Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, May 14, 1953—1:11 p.m.

CX 62413. Refs: ADA [JCS] 938626.² B. CX 62354.³

1. Further study of possible results, should the ques of disposition of non-repatriates be submitted to the political conf, causes me concern as to the working of subparas c and d, para 1, Part 4 of ref B, as approved by ref A. My concern is based on the folg:

a. Para 60 of Draft Armistice Agreement reads in part, (underlining my own⁴) “—The mil Comds of both sides hereby recm to the Governments of the countries concerned on both sides that within 3 months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes eff, a political conf of a higher level of both sides be held—”. This is a recm but there is no obligation on the part of the Governments that it be held in 90 days or ever as far as that is concerned. This recm was intentionally worded innocuously to avoid any commitment of the UN or US to enter into political discussions of the Far Eastern sit.

b. Subpara c, para 1, Part 4 of ref B, now provs for submission of the disposition of POWs to the political conf. The ques could not be submitted to the conf if it had not convened. Subpara d, para 1, Part 4 of ref B, now provs for release to civ status of any remaining nonrepatriates 30 days after the ques has been submitted to the political conf prov it has been unable to reach a decision on the disposition of the pris.

c. The wording of our counter proposal at this time assumes that a political conf will be held within 90 days after the armistice becomes eff. Should few non-repatriates be influenced by the Communists to return to their homelands by the end of the 90 days period of access, I consider it entirely within Communist tactics to intentionally delay the convening of the political conf. Thus the ques as to disposition of any remaining non-repatriates could not be submitted to the conf. This delay would result in keeping the non-repatriates in cust an indefinite length of time.

2. In view of the foregoing possibility I recm that subpara c and d, para 1, Part 4 of ref B, be combined and reworded as fols:

a. C. Change para 12 to: “90 days after the trf [transfer] of cust of POWs to the Custodial Com is completed the ques of the disposition of the PWs who have not availed themselves of their right to be repatriated shall be submitted for settlement to the political conf recm to be convened in para 60, Draft Armistice Agreement prov it has in fact convened. In any event the access of representatives to captured pers as prov for in para 9 above shall terminate 90 days after the Custodial Com had assumed cust of POWs. Further, any POWs who have not availed themselves of the right to be repatriated or whose disposition has not otherwise been determined within the period of 120 days after the com has assumed their cust shall be released to civ status, the com ceasing its functions and being dissolved”.

3. The foregoing wording is based on the assumption that my Government and other UN Governments involved intend to make every effort to convene the political conf within the 90 day period as recm in the Armistice Agreement. I realize that the Communists will immediately assume that we intend to delay the convening of the political conf and probably so charge us. However, if we are forced to our final psn on this issue I believe the effect of such charges can be minimized if in presenting this proposal we show clearly that any other solution could result in indefinite imprisonment of the non-repatriates and that their proposal would, if any “Government of the countries concerned” elected to delay the convening of the political conf, result in the problem remaining unsolved indefinitely.

4. As stated in para 1c the Communists might intentionally delay the convening of the political conf. However, the possibility exists that Communist insistence on turning ultimate disposition of non-repatriates over to the political conf is based in part on their desire to insure that a political conf is convened. It may be advisable to give some assurance to the Communists by means of public statements made at Governmental level to the effect that the UN countries involved consider themselves obligated to convene such a political conf within 3 months after an armistice becomes eff. Such assurance, besides assisting the UNC in refuting possible Commie charges set forth in para 3 above, might be utilized by the delegation to secure Communist agreement to our final psn on disposition of non-repatriates.

5. The recm referred to in para 60 of the Draft Armistice Agreement would be made by CINCUNC to the United States as exec agent for the UN. No info is aval here that indicates the possible composition of the UN delegation at political conf.

1. This telegram was sent to CINCUNC (Adv) Korea, for information.
2. Dated May 11, p. 1006.
3. Dated May 11, p. 999.
4. Printed here as italics.