Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
priority

Tokyo, May 14, 1953—4:25 p.m.

C 62419. Ref: A. CX 61160.¹ B. C 61283.² C. CX 62372.³ D. CX 55523.⁴ This msg in 4 parts.

Part 1. Although present indications favor the assumption that we may obtain an armistice, common prudence dictates that we must anticipate the possibility of another indefinite recess in negots. In that I am faced with the problem of increasing pressures on the enemy which may induce him to agree to an honorable armistice, the accomplishment of which I consider of paramount importance.

Part 2. a. If another prolonged recess is directed I propose to cont to exert max mil pressure within my capabilities. I am not auth by JCS directives to launch a maj ground offensive, nor do I see that I should at this time, with curr inadequate forces, because of the likelihood of incurring casualties incommensurate with possible tactical and strat gains. Therefore, I intend to conduct a strong def on the ground (with exception of a proposed limited objective atk noted in subpara b below) imm increase guerrilla opns, cont and expand present naval opns, and expand air opns as much as possible. Specifically, immed upon recess I plan to cont air atks on such critical tgts as Suiho, Tme Yangsi, and Pyongyang complexes and other sensitive tgts, observing presently imposed restrictions. Another tgt complex which has not been atkd to date, and which I plan to do under the above eventually, is the numerous North Korean dams, other than on the Yalu, impounding water for irrigation purposes. The breaching of these aprx 20 dams will inundate about 422,000 acres of land, causing damage or destruction of an est one quarter million tons of rice, thereby curtailing the enemy’s ability to live off the land and aggravating a reptd Chinese rice shortage and log problem. Further, for the reason set forth in ref A, I rqst auth to take Kaesong under heavy air atk 24 hours after advising the Communists that their use thereof violates the spirit of the 22 Oct 1951 Scty Agreement (d). Complete text of ltr which I would submit to the Communists was set forth in ref B. In view of great importance of timing, rqst I be given auth now to submit this ltr to the Communists as soon as I am directed to again indefinitely recess the negots.

b. In the event of a prolonged recess I consider it desirable that Eighth Army conduct a limited objective atk from the vic of Kumsong late this fall when armor can be used to the max over the frozen rice paddies, northeast to the east coast, supported by an amph close-in envelopment, with the objective of destroying that part of the NK Army in the area, to shorten the front line, and prov a better base for executing that portion of plan 8–52 which envisions opns across the waist of the peninsula. Such an atk would consider the max use of ROK Ground Forces in its execution. It has distinct advantages in that it would be an addl means of providing pressure for an armistice, would destroy the NK Army elms dir in the line, shorten the line and would exploit the capabilities of the ROKA in its expansion and increasing combat effectiveness.

c. Addl pressure which I strongly advocate in the event of another recess is the unilateral release of some 35,000 North Korean non-repatriate POWs. My reasons and recms for their release were presented verbally to JCS on 6 March by a member of my staff who also left a written statement of my views, dtd 4 March 1953, with the Chairman JCS.⁵ Although realizing difficulties of not releasing Chinese non-repatriates at same time as North Korean non-repatriates first logical step is release of Koreans. Release of Chinese non-repatriates would be held up pending further instructions to me, but pub announcement concerning release of non-repatriate POWs would be worded so that it does not indicate plans for disp of Chinese not believed entirely essential that disp of Chinese be settled at same time as Koreans. Again, based on the timing of these pressures, recm that I be given auth to implement this release program immed after another recess is directed. Implementation would be along the lines set forth in para 4 of my statement of 4 March 1953, referred to above.

Part 3. Under present directives, the actions set forth in Part 2 are the only ones within my capabilities which give promise of applying pressures on the Communists. The only addl pressure which I feel I can exercise with curr forces would entail a change of policy with respect to air opns against tgts in Manchuria and North China. I fully realize the political and mil implications in such a change of policy and make no recms at this time. I merely desire to point out pressures within my mil capabilities.

Part 4. A longer term pressure which can be brought to bear is an all out offensive which might create mil conditions nec to obtain an honorable armistice. My plan 8–52 is under constant revision with respect to concept and force rqmts. Unquestionably force rqmts for an offensive in 1954 would be greater than those contemplated in this plan. To offset this, at least in part, would be the availability of newly created ROK divs. However, an addl related pressure which could be exercised concurrent with another recess would be the announcement of the activation of 4 addl ROK divs, bringing them to the total of 20 divs, provided, of course, prior auth has not been granted for such action. As outlined in ref c such authorization would be helpful under curr conditions and if granted now would under the conditions assumed in this msg, place the Eighth Army in a more fav psn, not only to deter or repel renewed aggression by the Communists, but to launch an offensive.

1. Dated Feb, 7, p. 742.
2. Dated Feb. 19, not printed, but see footnote 1 p. 800.
3. In this telegram, exclusive for Collins, May 12, Clark strongly recommended that he be authorized to implement immediately the 20-division balanced program for the ROK Army, at least on paper, in anticipation of a possible cutback of the ROKA as part of the armistice agreement. (Department of Defense files)
4. Not printed, but see footnote 1 p. 742.
5. See the memorandum of discussion of State-JCS meeting, Mar. 6, p. 806.