State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Extract]
. . . . . . .
Korea
General Bradley: I understand you want to take up this draft telegram2 to Briggs and Murphy about what they might say to Rhee. I have not yet had the chance to read it.
Mr. Matthews: We realize that you have had no time to go over this and it is being brought up on short notice, but we thought it might be useful to have a general discussion on it and see what points there were that might need further work.
Admiral Fechteler: That is a pretty far-reaching statement where the President says that if the Koreans are attacked again the U.S. will again respond to the best of its ability.
Mr. Matthews: It is probably a key sentence of the whole draft. I should point out, however, that this is a preliminary draft.
Mr. Johnson: This is not an instruction but is a draft on which comments are asked.
General Bradley: Isn’t paragraph 8, where we talked about taking measures necessary to preserve the security of our forces, pretty blunt?
Mr. Matthews: Our feeling was that maybe we ought to be pretty blunt with Rhee.
Mr. Johnson: He certainly has been pretty blunt with us.
General Bradley: In paragraph 5 it seems to me that the phrase “preside at the liquidation of the ROK Government” might be changed to “the U.S. will not agree to or permit the liquidation of the ROK Government”.
Mr. Matthews: We have had some doubts as to whether this was really enough to persuade Rhee to cooperate with us and we thought we should be thinking as to whether there was anything more beyond this that we might do.
[Page 1026]General Bradley: You did intend to clear this with the Secretary of State and Defense and the President before it was decided on, didn’t you?
Mr. Matthews: Yes.
General Eddleman: We think a new Part 4 should be added along the lines that the proposed message might help persuade Rhee to go along with treating the North Korean POW non-repatriates the same way as the Chinese and asking Clark for his views on the suitability of that as a final position.
Mr. Johnson: I agree that we are in a bad position on the question of the Korean POWs. The Commies have been hammering us on our weakest point and in the last analysis our position just isn’t logical. I agree in principle that this message should be used to try and get Rhee to go along with treatment for the Koreans identical to that for the Chinese.
General Bradley: I think we agree in principle to the content of the message but we should have a chance to get specific comments. Why don’t we turn over the redrafting of the message to our joint team and then we can clear it with both our Secretaries. Since it is a State message I should think General Smith is the one to take it up with the President.
Admiral Fechteler: I again raise the point that the statement that the U.S. would again come to the defense of Korea is a pretty broad commitment, and a commitment that is beyond the purview of the JCS. I am not necessarily opposing it, but I don’t see how we can concur in something that is outside our purview.
General Bradley: I think some language changes should be made of the message to make this a State message and have the State Department recommend to the President that the President make this statement. Can we have the team revise the draft and then circulate it to us.
Request for 3-day recess
General Bradley: There is a message just in from Clark3 which says that unless he receives orders to the contrary, Harrison is at the next meeting going to call for a 3 day recess. Clark feels that the Commies will just use the next few meetings to beat their propaganda drums and that a recess would quiet this down and would at the same time present a chance for consideration of recommendations which Clark says he is making in a following message for bringing negotiations to a head.
Mr. Matthews: What reason would be given for recess?
General Bradley: Clark says Harrison would merely say it was for administrative reasons.
[Page 1027]Mr. Johnson: We are in somewhat a weak position for a recess. The Communists have focused on our stand on the Korean prisoners and we have not yet successfully focused on the central question of some prospect for release of the prisoners. However, a recess would give us a chance to get our position squared away.
General Bradley: I take it then that we should let Clark go ahead with the recess.
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A note on the title page read: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”
General Bradley and Admiral Fechteler attended for the JCS as well as Vice Chief General Twining. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent, Wisner represented the CIA, Gleason the NSC, and General Ruffner the Department of Defense. In all, 24 persons attended. In addition to Korea, Indochina, and the Five-Power Conference, proposed by Churchill before the House of Commons earlier in May, were topics of discussion at this meeting.
↩- Reference was to a draft of the message sent in telegram 713 to Pusan, May 15, p. 1029.↩
- The reference was to telegram C 62442, May 15, p. 1028.↩