be any basic improvement in situation even in unlikely event armistice obtained upon basis immediate release Koreans. No likelihood we can agree to security pact. Considered here that proposal in Clark’s CX 62456 on custody of Koreans and Chinese is such a reversion from our previously agreed position on five-nation commission it could not be maintained as final position and concession of shipment of Chinese from Korea would only be seized upon by Communists to insist upon same treatment for Koreans. It would introduce new complicating element in negotiations giving Communists opportunity focus attention away from principal problems.
After consultation with JCS and President have today discussed with UK, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African representatives final position along following lines: (1) maintenance present position on accepting five-nation custodial commission with all armed forces and operating personnel supplied only by India, (2) agreeing turn over custody Korean non-repatriates to commission in same manner as Chinese, (3) proposing commission reach decision on substantive matters by majority of four, (4) maintaining all elements our present position on detailed terms of reference for operations custodial commission which are necessary to assure right of Communist access is subject to conditions which will prevent use of coercion and force against non-repatriates, (5) maintaining previously planned final position on submission question disposition non-repatriates to political conference with 30 [Page 1059] day time limit together with indication willingness accept alternative contained last sentence Indian GA resolution.
Final decisions awaiting reactions governments consulted and results any necessary Congressional consultations.
Present planning is for Bohlen make approximately simultaneous approach in Moscow at time position presented Panmunjom and eliciting appropriate public statements Allied support and solidarity.
Thinking here is that presentation final position and any subsequent meetings should be in executive session doing all possible avoid ultimatum connotations, couched to maximum in terms acceptance Communist position, that is, do all possible facilitate Communist acceptance while making clear firmness our position.
Would appreciate your personal comments on how requirement for unanimous or majority of four decision on substantive matters in commission would work in practice.
Also working on instructions for Clark and Briggs discussion with Rhee at time he informed our decisions regarding Koreans centering on assurances contained in Greater Sanctions statement and willingness discuss military assistance agreement light comments Clark, Briggs and your Deptel 2694.3 Constitutional and political problems prevent consideration any stronger unilateral statement by President than that contained 2694.